THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


Ex  Libris 
C.  K.  OGDEN 


JL 


THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

ITS   PAST,   PRESENT,   AND 
POSSIBLE   FUTURE 


BY 

T.   J.   LAWRENCE,   LL.D.,   J.P. 

MEMBER  OF  THE  INSTITUTE  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  ; 

HONORARY  FELLOW  OF  DOWNING  COLLEGE,  CAMBRIDGE; 

READER  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  BRISTOL; 

RECTOR  OF  UPTON  LOVEL,  WILTS ; 

LATH  LECTURER  ON  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AT  THE  ROYAL  NAVAL  WAR  COLLEGE  ] 

SOMETIME  PROFESSOR  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO; 

AUTHOR  OF  "  PRINCIPLES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW," 

"  WAR  AND  NEUTRALITY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST,"  ETC. 


FIRST  EDITION 


NEW  YORK 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

AMERICAN  BRANCH  :  35  West  32nd  Steeet 
LONDON,  TORONTO,  MELBOURNE.  AND  BOMBAY 

1919 


•jy 


Copyright,  igiq 

by  Oxford  University  Press 

american  branch 


> 


TO 


J.  W.   THOMSON   WALKER,   ESQ.. 
M.B.,  C.M.lEdin.),  F.R.C.S.  (Eng.) 

IN   THANKFUL    REMEMBRANCE    OP   A   GREAT    BENEFIT 

MOST   GENEROUSLY   CONFERRED 

ON    THE    AUTHOR 


PREFACE 

As  Reader  of  International  Law  in  the  University 
of  Bristol  I  have  the  privilege  of  lecturing  there  from 
time  to  time  on  such  subjects  connected  with  the  Jus 
Gentium  as  seem  to  need  elucidation  at  the  moment. 
Happily  I  am  not  condemned  to  adapt  myself  to  the 
requirements  of  an  Examination  Schedule,  but  am  free 
to  dwell  on  what  fills  my  own  mind  and  interests  my 
audience,  without  regard  to  its  value  as  a  winner  of 
marks.  In  the  enjoyment  of  this  freedom  I  gave  six 
lectures  in  the  Autumn  of  19 17  on  The  Society  of 
Nations.  Their  substance  is  reproduced  in  the  pres- 
ent volume,  and  to  a  large  extent  their  wording  also. 
But  I  have  added  a  considerable  amount  of  new  mat- 
ter, and  have  felt  myself  at  liberty  to  introduce  refer- 
ences to  events  that  have  taken  place  since  the  course 
was  concluded.  In  fact,  the  growth  of  opinion  on  the 
great  issues  at  stake  in  the  present  world-conflict  has 
been  so  rapid,  that  in  order  to  keep  pace  with  it  I  have 
had  to  rewrite  entirely  and  lengthen  greatly  the  fifth 
and  sixth  lectures,  which  deal  with  the  much-discussed 
proposal  to  create  a  League  of  Nations.  What  I  said 
in  the  Council  Chamber  of  the  University  of  Bristol  is 
in  the  book,  but  not  exactly  as  I  said  it.  The  lectures 
have  undergone  some  excision  and  much  amplification. 

The  relations  subsisting  between  independent  states, 
and  the  rules  of  conduct  they  should  observe  in  their 
mutual  intercourse,  have  been  till  lately  deemed  by  the 
ordinary  intelligent  citizen  matters  far  beyond  his  ken. 


vi  PREFACE 

He  supposed  they  were  very  difficult  and  obscure,  and 
simply  declined  to  trouble  himself  about  them.  Now, 
under  stress  of  the  miseries  caused  by  the  present  war, 
quite  a  new  attitude  is  taken  up.  There  is  a  tendency 
to  look  seriously  into  these  matters  in  order  to  dis- 
cover remedies  for  the  evils  that  are  threatening 
civilisation  itself  because  of  the  unsatisfactory  nature 
of  inter-state  relations.  Nothing  but  good  can  come 
of  this  awakening,  if  it  is  accompanied  by  some  real 
knowledge  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  prob- 
lems to  be  solved  have  grown  up,  and  the  circum- 
stances that  must  be  reckoned  with  in  any  serious  at- 
tempt at  their  solution. 

In  the  lectures  which  follow  I  have  tried  to  supply 
some  outlines  of  this  knowledge.  They  are  an  attempt 
to  meet  the  needs  of  intelligent  people  who  neither 
possess  nor  wish  to  possess  the  technical  skill  of  the 
historian  or  the  jurist,  but  nevertheless  desire  to  learn 
enough  of  what  has  taken  place  between  states  during 
the  course  of  recorded  history  to  enable  them  to  form 
reasonable  convictions  with  regard  to  the  possibilities 
of  improvement,  and  the  lines  along  which  mankind  may 
advance  towards  it.  I  have  endeavoured  to  show  that 
there  is  a  real  Society  of  Nations,  that  it  grew  up  by  a 
gradual  process  of  evolution  which  can  be  followed 
historically,  and  that  it  was  on  the  point  of  developing 
certain  much  needed  judicial  and  legislative  organs 
when  the  present  war  brought  about  a  crisis  in  its  life, 
and  placed  before  it  the  choice  of  making  a  long  step 
forward  in  the  path  of  progress  or  heading  back 
towards  barbarism  and  misery.  Finally,  I  have  tried 
to  indicate  the  true  line  of  advance  and  the  best  means 


PREFACE  vii 

of  facilitating  the  march  along  it.  My  profound  con- 
viction is  that  the  great  fundamental  factor  in  the 
whole  complicated  problem  is  moral  and  spiritual. 
If  the  nations  are  content  to  go  on  with  their  enmities 
and  jealousies,  their  belief  that  the  foremost  places 
in  the  world,  and  the  largest  share  of  its  material 
and  intellectual  good,  are  the  prize  of  those  who 
can  most  cleverly  outwit  and  most  efficiently  outfight 
their  neighbours,  then  there  is  nothing  left  for  mankind 
but  a  swift  descent  into  the  abyss.  But  if  they  will 
substitute  brotherhood  for  enmity,  and  mutual  service 
for  jealousy,  and  install  justice  instead  of  force  as  the 
ultimate  arbiter  in  their  disputes,  they  may  rid  the 
human  race  of  some  of  its  most  crying  evils,  and  in- 
augurate a  better  epoch  of  peace  and  prosperity. 

In  the  early  stages  of  the  war  I  endeavoured  to  set 
forth  some  of  these  views  in  the  pages  of  Goodwill, 
the  organ  of  the  British  Council  of  the  World  Alliance 
for  promoting  international  friendship  through  the 
Churches;  and  I  am  indebted  to  the  Editor,  the  Rev. 
T.  H.  Rushbrooke,  M.A.,  for  permission  to  use  a  few 
small  portions  of  my  articles  in  the  composition  of  the 
present  lectures.  To  my  lifelong  friend  Dr.  Courtney 
S.  Kenny,  till  lately  Downing  Professor  of  English 
Law  in  the  University  of  Cambridge,  and  to  my  old 
pupil  and  valued  fellow-labourer,  Dr.  A.  Pearce  Hig- 
gins,  the  learned  editor  of  the  last  edition  of  Hall's 
International  Law,  I  tender  my  grateful  thanks  for  in- 
formation which  I  should  with  difficulty,  if  at  all,  have 
obtained  without  their  aid. 

T.  J.  Lawrence. 

Upton  Lovel  Rectory, 

Wiltshire,  England. 
October  ist,  1918. 


ANALYTICAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE 
LECTURES. 

LECTURE  I. 

The  Origin  of  International  Society. 

Distinctions  between  the  nation  and  the  state.  International 
Society  involves 

i.    A  considerable  number  of  states. 

2.  The  existence  in  each  of  ideas  and  standards  sufficiently  alike 

to  enable  them  to  understand  each  other  and  arrange  for 
common  action. 

3.  Territorial  Sovereignty. 

These  essentials  did  not  co-exist  in  the  world  till  the  period  of 
the  Renaissance  and  the  Reformation,  though  long  before  we  can 
discern  a  few  customary  rules  applicable  to  war  between  states  and 
to  what  we  now  call  diplomacy. 

The  code  which  attempts  to  regulate  interstate  relations  derived 
its  rules  originally  from 

Roman  Law 
Canon  Law 
Customs 

Christian    Morality 
It  came  into  being  through  the   work  of  great  writers,  among 
whom  may  be  specially  mentioned 

i.     Francis  Suarez    (1548-1617),  a  Jesuit  theologian. 

2.  Albericus  Gentilis   (1552-1608),  a  Protestant  civilian. 

3.  Hugo   Grotius    (1583-1645),   a    Dutch   Scholar,   Jurist,   Theo- 

logian, Publicist  and  Poet. 

Grotius  has  been  called  the  Father  of  International  Law.  A  brief 
statement  of  what  he  accomplished. 

viii 


OUTLINE  OF  THE  LECTURES  ix 

LECTURE  II. 

The  Growth  of  International  Society. 

International  Society  has  grown  enormously  since  the  time  of 
Grotius,  and  its  leading  members  have  been  distinguished  from  the 
rest  under  the  name  of  Great  Powers.  Its  development  has  led  to  a 
corresponding  development  of  International  Law.  The  chief  means 
whereby  progress  was  made  were 

1.  The  theories  of  the   Philosophical  Jurists — Pufendorf,  Wolff, 

Bynkershoek,  Vattel,  and  others.     Nature  and  her  Law. 

2.  The  succession  of  great  Publicists.    Their  authority. 

3.  The  development  of  Maritime  International   Law  by  Courts. 

4.  The  addition  of  express  consent  to  tacit  consent.    Law-Making 

Treaties. 

LECTURE  III. 
International  Society  as  it  stood  in  July,  1914. 

During  the  last  three  centuries  International  Law  increased  greatly 
in  bulk,  and  a  very  rudimentary  and  imperfect  International  Legis- 
lature came  into  existence  in  the  shape  of  the  Hague  Conferences  of 
1899  and  1907.  When  on  July  31,  1914,  Germany  sent  her  ultimatum 
to  Russia,  the  civilised  world  possessed 

1.  The  beginnings  of  an  Arbitral  Jurisprudence. 

2.  A  rapidly  increasing  "  Statute  Book  of  the  Law  of  Nations." 
Moreover,  attempts  had  been  made,  with  more  or  less  success,  to 

1.  Codify  the  Law  of  War  on  Land  by  means  of  the  Hague 

Reglement. 

2.  Settle  parts  of  the  Law  of  War  at  Sea  by  some  of  the  Hague 

Conventions  of   1907,   the   Declaration   of  London  of   1909, 
and  the  Oxford  Manuel  of  1913. 

3.  Create    an    International    Prize    Court    and    an    International 

Judicial  Arbitration  Court. 
But  the  hopeful  prospect  was  vitiated  by 

1.  The   absence   of  any  general   obligation  to  enforce   accepted 

rules. 

2.  The  rapid  and  enormous  advance  in  the  application  of  science 

to  warfare,  and  the  organisation  of  nations  for  war. 

3.  The  German  doctrine  of  Kriegsraison. 


x  OUTLINE  OF  THE  LECTURES 

LECTURE  IV. 

The   Partial   Overthrow   of   International   Law. 

The  weak  points  referred  to  in  the  previous  lectures  have  been 
accentuated  during  the  present  war  by 

i.     The  blow  to  good  faith  and  the  Obligation  of  Treaties  struck 
by  the  German  attack  on  Belgium. 

2.  The  blow  to  Humanity  and  the  Obligation  of  Law  in  general 

struck  by  German  "  frightfulness." 

3.  The  blow  to  Neutral  Rights  struck  by  the  widespread  applica- 

tion of  the  doctrine  of  Reprisals. 
The  fabric  of  International  Law  has  been  badly  shattered  in  some 
parts,  but  left  standing  in  others.    The  parts  reduced  to  ruin  are 

1.  The  Law  of  War. 

2.  The  Law  of  Neutrality. 
The  parts  but  little  touched  are 

1.  The  Law  of  Jurisdiction. 

2.  The  Law  of  Diplomacy. 

The  downfall  of  a  large  portion  of  a  building  may  weaken  the 
rest.  But  on  the  other  hand  the  desire  of  civilised  humanity,  not  to 
destroy  International  Law,  but  to  improve  and  strengthen  it,  is  shewn 
by  the  fact  that  nearly  the  whole  world  has  armed,  or  is  arming,  in  its 
defence. 


LECTURE  V. 

The  Conditions  of  Reconstruction. 

The  work  of  building  up  the  shattered  edifice  of  International 
Law  concerns  the  whole  of  civilised  humanity.  It  is  rendered  im- 
perative not  only  by  German  "  frightfulness,"  but  also  by  three  recent 
developments, 

i.  The  practical  obliteration  of  the  difference  between  combatants 
and  non-combatants. 

2.  The  creation  of  War  Zones  on  the  high  seas. 

3.  The   introduction  of   aerial   warfare. 

There  are  also  three  other  points  to  be  considered,  the  general 
effect  of  which  is  to  make  a  new  international  order  urgent  as  well 
as  imperative. 


OUTLINE  OF  THE  LECTURES  xi 

i.    The  present  opportunity  is  most  favourable.     If  it  is  allowed 
to  slip   mankind   may  never  have   another. 

2.  The  general  and  express  consent  of  states  is  the  only  possible 

agent  of  immediate  reform. 

3.  The  world  must  be  organized  for  peace  rather  than  for  war, 

and  the  duty  of  helping  to  enforce  International  Law  must 
be   laid   on   all   states. 
The  following  suggestions  are  put  forth  as  to  procedure: 

1.  The  great  Conference  which  meets  to  make  peace  should  de- 

cide on  the  principal  features  of  the  new  World-Order,  and 
then  appoint  an  International  Committee  to  work  out  the 
details  and  another  to  revise  and  codify  International  Law. 

2.  Their  Reports   should   be   submitted  to   a   great  International 

Congress  composed  of  representatives  of  all  civilised  states. 

3.  Without  waiting  for  the  completion  of  this  process  in  all  its 

details  an  international  authority  or  authorities  should  be 
set  up  immediately  to  decide  disputes  which  cannot  be 
settled  by  diplomatic  means. 

LECTURE  VI. 

The  Rebuilding  of  International  Society. 

A  great  change  of  heart  among  the  peoples  is  necessary  before 
a  righteous  international  order  can  be  set  up.  Brotherhood  must 
drive  away  jealousy,  and  mutual  service  must  take  the  place  of 
mutual  ill-will.  The  best  available  means  for  maintaining  peaceful 
relations  and  diminishing  the  frequency  and  the  horrors  of  war  is  the 
establishment  of  a  League  of  Nations  in  which  all  or  most  civilised 
states  shall  bind  themselves  together  for  the  purpose  of  settling  dis- 
putes by  justice  instead  of  force.  To  this  two  fundamental  objections 
are  made. 

1.  It  will   be   fatal  to   state   sovereignty.     A  careful   discussion 

shews  this  has  no  solid  foundation. 

2.  It  will  be  found  impracticable.     This  can  be  met  by  shewing 

that  the  elements  of  the  new  order  exist  already  and   re- 
quire only  development  and  combination. 
But  undoubtedly  these   are  serious  difficulties,   and  they  will   tax 
to   the   full   the   best   mental    and   moral    elements   in    human   nature. 
The   problem   is   at   bottom   spiritual.     The   two   organisations   which 
can  do  the  most  to  solve  it  are  the  Church  and  the  Labour  Movement. 


THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

LECTURE  I. 
THE  ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY. 

Before  I  begin  to  deal  with  the  subject-matter  of 
these  lectures  it  seems  desirable  to  make  clear  that  the 
responsibility  for  the  statements  and  arguments  they 
contain  is  mine  alone.  The  University  of  Bristol  has 
arranged  for  their  delivery;  but  its  corporate  action 
goes  no  further.  It  must  not  be  held  bound  by  my 
assertions,  still  less  by  the  conclusions  I  draw  from 
them.  Most  of  my  facts  are  the  common  property  of 
all  students  who  have  investigated  the  history  of  inter- 
national relations.  My  views  are,  I  believe,  shared  by 
a  rapidly  increasing  number  of  thoughtful  people;  but 
the  responsibility  for  their  utterance  on  the  present 
occasion  rests  on  no  shoulders  but  my  own. 

This  afternoon  I  am  to  speak  about  the  origin  of  the 
Society  of  Nations.  The  average  human  being  takes 
such  a  Society  for  granted,  pretty  much  as  he  takes  for 
granted  families,  governments,  laws  and  tribunals.  Yet 
all  these  owe  their  existence  in  their  present  shape  to  a 
long  process  of  gradual  development;  and  this  is  true 


2  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

of  the  Society  of  Nations  also.  There  was  a  time  when 
it  was  not.  And  when  it  came  into  existence  it  did  not 
take  at  first,  or  indeed  for  generations  afterwards,  the 
form  we  knew  before  the  World-War  complicated  or 
upset  our  previous  notions.  Moreover  in  its  case  we 
have  to  face  the  additional  complication  that  the  name 
does  not  properly  fit  the  thing  it  is  used  to  denote.  If 
we  were  strictly  accurate  we  should  speak  of  the  Society 
of  States,  not  the  Society  of  Nations.  The  usual  phrase 
has  obtained  such  a  hold  that  we  cannot  avoid  using 
it;  but  a  little  consideration  will  shew  that  it  is  unscien- 
tific and  incorrect. 

Nations  are  aggregations  of  individuals  bound  to- 
gether by  ties  of  common  blood,  common  language, 
common  history,  common  institutions,  common  religion, 
and  a  common  way  of  looking  at  life  and  society.  One 
or  more  of  these  characteristics  may  be  wanting,  and 
yet  the  rest  may  be  sufficiently  strong  to  create  a  bond 
between  those  who  possess  them  much  closer  than  any 
that  unites  them  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  Swiss, 
for  instance,  have  neither  a  common  religious  faith  nor 
a  common  tongue.  But  the  ties  of  political  free- 
dom, historical  association  and  geographical  con- 
tiguity are  so  strong  that  no  one  in  or  out  of  Switzer- 
land doubts  for  a  moment  the  existence  of  a  Swiss 
nation.  Yet  a  nation  is  not  necessarily  a  political  unit, 
nor  need  it,  or  any  part  of  it,  be  ruled  by  its  own  people. 
The  Poles  are  split  up  into  three  great  divisions  no  one 
of  which  is  under  distinctly  Polish  government.  There 
is  a  German  Poland,  a  Russian  Poland,  and  an  Austrian 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY       3 

Poland,  but  there  is  nowhere  a  Polish  Poland.1  On  the 
other  hand  the  Italian  people  live,  as  regards  by  far 
the  greatest  number  of  them,  under  rulers  of  their 
own  race  and  their  own  choosing;  but  there  is  still  on 
the  borders  of  Italy  an  Italia  Irridenta  under  Austrian 
domination.1  Sometimes,  as  in  the  instances  we  have 
just  been  considering,  the  great  bulk,  of  a  nation  dwell 
together  on  a  given  portion  of  the  earth's  surface, 
which  is  peopled  mainly,  if  not  exclusively,  by  them. 
But  there  are  cases  where  two  or  more  nations  are  in- 
extricably mingled  in  the  same  territory.  Of  certain 
districts  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  it  is  impossible  to  say 
that  they  are  Greek  or  Bulgarian  or  Slav.  They  are 
all  three  in  varying  proportions,  and  the  question  which 
race  is  in  a  majority  in  any  given  place  is  often  fiercely 
disputed,  and  proves  in  practice  almost  impossible  of 
solution,  owing  to  the  feuds  and  subterfuges  of  the 
inhabitants.  In  such  circumstances  it  is  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  make  the  nations  concerned  into  separate 
self-governing  units.  And  though  the  principle  of 
nationality  asserts  that,  wherever  possible.,  this  should 
be  done,  even  at  the  cost  of  much  regrouping  of  peoples 
and  rearrangement  of  political  boundaries,  yet  those 
who  have  adopted  it  as  a  working  rule  would  be  the 
last  to  assert  that  it  can  be  applied  universally. 

We  have  seen  that  a  nation  is  a  group  based  on  unity 
of  sentiment  or  unity  of  blood,  or  both.  On  the  other 
hand  a  state  is  a  group  based  on  unity  of  government. 

1  In  the  interval  between  the  writing  and  the  printing  of  these 
sentences  they  have  happily  lost  their  original  accuracy. 


4  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

When  the  two  groups  coincide,  there  is  more  prospect 
of  stability  and  happiness  than  under  any  other  political 
conditions.  But  when  it  is  a  question  of  regulating 
the  relations  between  the  various  bodies  into  which 
mankind  are  divided  for  purposes  of  internal  order 
and  external  security,  it  is  the  state  rather  than  the 
nation  that  must  be  considered.  Imagine  an  attempt 
to  send  an  Ambassador  to  the  Jews.  Where  is  he  to 
go?  To  whom  is  he  to  be  accredited?  Who  has  power 
to  bind  the  Jewish  nation  to  any  agreement  he  may  en- 
deavour to  negotiate  ?  The  same  questions  may  be  put, 
with  the  same  impossibility  of  obtaining  an  answer,  in 
respect  of  any  nation  which  is  not  a  state  also,  that  is  to 
say  a  group  of  people  settled  on  a  given  portion  of  the 
earth's  surface,  and  organised  for  purposes  of  govern- 
ment under  rulers  who  have  authority  to  speak  for  the 
whole  body-politic  in  its  dealings  with  other  groups  of 
the  same  nature.  The  intercourse  of  these  groups  is 
interstate  intercourse.  The  society  they  form  is  a  So- 
ciety of  States,  not  a  Society  of  Nations.  The  rules 
they  observe  in  their  mutual  relations  are  Interstate 
Law,  not  International  Law. 

It  is  necessary  to  remember  this  always,  though  we 
cannot  now  alter  the  nomenclature  that  has  been  in  use 
for  generations.  But  we  ought  to  use  it  with  the  mental 
reservation  that  it  signifies  something  which  may  or 
may  not  be  identical  with  what  it  says.  We  are  dealing 
to-day,  and  throughout  this  course,  with  states.  And 
though  probably  all  of  us  believe  that  in  an  ideal  world 
states   would    invariably    coincide    with    nations,    we 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY       5 

know  that  at  present  instances  to  the  contrary  abound. 
There  are  many  states  that  are  not  nations  and  many 
nations  that  are  not  states.  And  though  one  result  of 
the  present  World-War  will  almost  certainly  be  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  Nation  States,  we  cannot  sup- 
pose that  it  will  blot  out  from  the  map  all  the  states 
that  are  bundles  of  nationalities,  or  unite  the  severed 
parts  of  all  nations  that  are  now  divided  among  two  or 
more  states.  A  completely  satisfactory  adjustment  of 
the  relations  between  state  and  nation  cannot  take 
place  till  many  difficult  problems  connected  with  Fed- 
eral Government  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  control  and 
development  of  backward  races  on  the  other,  have  been 
solved.  I  have  no  intention  of  discussing  them  now. 
But  I  do  want  to  make  it  quite  plain  that  at  present  we 
have  no  right  to  think  of  nations  as  the  units  of  what 
we  cannot  escape  from  calling  international  society.  In 
discussing  this  society,  and  the  laws  which  do  regulate, 
or  ought  to  regulate,  its  affairs,  we  are  dealing  with 
states.  We  must  use  the  old  terms;  but  if  we  are  to 
think  clearly  we  must  use  them  with  the  reservations 
I  have  insisted  on. 

Having  dealt  with  this  preliminary  point,  we 
can  now  go  on  to  consider  the  conditions  that  must  be 
satisfied  before  any  real  Society  of  Nations  can  exist 
and  flourish.  First,  it  is  clear  that  a  Society  implies 
members.  If  all  the  world  were  one  great  state,  there 
could  not  be  a  Society  of  States.  This  was  exactly  what 
occurred  throughout  the  long  centuries  during  which 
the  dominion  of  the  Roman  Caesars  extended  over  all, 


6  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

or  very  nearly  all,  the  civilised  peoples  of  the  earth. 
The  existence  of  a  common  superior  prevented  the 
growth  of  separate  and  independent  political  units. 
States  as  we  understand  them  could  not,  and  did  not, 
exist.  Now  the  area  of  civilisation  is  far  wider  than  it 
was  in  the  palmiest  days  of  ancient  Rome.  But  it  is 
broken  up  into  a  number  of  commonwealths,  great  and 
small,  each  of  which  acknowledges  no  earthly  superior. 
These  are  constantly  brought  into  relationship  with 
each  other,  and  form  what  is  sometimes  called  the 
Family  of  Nations  and  sometimes  the  Society  of  Na- 
tions. Unless  they  existed  together,  and  in  constant 
contact  with  one  another,  International  Law  and  all 
that  it  implies  would  be  impossible.  There  can  be  no 
body  of  rules  to  regulate  mutual  relations  when  there 
is  no  society  and  no  intercourse,  and  consequently  no 
relations  to  be  regulated. 

Secondly,  it  is  necessary  that  among  the  members  of 
a  society  there  should  be  some  community  of  thought 
and  aspiration,  though  it  is,  of  course,  highly  desirable 
that  a  certain  variety  of  outlook  should  exist  as  well. 
But  if  ideals  and  standards  are  so  different  that  the 
members  practically  fail  to  understand  each  other,  they 
are  quite  unable  to  work  together,  and  it  is  impossible 
for  them  to  unite  for  the  accomplishment  of  common 
purposes.  I  remember  once  declining  to  join  an  asso- 
ciation of  clergy  formed  to  go  together  in  groups  on 
foreign  tours.  My  reason  was  that  a  healthy  admix- 
ture of  the  lay  element  was  necessary  in  order  to 
obtain  in  full  measure  the  recreation,  refreshment  and 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     7 

instruction  we  expect  from  travel  abroad.  I  still  think. 
I  was  right;  but  if  in  my  ardour  for  variety  of  view  I 
had  taken  the  extreme  course  of  joining  a  club  of 
Publicans  and  Bar-tenders  on  a  Whitsuntide  excursion, 
I  should  probably  have  felt  so  isolated  and  uncomfor- 
table that  before  long  I  should  have  deeply  regretted 
my  leap  from  the  clerical  frying-pan  into  the  Liquor 
Trade  fire!  A  certain  amount  of  community  of  interest 
is  requisite  for  the  welfare,  and  even  the  existence,  of 
all  societies.  Exactly  how  much  of  it  is  essential  no 
wise  man  will  venture  to  define.  But  we  can  at  any 
rate  declare  that  social  life  is  impossible  when  people 
live  on  such  different  planes  of  thought  that  they  are 
altogether  incapable  of  seeing  and  understanding  each 
other's  points  of  view. 

All  this  applies  in  large  measure  to  states  as  well 
as  to  individuals.  The  ideas  of  the  most  reactionary 
government  in  Europe  would  appear  like  enlightenment 
itself  when  compared  with  those  of  a  cattle-stealing, 
man-slaying,  witchcraft-loving  Central  African  poten- 
tate. The  manners  and  customs,  standards  and  ideals, 
of  Seven  Dials  or  Montmartre  would  be  deemed  fas- 
tidious and  impossible  by  the  dwarfs  of  the  Upper 
Congo  or  the  Black-Fellows  of  Central  Australia.  Such 
peoples  and  rulers  as  these  could  not  be  received  into 
the  Family  of  Nations.  But  when  communities  are 
sufficiently  civilised  to  render  it  possible  for  their  en- 
voys to  meet  on  something  like  equal  terms  with  those 
of  European  and  American  states,  to  honour  the  en- 
gagements entered  into  by  their  representatives,  and  to 


8  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

treat  with  substantial  justice  subjects  of  other  powers 
resident  among  them,  then  they  can  be  received  into 
international  society  without  danger  to  its  future.  They 
may  not  at  first  wield  any  considerable  influence.  They 
may  indeed  find  their  privileges  somewhat  curtailed  in 
comparison  with  those  of  older  members,  as  is  the  case 
with  several  Oriental  realms  who  are  not  allowed  full 
rights  of  jurisdiction  over  subjects  of  Western  states 
resident  within  their  borders.  But  on  the  whole  it  is 
better  for  them,  and  for  the  rest  of  the  world,  to  admit 
them  than  to  keep  them  outside.  International  Law, 
as  we  shall  soon  see,  sprang  up  among  a  group  of 
powers  which  had  been  for  centuries  under  the  influ- 
ence of  Christianity;  and  at  one  time  there  was  a  tend- 
ency to  assert  that  it  was  peculiar  to  Christian  states. 
But  this  position  became  impossible  with  the  formal 
admission  of  the  Mahometan  state  of  Turkey  into  the 
Society  of  Nations  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1856.  At 
the  Hague  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907  five  non- 
Christian  countries — Turkey,  Persia,  Siam,  China  and 
Japan — were  seated  at  the  International  Council 
Board.  By  the  latter  date  one  of  them,  Japan,  had  won 
for  herself  a  position  among  the  Great  World- 
Powers  to  whom  the  political  leadership  of  civilised 
humanity  is  tacitly  conceded.  The  other  four  were  still 
deprived  of  full  territorial  jurisdiction  over  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Western  States  resident  in  their  dominions. 
In  other  respects  they  are  full  subjects  of  International 
Law,  possessed  of  all  the  rights  it  confers,  and  subject 
to  all  the  obligations  it  imposes.    In  the  modern  world 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY       9 

civilisation  rather  than  religion  has  been  the  passport 
of  admission  into  the  Society  of  Nations.  Whenever  a 
state  has  been  found  willing  to  shape  its  international 
action  according  to  the  ideas  developed  originally  in 
Europe  and  put  in  practice  first  among  European  coun- 
tries, it  has  been  received  by  the  old-established  mem- 
bers of  the  international  family  with  a  welcome 
corresponding  in  cordiality  to  the  completeness  of  its 
approximation  to  their  standards. 

In  the  third  place  it  is  obvious  from  what  has  just 
been  set  forth  that  states  are  regarded  as  possessors  of 
a  definite  portion  of  the  earth's  surface.  In  fact  the 
conception  of  territorial  sovereignty  is  essential.  There 
could  be  no  Society  of  Nations,  and  no  International 
Law,  without  it.  Nomadic  tribes  wandering  over  a 
continent,  in  one  place  to-day  and  hundreds  of  miles 
away  in  six  months'  time,  could  not  develop  among 
themselves  any  system  of  regular  communication,  or 
establish  mutual  rights,  duties  and  services.  They 
might  now  and  again  meet  and  fight.  Now  and  again 
two  or  three  of  them  might  arrange  some  isolated  trans- 
action, such  as  an  exchange  of  goods  or  captives,  or  an 
alliance  for  a  foray.  But  anything  worthy  of  the  name 
of  Society  would  be  impossible.  Communities  must 
settle  down  on  the  land  before  they  can  maintain  with 
one  another  regular  and  continuous  intercourse. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  that  no  real 
International  Law  is  possible  unless  a  considerable 
number  of  states,  imbued  with  similar  ideas  as  to 
society  and  government,  exist  together  in  a  world  which 


io  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

recognises  that  dominion  over  a  certain  portion  of  the 
earth's  surface  is  an  essential  attribute  of  statehood. 
Simple  as  these  conditions  appear  to  us  they  were  not 
satisfied  till  a  comparatively  modern  epoch  in  the  his- 
tory of  mankind.  There  was  indeed  in  ancient  Greece 
some  approach  to  a  very  rudimentary  International 
code.  The  little  City-States  into  which  the  Greek 
world  was  divided  recognised  that  in  virtue  of  their 
common  Hellenic  descent  there  was  something  special 
between  them  in  the  way  of  mutual  rights  and  duties. 
This  feeling  survived  the  terrible  severities  of  their 
warfare  and  the  frequent  lapses  into  piracy  of  some  of 
their  communities.  It  decreed  that  the  persons  of 
heralds  and  envoys  were  sacred.  Truces  and  treaties 
it  deemed  inviolable.  Burial  was  granted  to  the  dead 
who  fell  on  the  battlefield;  and  the  living  were  held 
entitled  to  freedom  from  molestation  when  travelling 
to  and  from  the  chief  seats  of  Hellenic  worship.  But, 
as  Dr.  T.  A.  Walker  has  well  observed,  "  The  Inter- 
national Law  of  such  a  people  could  hardly,  it  is  clear, 
be  more  than  an  inter-municipal  law."  x  Such  in  fact  it 
was;  and  the  group  of  municipalities  among  which  it 
held  a  somewhat  uncertain  sway  was  small  when  com- 
pared with  the  great  world  outside.  As  to  the  non- 
Hellenic,  the  so-called  Barbarian  peoples,  a  still  more 
elementary  and  still  less  rigidly  observed  law  was 
recognised  as  applicable  to  them.  But  its  obligation 
was  derived  more  from  the  general  feeling  as  to  what 
was  fitting  and  honourable  than  from  any  notion  that 

'  History  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  Vol.  I,  p.  38. 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     1 1 

Barbarian   peoples    had,    or   could   have,    any    rights 
against  Greek  states. 

Soon  "  the  glory  that  was  Greece  "  faded  from  the 
earth,  and  was  followed  by  the  dominion  of  all-conquer- 
ing Rome.  Her  Empire  in  its  palmy  days  almost 
covered  the  civilised  world.  Without  were  Chimeras 
dire,  and  naked  savages,  and  dim  realms  hidden  away 
beyond  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  and  in  the  mysterious 
recesses  of  the  farthest  East.  Within  were  not  only 
individual  subjects  dependent  in  all  things  on  Roman 
Law  and  Roman  magistrates,  but  also  kingdoms,  dis- 
tricts, cities,  retaining  greater  or  less  powers  of  self- 
government.  Disputes  between  them,  or  between  their 
subjects  and  themselves,  were  referred  to  Caesar,  where 
he  sat  in  the  Eternal  City  surrounded  by  his  Jurists, 
his  Generals  and  his  Statesmen.  He  was  supreme 
judge  as  well  as  supreme  law-giver,  and,  as  such,  dealt 
with  subject  rulers  and  commonwealths  as  well  as  pri- 
vate citizens.  Before  long  civilised  mankind,  general- 
ising from  its  own  experience,  developed  the  idea  of 
universal  sovereignty,  and  held  that  there  was,  and 
ought  to  be,  a  power  above  all  other  powers,  which 
should  in  the  last  resort  not  only  dictate  its  will  to  all 
its  immediate  subjects,  but  also  control  the  actions  of 
subordinate  rulers.  "  It  is  better,"  said  Augustus  of 
the  terrible  founder  of  the  Herodian  line,  "  to  be  his 
pig  than  his  son."  But  his  own  permission  had  to  be 
given  before  even  Herod  the  Great  could  execute  a 
prince  of  the  royal  house.  By  means  of  this  supreme 
authority  the  fairest  and  most  fertile  portions  of  the 


iz  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

earth's  surface  were  kept  at  peace  for  many  genera- 
tions; and  so  great  was  the  boon  thus  given  to  men  that 
they  saw  nothing  incongruous  in  the  worship  of  the 
Emperor,  who  summed  up  in  his  own  person  the  glory 
and  majesty  of  a  rule  which  gave  security  to  a  grateful 
world. 

In  time  Christian  influences  prevailed,  and  Caesar 
was  no  longer  deified.  But  the  triumph  of  the  Cross 
did  much  more  than  abolish  sacrifices  to  dead  Em- 
perors. It  profoundly  modified  fundamental  political 
conceptions.  Early  in  the  fourth  century  Constantine 
the  Great  made  Christianity  into  the  official  religion 
of  the  Empire;  and  though  the  Church  lost  in  conse- 
quence much  of  its  pristine  zeal  and  purity,  it  gradually 
influenced  current  nations  of  government  and  social 
order  by  a  long  process  of  peaceful  penetration.  The 
idea  of  universal  sovereignty  was  not  weakened  there- 
by but  received  fresh  vigour  instead.  The  fall  of  the 
Roman  Empire  of  the  West  failed  to  destroy  it;  and 
a  new  life  descended  upon  it  when  Charlemagne  re- 
established the  Empire  under  ecclesiastical  auspices, 
and  was  crowned  by  the  Pope  in  the  Basilica  of  St. 
Peter  at  Rome  on  Christmas  Day,  A.D.  800,  amid  the 
acclamations  of  the  people,  who  hailed  the  Frankish 
hero  as  Augustus  and  Imperator. 

This  daring  and  fruitful  deed  changed  the  face  of 
history,  and  rendered  possible  the  mediaeval  theory  of 
one  great  Christendom,  the  Kingdom  of  God  on  earth, 
governed  in  temporal  matters  by  the  head  of  the  re- 
vived or  Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  in  spiritual  matters 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     13 

by  the  Pope  as  head  of  the  Western  Church,  which 
claimed  to  be  at  once  Catholic  and  Roman.  And  as 
there  were  two  potentates,  so  there  were  two  swords, 
the  temporal  wielded  by  the  Emperor,  the  spiritual  by 
the  Pope.  Each  was  granted  by  God  for  the  due 
governance  of  His  baptised  people.  They  formed  the 
great  World-State,  the  one  vast  realm  over  which  He 
ruled  supreme  through  His  two  lieutenants.  Pope  and 
Emperor,  it  was  held,  exercised  authority  by  divine  de- 
cree. They  were  to  walk  together  in  righteousness, 
each  attending  to  his  allotted  sphere,  for  the  good  of 
Christ's  people  and  the  enlargement  of  His  Kingdom 
on  earth.  But  practice  soon  fell  far  short  of  theory, 
and  before  long  the  usual  relation  between  the  two 
Vicegerents  of  the  Almighty  was  that  of  open  or 
veiled  hostility.  Mediaeval  history  is  full  of  their 
quarrels,  and  mediaeval  literature  of  the  controversies 
of  their  partisans.  In  the  heat  of  the  conflict  the  no- 
tion of  co-operation  on  equal  terms  tended  to  vanish; 
and  each  side  claimed  supremacy  for  its  chief.  But  for 
ages  neither  imperialist  nor  papalist  denied  that  uni- 
versal sovereignty  must  somewhere  be  found  if  right 
were  done  in  the  sphere  of  government. 

At  last  facts  grew  too  strong  for  theories  that  had 
long  ceased  to  be  inductions  from  them.  On  a  world  in 
which  the  power  of  the  Emperor  had  for  ages  been  of 
little  account  outside  Germany  and  the  hereditary  pos- 
sessions of  the  House  of  Hapsburg  the  storm  of  the 
Reformation  burst,  shattering  Papal  authority  over 
half  Europe  far  more  completely  than  Imperial  au- 


i4  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

thority  had  been  destroyed  by  a  slow  process  of  decay. 
At  the  same  time  the  revival  of  learning  revealed  again 
the  independent  political  life  of  ancient  Greece,  and 
created  a  spirit  which  strove  for  the  emancipation  of 
the  human  mind  from  the  shackles  of  authority.  The 
Reformation  and  the  Renaissance  together  destroyed 
the  idea  of  a  common  superior  over  states. 

The  removal  of  the  old  restraining  influences  not 
only  dispersed  much  moral  and  intellectual  fog,  but 
let  loose  at  first  some  of  the  worst  elements  in  human 
nature.  Statecraft  became  more  unscrupulous  and  war 
more  cruel.  As  usual  the  intellectual  need  of  justifying 
evil  practice  led  to  evil  theory,  and  evil  theory  led  in 
turn  to  a  vast  increase  of  evil  practice.  Machiavelli, 
the  astute  Florentine  statesman,  separated  statecraft 
from  other  portions  of  human  conduct,  and  divorced  it 
entirely  from  ordinary  morality.  His  famous  work 
The  Prince,  published  early  in  the  sixteenth  century, 
would  never  have  been  written  had  not  courts  and 
camps  been  full  of  anarchial  speculations  and  outra- 
geous acts  of  perfidy  and  cruelty.  But  its  great  influence 
and  popularity  vastly  increased  the  tendency  towards 
lawlessness  in  international  transactions.  It  taught  that 
the  business  of  a  Prince  or  ruler  is  first  and  foremost 
to  maintain  his  authority  and  if  possible  increase  his 
dominions.  Accordingly  he  is  "  to  have  no  other  de- 
sign, nor  thought,  nor  study,  but  war  and  the  arts  and 
disciplines  of  it,  for  indeed  that  is  the  only  profession 
worthy  of  a  Prince,  and  is  of  so  much  importance  that 
it  not  only  preserves  those  that  are  born  Princes  in 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     1 5 

their  patrimonies,  but  advances  men  of  private  condi- 
tion to  that  honourable  degree."  1  He  is  "  to  learn  to 
be  good  or  otherwise  according  to  the  exigence  of  his 
affairs  .  .  .  for  if  we  consider  things  impartially  we 
shall  find  some  things  in  appearance  are  virtuous,  and 
yet,  if  pursued  would  bring  certain  destruction;  and 
others  on  the  contrary  are  seemingly  bad,  which,  if 
followed  by  a  Prince,  procure  his  peace  and  security."  2 
As  to  humanity,  "  he  is  not  to  regard  the  scandal  of 
being  cruel,  if  thereby  he  keeps  his  subjects  in  their 
allegiance  and  united," 3  while  as  to  good  faith  he 
"  neither  can  nor  ought  to  keep  his  word  when  to  keep 
it  is  hurtful,  and  the  causes  which  led  him  to  pledge  it 
are  removed."  4 

Nicolo  Machiavelli  banished  morality  from  state- 
craft, and  the  rough  fighting-men  among  his  disciples 
banished  it  from  war.  In  neither  sphere  had  it  ob- 
tained more  than  a  precarious  foothold;  but  things 
were  sadly  worsened  when  it  disappeared  altogether. 
The  evil  culminated  a  century  or  more  after  the  death 
of  its  chief  contriver  in  the  terrible  Thirty  Years'  War. 
I  have  given  in  another  place  a  brief  account  of  the 
horrors  of  that  awful  time,  and  from  it  I  venture  now 
to  take  a  few  descriptive  sentences.  "  Famine  and 
pestilence  followed  in  the  wake  of  the  armies.  There 
was  no  pity,  no  reverence,  no  devotion.  Wolfish 
ferocity,  blasphemous  impiety,  unbridled  lust,  bore 
sway  over  the  words  and  deeds  of  men.     Whole  dis- 

1  The  Prince,  Ch.  XIV.  8  Ibid.,  Ch.  XVII. 

1  Ibid.,  Ch.  XV.  ■  Ibid.,  Ch.  XVIII. 


1 6  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

tricts  went  out  of  cultivation,  and  were  restored  to 
forest  and  wilderness.  The  wretched  inhabitants,  such 
of  them  as  were  left  alive,  formed  predatory  bands,  and 
lived  by  robbery.  Often  the  gibbets  were  deprived  of 
their  ghastly  load  to  satisfy  the  pangs  of  hunger. 
But  cannibalism  was  frequently  preceded  by  murder. 
Human  beings,  turned  by  misery  into  wild  beasts, 
rivalled  the  beasts  in  ferocity  and  foulness.  Greed 
was  rampant,  and  nothing  was  secure  from  the  spoiler. 
Even  the  abodes  of  the  dead  were  ransacked  in  the 
search  for  treasure,  and  the  mouldering  bodies  thrown 
out  to  the  kites  and  the  wolves.  Men  gloried  in  their 
wickedness.  They  chanted  litanies  of  the  devil,  they 
sang  songs  in  praise  of  lust  and  torture,  they  raged 
with  special  fury  against  churches,  priests  and  pastors. 
In  the  remote  country  districts  religion  died;  and  learn- 
ing perished  from  the  Universities."  x  At  the  end  of 
the  struggle  in  1648  whole  provinces  were  depopulated; 
and  even  at  the  beginning  Hugo  Grotius,  the  great 
father  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  was  impelled  to  write  the 
oft-quoted  words,  "  I  saw  prevailing  throughout  the 
Christian  world  a  licence  in  making  war  of  which  even 
barbarous  nations  would  have  been  ashamed,  recourse 
being  had  to  arms  for  slight  reasons  and  no  reason; 
and  when  arms  were  once  taken  up  all  reverence  for 
human  and  divine  law  was  thrown  away,  just  as  if  men 
were  henceforth  authorised  to  commit  all  crimes  with- 
out restraint."  2 

1  Lawrence,  Essays,  p.  181. 

2  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pacts,  Prolegomena,  §  28. 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     17 

Into  such  a  world  as  this  modern  International  Law 
was  born.  Blood-stained  and  dishonourable  as  were 
its  surroundings,  in  some  respects  the  times  were 
favourable.  The  disappearance  of  the  notion  of  a 
common  superior  ruling  over  one  great  composite 
Christian  realm  left  the  field  clear  for  the  idea  of  a 
Society  of  independent  states.  The  theory  that  sov- 
ereignty was  not  universal  but  territorial,  due  probably 
at  first  to  feudalism  but  destined  to  survive  its  origin, 
gave  a  legal  basis  to  the  claims  of  Kings  and  other 
potentates.  For  were  they  not  as  against  each  other 
proprietors  of  the  lands  they  governed  and  was  not 
supreme  rule  associated  with  ownership  of  a  portion  of 
the  earth's  surface?  Above  all  the  crying  need  of 
something  to  take  the  place  of  the  old  discarded  re- 
straints and  save  the  world  from  moral  anarchy  dis- 
posed men  to  try  new  projects,  if  only  they  promised  to 
curb  the  unbridled  ambitions  of  princes,  and  the  fero- 
cious cruelty  of  armies.  Thus  it  was  that  we  got  back 
again  in  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  to  a 
Society  of  Nations,  but  a  Society  very  different  from 
the  group  of  City-States  we  saw  in  ancient  Greece.  It 
was  a  Society  permeated  through  and  through  by 
Christian  influences  and  endowed  with  a  great  heritage 
of  Greek  Philosophy  and  Roman  Law.  Moreover, 
though  it  was  cruel  and  barbarous  in  many  of  its  usages, 
it  arose  among  peoples  accustomed  for  centuries  to 
the  idea  that  order  and  government  were  normal  in- 
cidents of  human  life.  The  modern  state,  with  no 
earthly  authority  over  it,  had  arrived.     How  was  it 


1 8  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

to  act  when  faced  by  its  fellows  on  the  world-stage 
opening  out  before  them? 

Before  we  attempt  to  answer  this  question  it  will  be 
worth  while  to  pause  a  moment  and  consider  whether 
progressive  Christian  civilisation  is  not  in  as  great 
danger  now  as  it  was  in  the  days  of  Tilly,  and  Mans- 
feld,  and  Wallenstein,  and  Christian  of  Brunswick.  We 
have  just  described  the  result  of  the  principles  of 
Machiavelli  applied  in  the  field  as  well  as  in  the 
cabinet.  Surely  a  similar  cause  is  producing  similar  ef- 
fects at  the  present  time.  The  seed  has  been  sown  far 
more  diligently  in  Germany  than  anywhere  else;1  but 
the  harvest  is  being  garnered  all  over  the  world.  The 
historical  theories  of  Treitschke,  with  his  worship  of 
power  stored  up  in  the  autocratic  state,  the  sociological 
theories  of  Bernhardi,  with  his  loudly  proclaimed  be- 
lief in  the  necessity  and  inherent  nobility  of  war,  have 
not  even  the  merit  of  originality.  They  are  merely 
disguised  Machiavellianism,  with  a  dash  of  imperfectly 
understood  Biology  thrown  in.  And  they  are  rapidly 
repeating  in  the  world  the  evil  work  that  was  done  by 
their  predecessors  three  hundred  years  ago.  On  the 
German  side  in  the  present  war  bad  faith  has  again 
been  justified  by  state  necessity.  Great  International 
Treatieshave  been  torn  asunder  as  mere  scraps  of  paper 
whenever  it  is  deemed  that  state  policy  can  be  furthered 
thereby  or  military  advantages  secured.  Further  we 
have  seen  a  terrible  recrudescence  of  inhuman  barbari- 
ties  as   far   as   the   incidents   of   actual   warfare    are 

1  F.  Von  Hugel,  The  German  Soul,  pp.  132-145. 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     19 

concerned.  We  have  no£  yet  perhaps  got  so  far  as 
cannibalism,  though  even  with  regard  to  this  crowning 
horror  it  would  not  be  wise  to  hazard  a  too  emphatic 
negative,  seeing  that  in  Poland,  and  Serbia,  and  Ar- 
menia, people  are  known  to  have  perished  in  thousands 
of  hunger,  and  in  such  a  dire  strait  human  nature  may 
sometimes  revert  to  primitive  ferocity.  But  undoubt- 
edly German  troops  have  of  set  purpose,  and  not  in 
fits  of  temporary  madness,  desecrated  graves,  violated 
women,  and  mutilated  children.  Unarmed  civilians 
have  been  used  as  screens  for  advancing  columns. 
Food  supplies  have  been  torn  from  starving  popula- 
tions. Prisoners  of  war  have  perished  by  thousands  of 
privation,  and  many  more  have  been  done  to  death  by 
persistent  and  calculated  cruelty.  In  some  districts  men 
and  women  have  been  taken  from  their  homes  by  Ger- 
man invaders,  and  made  to  labour  on  military  works 
devised  for  the  destruction  of  their  own  countrymen. 
This  is  little  better  than  a  return  to  the  slavery  which 
was  of  old  the  fate  of  the  inhabitants  of  conquered 
territory.  And  Teutonic  ingenuity  is  equal  to  the  task 
of  devising  new  barbarities  as  well  as  reviving  old  ones. 
It  has  taken  the  triumphs  of  modern  science,  and  pros- 
tituted them  to  the  service  of  unsoldierly  brutality. 
New  gases  have  been  invented  to  kill  the  enemy  whole- 
sale by  slow  torture,  new  chemical  compounds  to  burn 
him  to  death.  Not  long  before  the  war  man  achieved 
the  conquest  of  the  air,  and  the  first  use  to  which  Ger- 
many put  this  fresh  victory  of  the  human  mind  was  to 
rain  down  explosive  bombs  and  fire-raising  projectiles 


20  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

on  the  civilian  population  of  enemy  cities,  and  even  on 
dressing  stations  and  hospitals.  At  much  the  same  time 
the  discovery  was  made  that  the  depths  of  the  sea  could 
be  safely  traversed  by  craft  specially  constructed  for 
the  purpose.  Immediately  German  submarines  at- 
tacked enemy  merchantmen  as  well  as  enemy  warships, 
and  sometimes  sent  to  the  bottom  without  warning  the 
unarmed  voyagers  upon  them.  In  several  conspicuous 
instances  helpless  women  and  children  were  thus  de- 
stroyed, either  at  once  by  drowning  or,  after  long 
hours  of  exposure  in  open  boats,  by  cold  and  exhaus- 
tion. But  such  horrors  were  only  a  beginning.  Worse 
followed  afterwards.  In  certain  wide  stretches  of 
water  neutral  vessels  were  attacked  as  well  as  belliger- 
ents ;  and  by  and  by  the  sanctity  of  the  sick  and  wounded 
was  violated  by  the  torpedoing  of  Hospital  Ships  and 
the  slaughter  of  Nurses  and  Doctors.  For  this  no  sud- 
den outbreak  of  passionate  hate  is  responsible,  but  cold- 
blooded and  deliberate  iniquity.  Those  who  are  fa- 
miliar with  the  majestic  verse  of  Milton  will  remember 
how,  in  the  Council  of  the  rebel  angels  after  the  first 
day  of  the  great  battle  in  heaven,  Satan  himself  demon- 
strated the  ease  with  which  tubes  and  projectiles  could 
be  made  that 

shall  send  forth 
From  far,  with  thundering  noise,  among  our  foes, 
Such  implements  of  mischief  as  shall  dash 
To  pieces  and  o'erwhelm  whatever  stands 
Adverse.1 

And  then  the  poet  goes  on  to  describe  how  the  advice  of 

1  Paradise  Lost,  Bk.  VI. 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     2 1 

the  enemy  of  mankind  was  taken  by  his  followers;  and 
how  the  terrible  enginery 

Secret  they  finished,  and  in  order  set 
With  silent  circumspection,  unespied.1 

May  we  not  trace  to  some  such  infernal  origin  what  the 
German  High  Command  euphemistically  calls  the  un- 
restricted U-boat  warfare  of  its  submarines? 

Enough  has  been  said  to  shew  the  similarity  between 
the  present  crisis  and  the  great  outburst  of  lawlessness 
in  international  affairs  three  centuries  ago.  The  two 
are  alike  in  the  theories  that  gave  rise  to  them,  and  in 
the  unutterable  miseries  which  accompanied  the  trans- 
lation of  those  theories  into  practice.  On  the  first 
occasion  a  great  moral  and  intellectual  revolt  against 
Machiavellianism  stayed,  if  it  did  not  stamp  out,  the 
plague.  It  behoves  us  to  study  this  movement  carefully 
with  a  view  to  finding  out  whether  some  further  de- 
velopment of  it  may  not  be  able  to  check  the  present 
evil. 

The  answer  to  the  question  how  the  modern  state 
was  to  act  towards  its  fellows  when  the  inexorable  logic 
of  events  had  substituted  a  number  of  independent  sov- 
ereignties for  one  world-wide  realm  could  not  of  course 
be  reached  as  the  result  of  a  process  of  pure  reasoning. 
The  past  had  to  be  taken  into  account.  In  the  six- 
teenth and  seventeenth  centuries  the  world  was  not, 
any  more  than  it  is  now,  a  blank  sheet  of  paper  on  which 
some  all-powerful  and  influential  personage  could  write 

1  Paradise  Lost,  Bk.  VI. 


22  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

what  characters  he  pleased.  If  the  law  of  the  beast, 
the  philosophy  of  the  tiger-spring  and  the  pig-sty,  was 
not  to  prevail  to  the  utter  undoing  of  civilisation  and 
humanity,  it  was  necessary  to  search  the  mental  and 
moral  heritage  of  the  age  for  elements  that  were  capa- 
ble of  being  built  up  into  a  new  and  better  international 
order.  A  succession  of  great  writers  found  and  utilised 
such  elements,  all  of  which,  it  is  worthy  of  note,  had  one 
feature  in  common.  They  were  held  to  be  universal  in 
their  application  and  binding  by  reason  of  their  inher- 
ent worth,  without  regard  to  any  force  that  could  be 
invoked  to  compel  obedience  to  them.  Whether  this 
was  true  we  need  not  stop  to  discuss.  The  important 
point  is  that  in  the  last  half  of  the  sixteenth  century 
and  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  vast 
majority  of  thinkers  in  every  European  country  be- 
lieved it  to  be  true.  The  elements  in  question  were 
Roman  Law,  Canon  Law,  International  Custom,  and 
Christian  Morality.  We  will  take  them  separately,  and 
give  a  brief  account  of  each  as  a  factor  in  the  creation 
and  development  of  the  modern  Law  of  Nations. 

i.  The  first  to  be  considered  is  Roman  Law.  Many 
of  us  have  remembered  from  our  school  days  the  ring- 
ing lines  in  which  Macaulay  describes  the  great  work 
of  ancient  Rome  as  conquest  and  dominion, 

Thine,  Roman,  is  the  pilum; 

Roman!  the  sword  is  thine; 
The  even  trench,  the  bristling  mound, 

The  legion's  ordered  line. 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     23 

But  the  great  historian  might  have  added,  though  he 
did  not,  that  after  all  the  chief  gift  of  the  eternal  city 
to  humanity  was  not  military  science,  but  law.  He 
might  have  sung,  though  he  did  not, 

Thine,  Roman,  is  the  jurist, 

Roman!  the  code  is  thine; 
The  sentence  deep,  the  reasoned  rule, 

The  judgment's  ordered  line. 

Taking  its  rise  in  the  customs  of  a  few  semi-barbarous 
tribes,  Roman  Law  gradually  developed  into  a  great 
scientific  system.  Consolidated  early  in  the  sixth  cen- 
tury by  Justinian,  or  rather  by  the  Jurists  he  gathered 
together  for  the  purpose,  it  stood,  under  the  name  of 
the  Corpus  Juris  Civilis,  as  the  acknowledged  law  of 
the  Eastern  Empire,  till  Constantinople  fell  before  the 
onslaught  of  Mahomet  II  in  1453.  In  the  West  after 
Rome's  downfall  from  her  high  estate  it  remained  the 
heritage  of  the  Roman  populations  under  their  bar- 
barian masters.  And  when  a  man  of  insight  as  well  as 
courage  was  at  the  head  of  a  horde  of  semi-savage 
invaders  it  formed  the  chief  material  of  the  code  he 
strove  to  impose  on  his  followers.  As  new  political 
arrangements  grew  up  amidst  the  ruins  of  the  Roman 
Empire  of  the  West  the  study  of  Roman  Law  revived 
in  the  Universities  that  arose  during  the  twelfth  and 
thirteenth  centuries.  At  Bologna,  at  Paris,  and  at 
Oxford  and  other  seats  of  learning,  Professors  lectured 
on  the  Corpus  Juris  Civilis.  It  was  the  great  litera 
scripta  of  an  age  when  an  almost  superstitious  rever- 
ence was  felt  for  the  written  word,  and  in  many  spheres 


24  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

its  authority  remained  unchallenged  in  spite  of  the 
growth  of  homespun  national  laws.  Right  up  to  the 
end  of  the  sixteenth  century  it  was  deemed  to  have  a 
special  and  direct  bearing  on  disputes  between  heads  of 
states.  Accordingly  the  founders  of  modern  Inter- 
national Law  drew  on  it  for  many  of  the  rules  they 
laid  down.  The  Civilians,  as  its  teachers  were  called, 
kept  alive  the  idea  of  a  science  of  law  in  the  midst  of 
the  chaotic  masses  of  local  custom  out  of  which  national 
laws  emerged.  There  is  hardly  a  legal  system  in  the 
civilised  world  which  has  not  been  influenced  to  a 
greater  or  less  degree  by  the  majestic  jurisprudence  of 
Imperial  Rome. 

2.  Canon  Law  demands  our  attention  next.  It  was 
based  on  the  Jus  Civile  to  a  large  extent,  and  was  al- 
ways studied  in  close  connection  with  it.  Side  by  side 
with  the  Civilian  in  mediaeval  Universities  stood  the 
Canonist,  and  in  the  great  systemof  Ecclesiastical  Courts 
which  culminated  in  the  Roman  Curia  he  held  undis- 
puted sway.  The  law  he  studied  and  developed  tran- 
scended, like  the  Civil  Law,  all  national  boundaries.  It 
held  good  from  one  end  of  Christendom  to  the  other, 
and  was  administered  by  those  Courts  Christian  which 
were  so  often  in  violent  conflict  with  National  and 
Royal  Courts.  It  was  a  digest  of  the  canons  of  Church 
Councils  and  decrees  of  Popes  eked  out  by  quotations 
from  the  writings  of  ecclesiastics  of  accepted  authority 
and  a  certain  number  of  texts  from  the  Corpus  Juris 
Chilis.    This  latter  was  indeed  its  model  as  to  form; 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     25 

and  at  last  in  1580  Pope  Gregory  XIII  set  forth  a 
Corpus  Juris  Canonici  in  imitation  of  the  earlier  code. 
When  it  became  necessary  to  find  rules  and  principles 
for  the  conduct  of  international  affairs,  the  first  writers 
who  attempted  the  task,  made  frequent  use  of  the  va- 
rious digests  and  collections  of  the  Canon  Law  of 
Western  Christendom. 

3.  The  Customs  of  States  in  their  dealings  one  with 
another. 
Clearly  if  a  Society  is  to  subsist  at  all  in  the  absence 
of  a  common  superior  to  dictate  its  laws  it  must  fall 
back  on  rules  of  conduct  obeyed  by  its  members  because 
they  think  fit  to  observe  them.  That  is  to  say  it  must 
be  guided  to  a  large  extent  by  custom.  But  customs  are 
good,  bad  and  indifferent.  With  regard  to  the  last, 
the  indifferent  in  point  of  goodness  or  badness,  usage 
is  its  own  justification.  There  is,  for  instance,  no  spe? 
cial  ground  in  reason  and  morality  why  a  gentleman 
should  salute  the  ladies  of  his  acquaintance  by  taking 
off  his  hat  to  them  when  he  meets  them  in  the  street. 
Any  other  form  of  courtesy  would  do  as  well.  This 
particular  form  however  happens  to  be  prescribed  by  a 
custom  which  has  sprung  up,  no  one  knows  how,  in 
decent  society,  and  so  we  all  follow  it.  Similar  instances 
can  be  quoted  from  the  intercourse  of  nations.  Usage 
goes  so  far  as  to  prescribe  the  size  of  the  paper  by 
means  of  which  communications  of  various  kinds  pass 
from  one  state  to  another.  It  does  even  more.  It 
settles  the  exact  kind  of  communication  that  a   self- 


26  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

respecting  Foreign  Office  should  send  on  gold-edged 
sheets.1  Far  be  it  from  me  to  belittle  the  importance 
of  these  observances.  Yet  I  venture  to  suggest  that 
though  we  may  safely  leave  them  as  they  are,  no  great 
harm  would  be  done  if  they  were  otherwise.  But  when 
matters  that  involve  right  and  wrong  are  concerned, 
customs  must  be  weighed  in  the  balance  and  judged. 
That  a  rule  has  been  followed  in  the  past  is  not  suffi- 
cient justification  for  continuing  to  follow  it  in  the 
future.  The  question  of  the  proper  tests  to  apply  and 
the  proper  method  of  their  application  must  be  re- 
served for  the  present,  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  dealt 
with  under  the  next  head.  I  hope  to  discuss  it  in  the 
second  lecture. 

4.    Christian  Morality. 

Appeals  were  constantly  made  by  the  great  writers 
who  founded  modern  International  Law  to  Christian 
rules  of  life,  even  as  against  customs  which  they  ad- 
mitted to  be  so  general  among  the  most  civilised  states 
of  the  time  that  it  was  impossible  to  refuse  them  admis- 
sion into  the  international  code.  This  is  particularly 
the  case  as  regards  war.  Its  usages  are  necessarily 
harsh;  and  those  who  generalised  from  the  practice  of 
antiquity  had  to  admit  that  it  allowed  the  general 
slaughter  of  all  enemy  subjects.  But  they  strove  to 
exempt  women,  children,  ministers  of  religion,  and 
captives  as  protected  by  natural  feelings  of  humanity, 
and  even  husbandmen,  merchants,   and  workmen,  as 

1  Satow,  Guide  to  Diplomatic  Practice,  Vol.  I,  pp.  85-98. 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     27 

excepted  by  the  Canons  of  the  Church.  In  the  same 
spirit  they  dealt  with  other  portions  of  the  field,  striv- 
ing everywhere  to  introduce  restraints  deduced  from 
Christian  principles. 

Having  considered  separately  the  various  elements 
utilised  for  their  purpose  by  the  early  writers  on  Inter- 
national Law,  we  must  now  turn  to  these  writers  them- 
selves; and  though  we  cannot  deal  with  all  of  them, 
there  are  three  who  must  be  selected  for  brief  notice. 
They  are : — 

Francis  Suarez  (1548-1617),  a  Jesuit  theologian  and 
Professor  in  the  University  of  Coimbra.  He  published 
there  in  1612  his  Tractatus  de  Le gibus,  in  which,  as 
Professor  Westlake  has  said,  he  "  has  put  on  record 
with  a  master's  hand  the  existence  of  a  necessary  human 
society  transcending  the  boundaries  of  states,  the  in- 
dispensableness  of  rules  for  that  society,  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  reason  to  provide  with  demonstrative  force 
all  the  rules  required,  and  the  right  of  human  society 
to  supply  the  deficiency  by  custom  enforced  as  law, 
such  custom  being  suitable  to  nature."  x  It  is  just  as 
well  for  us,  among  whom  a  tendency  to  disparage  the 
Latin  races,  the  Roman  Church,  and  the  religious  or- 
ders, has  been  by  no  means  unknown,  to  note  that  it  is 
to  one  who  was  at  once  a  Spaniard,  a  Schoolman,  a 
Theologian  and  a  Jesuit,  that  we  owe  the  clear  enuncia- 
tion of  two  most  fruitful  principles.  The  first  is  that 
there  is  really  and  truly  a  Society  or  Family  of  Nations, 
and  the  second  is  that  the  law  which  must  be  applied 

1  Chapters  on  the  Principles  of  International  Law,  pp.  27,  28. 


28  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

to  this  family  or  society  is  not  so  much  a  law  common 
to  all  nations,  as  the  classical  Roman  Jurist  conceived 
of  the  Jus  Gentium,  but  a  law  between  nations,  a  law 
which,  as  Suarez  himself  says,  all  peoples  and  nations 
ought  to  observe  between  themselves.  Next  in  order 
we  must  deal  with  a  very  different  man, 
Albericus  Gentilis  (1552-1608),  who  was  born  a  few 
years  after  Suarez,  but  died  a  few  years  before  him. 
He  was  an  Italian  by  birth,  and  at  the  age  of  20  gradu- 
ated as  a  doctor  of  Civil  Law  in  the  University  of 
Perugia.  There  he  and  his  father  seem  gradually  to 
have  adopted  heretical  Protestant  opinions,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  they  had  to  fly  from  their  native 
country.  We  find  Albericus  first  in  Austria  and  after- 
wards in  England.  By  1580  he  had  settled  in  Oxford, 
and  seems  to  have  enjoyed  a  career  of  unabated  honour 
and  prosperity  there  till  the  end  of  his  life.  He  was 
fortunate  in  securing  the  patronage  of  Queen  Eliza- 
beth's friend,  the  Earl  of  Leicester,  who  was  Chancel- 
lor of  the  University  at  the  time,  and  got  his  client 
made  Regius  Professor  of  Civil  Law  in  1587,  the  year 
before  the  Spanish  Armada.  Nearly  two  centuries 
afterwards  he  was  equally  fortunate  in  obtaining  for 
admirer,  editor  and  biographer,  another  distinguished 
son  of  Oxford  in  the  person  of  Professor  Sir  T.  E.  Hol- 
land, who  published  in  1877  a  valuable  edition  of  the 
De  Jure  Belli  of  Gentilis.  The  work  is  one  of  several, 
all  dealing  with  matters  that  arise  out  of  the  inter- 
course of  nations,  and  all  distinguished  by  a  grasp  of 
sound  practical  considerations  rather  than  philosophi- 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY     29 

cal  discussion  of  first  principles.  He  does  of  course 
mention  Natural  Reason  and  Natural  Law,  and  when 
met  by  the  obvious  consideration  that  men  have  differed 
greatly  as  to  what  these  command,  he  declares  that 
mathematical  proofs  are  impossible,  and  proceeds  to 
deal  with  historical  and  legal  precedents.  In  fact,  Ital- 
ian though  he  was,  he  had  a  thoroughly  English  mind. 
What  has  been  called  the  pure  ether  of  speculation  had 
no  attractions  for  him.  He  is  always  the  well-informed 
practical  man,  on  whom  his  learning  sits  lightly,  but 
who  brings  an  acute  mind  and  a  sound  judgment  to 
the  discussion  of  questions  vitally  important  at  the 
moment.  His  great  strength  lay  in  arrangement  and 
the  skill  with  which  he  disentangled  his  arguments  from 
irrelevant  matter,  going  straight  to  the  heart  of  the 
question  under  discussion.  To  his  treatise  on  the  Law 
of  War  Grotius  owed  much  of  the  plan  and  a  good 
deal  of  the  subject-matter  of  his  own  immortal  work. 
We  pass  now  to  an  account,  necessarily  very  brief,  of 
the  life  and  labour  of  this  greatest  of  all  the  founders 
of  the  modern  Law  of  Nations. 

Hugo  Grotius  (1 583-1645),  "the  miracle  of  Hol- 
land," as  he  was  called  by  Henry  IV  of  France,  was 
attached  at  the  age  of  15  to  the  embassy  of  John  of 
Barneveld  to  that  monarch.  The  year  before  he  had 
taken  his  Bachelor's  degree  at  the  University  of  Ley- 
den,  which  had  been  founded  in  1575  in  memory  of  the 
siege  and  the  great  deliverance  of  the  previous  year. 
As  a  student  he  must  often  have  wandered  over  the 
country  then  occupied  by  the  Spanish  lines,  and  gazed 


3o  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

from  the  ramparts  at  the  fields  which  had  been  restored 
to  the  waves  in  order  that  Boisot  and  his  Zealanders 
might  sail  over  them  to  the  relief  of  the  famine- 
stricken  city.  He  became  a  marvel  of  erudition,  while 
his  training  in  practical  affairs  kept  him  from  pedantry. 
He  was  at  once  a  great  scholar,  a  great  theologian,  a 
great  lawyer,  an  acute  diplomatist,  an  able  historian, 
and  a  melodious  poet.  It  is  impossible  here  to  give  a 
biography  of  him.  All  that  can  be  done  is  to  mention 
a  few  facts  in  a  great  career.  At  the  age  of  17  he 
commenced  practice  at  the  bar.  At  24  he  was  made 
Advocator-General  of  Holland.  In  1607  he  published 
his  Mare  Liberum  in  favour  of  the  doctrine  that  the 
high  seas  are  free  from  territorial  sovereignty.  In 
1608  he  married.  He  took  the  Arminian  and  State 
Rights  side  in  the  religious  and  political  controversy 
that  convulsed  the  newly-founded  Republic  of  the 
United  Netherlands,  and  in  161 8  was  condemned  in 
consequence  to  perpetual  imprisonment.  But  in  1621 
he  was  enabled  through  the  devotion  of  his  wife  to  es- 
cape from  the  castle  where  he  was  confined.  The  im- 
prisoned statesman  was  tall  and  handsome,  but  he 
managed  to  squeeze  himself  into  a  trunk  about  4  feet 
long,  which  was  supposed  to  contain  the  books  he  had 
borrowed  from  his  friends.  His  wife  turned  the  key, 
kissed  the  lock,  and  sent  for  the  soldiers  who  were  to 
carry  the  trunk  out  of  the  castle  and  take  it  to  the 
house  of  a  friend  in  Gorcum,  the  nearest  town.  As 
they  lifted  it,  one  of  them  said,  "  The  Arminian  himself 
must  be  in  it,  it  is  so  heavy."     "  Not  the  Arminian," 


ORIGIN  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SOCIETY    31 

replied  Madam  Grotius,  "  only  heavy  Arminian  books." 
Just  outside  the  castle  a  soldier  declared  he  would  get 
a  gimlet  and  bore  a  hole  into  the  Arminian.  "  Then," 
said  a  maidservant  who  had  accompanied  the  precious 
chest,  "  you  must  get  a  gimlet  that  will  reach  to  the  top 
of  the  castle  where  the  Arminian  lies  abed  and  asleep." 
At  last  the  box  reached  its  destination,  and  Grotius 
stepped  out  among  his  friends,  pale  and  faint,  but 
nevertheless  full  of  life  and  resource.  He  was  at  once 
disguised  as  a  bricklayer,  and  taken  out  of  the  town. 
After  many  adventures  he  reached  Paris,  and  resided 
there  till  1631,  living  with  difficulty  on  a  pension 
granted  him  by  the  French  King  and  very  irregularly 
paid.  In  1625  he  published  his  most  celebrated  book, 
the  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pads.  In  1635  he  entered  into 
the  service  of  Queen  Christina  of  Sweden  as  her  Am- 
bassador to  France,  and  died  in  1645  at  Rostock  from 
the  effects  of  a  shipwreck  which  befel  him  on  a  voyage 
from  Stockholm.  Thus  sadly  ended  a  great  life.  The 
most  marvellous  thing  connected  with  it  was  the  won- 
derful success  of  the  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pads.  At  first  it 
sold  very  slowly;  but  within  a  few  years  it  was  taught 
as  Public  Law  in  the  Universities  of  Heidelberg  and 
Wittenberg.  Gustavus  Adolphus  carried  a  copy  about 
with  him  on  his  campaigns,  and,  it  is  said,  always  slept 
with  it  under  his  pillow.  In  1648  its  leading  principles 
were  acted  on  in  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  which  put 
an  end  to  the  mediaeval  theory  of  international  rela- 
tions, and  inaugurated  the  modern  state-system.  Thus 
within  a  generation  of  its  publication  by  a  poor  and 


yi  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

exiled  scholar  it  had  profoundly  modified  the  thought 
of  the  world,  and  moulded  the  rising  Society  of 
Nations. 

This  Society  was  then  in  a  condition  we  find  it  very 
hard  to  picture  to  ourselves.  It  included  about  2000 
separate  sovereignties,  most  of  them  insignificant  in 
size  and  importance.  And  yet  this  numerous  body  did 
not  cover  the  whole  geographical  area  of  Europe,  to 
say  nothing  of  lands  beyond  the  European  borders. 
Russia  was  outside  it  and  remained  outside  till  the 
masterful  genius  of  Peter  the  Great  forced  for  her  an 
entrance  into  the  councils  and  alliances  of  her  Western 
neighbours.  Turkey,  proud  of  the  terror  she  inspired 
as  the  scourge  of  Christendom,  held  haughtily  aloof 
from  the  company  of  states  she  despised  as  infidel,  and 
proclaimed  aloud  her  freedom  from  the  rules  they 
imposed  on  themselves  for  the  conduct  of  their  mutual 
intercourse.  The  new  Society  of  Nations,  though  as 
regards  the  number  of  its  members  large,  and  indeed 
too  large  for  real  association,  was,  as  regards  the  area 
of  territory  within  its  limits,  small  in  comparison  with 
the  world  outside.  The  gradual  transformation  of  this 
Europe  into  the  Europe  of  the  days  just  before  the 
great  World-War  will  be  traced  in  the  next  two 
lectures. 


LECTURE  II. 

THE  GROWTH  OF  INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY. 

At  the  end  of  the  previous  lecture  we  took  a  neces- 
sarily hurried  survey  of  the  European  State-System  as 
it  existed  during  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century. 
The  Peace  of  Westphalia  which  laid  the  foundation  of 
the  new  order  established  the  principle  of  territorial 
sovereignty  as  part  of  the  public  law  of  the  civilised 
world.  It  did  this  in  effect  when  it  recognised  the  com- 
plete independence  of  sovereign  states,  and  confined  the 
real  power  of  the  Emperor  to  dominion  over  the 
hereditary  possessions  of  the  House  of  Hapsburg.  His 
shadowy  headship  of  a  loose  German  Confederation 
barely  obscured  the  fact  that  its  leading  states  were  in 
the  habit  of  ignoring  or  flouting  his  authority,  and  even 
its  lesser  members  were  constantly  entering  into  com- 
binations and  counter-combinations  with  little  regard  to 
his  interests,  and  without  troubling  to  ask  of  him  leave 
or  licence.  We  also  saw  that  the  Family  of  Nations, 
though  unlike  other  families  it  began  by  being  very 
large,  did  not  cover  in  extent  of  territory  an  area 
nearly  as  great  as  the  realms  beyond  its  borders. 

But   since    1648   enormous   alterations   have  taken 

33 


34  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

place.  Two  great  processes  have  been  going  on  contin- 
uously and  simultaneously.  A  vast  crowd  of  wholly 
artificial  international  atoms  situated  mainly  but  by  no 
means  exclusively  in  Germany  have  disappeared 
through  absorption  in  larger  realms.  The  startling 
result  is  that  instead  of  the  two  thousand  or  so  inter- 
national units  existing  in  Europe  when  Grotius  wrote, 
we  have  now  only  twenty-two,  if  we  leave  out  as 
separate  states  the  twenty-four  members  of  the  Federal 
Union  commonly  called  the  German  Empire,  seeing 
that  they  can  have  little  or  no  foreign  policy  apart  from 
'it.  The  Society  of  Nations  has  thus  been  simplified 
from  within  to  an  absolutely  enormous  extent. 

At  the  same  time  it  has  been  amplified  from  without 
in  an  equally  amazing  manner.  No  one  dreamed  in 
1648  that  the  vast  colonial  possessions  of  Spain  in 
South  and  Central  America  would  become  independent 
states  in  less  than  two  hundred  years.  Nor,  when 
Virginia  was  founded  in  1607  as  the  first  English 
colony  on  the  mainland  of  the  American  continent, 
would  anyone  have  predicted  that  it,  and  twelve  other 
colonies,  none  of  which  were  then  in  existence,  would 
before  the  end  of  the  next  century  throw  off  the  domin- 
ion of  the  British  Crown,  and  by  rapid  growth  in  ex- 
tent and  power  become  in  a  short  time,  as  a  Federal 
Republic,  a  highly  influential  factor  in  international  re- 
lations. Throughout  the  last  century  the  weight  of  the 
New  World  in  the  councils  of  the  powers  steadily  in- 
creased, and  in  1907  at  the  second  Hague  Conference 
no  less  than  nineteen  states  from  North,  Central  and 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  35 

South  America  were  present  by  their  representatives 
and  took  their  full  share  in  the  proceedings. 

The  New  World  drew  its  civilisation  from  the  Old, 
and  therefore  it  had  no  difficulty  in  assimilating  rules 
of  international  intercourse  which  had  grown  up  origi- 
nally among  the  nations  of  Europe.  We  find  its  states- 
men quoting  from  the  beginning  opinions  of  European 
authorities  on  the  Jus  Gentium  and  referring  in  inter- 
national controversies  to  precedents  drawn  from 
European  history.  When  the  United  States,  Chili, 
Peru  and  the  rest  started  on  their  separate  national 
careers,  they  became  at  the  same  time  members  of  the 
Society  of  Nations  and  subjects  of  International  Law. 
There  was  no  question,  as  there  was  with  the  indepen- 
dent realms  of  Asia,  of  formal  admission  or  admission 
on  condition  that  the  full  rights  of  territorial  jurisdic- 
tion over  resident  foreigners  were  curtailed  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  subjects  of  Western  powers.  The  new- 
comers entered  the  august  company  of  civilised  states 
on  equal  terms  with  the  rest,  and  though  the  warnings 
given  by  Washington  in  his  Farewell  Address  against 
entanglement  in  "  the  ordinary  combinations  and  col- 
lisions "  of  the  European  state  system  have  been  some- 
times quoted  in  favour  of  the  complete  political  isola- 
tion of  the  New  World,  the  sound  sense  of  American 
statesmen  has  prevented  any  serious  attempt  to  create 
two  Societies  of  Nations  and  two  systems  of  Inter- 
national Law.  The  famous  Monroe  Doctrine,  enunci- 
ated by  the  President  of  that  name  in  his  December 
Message  of   1823,  aimed  at  nothing  more  than  the 


36  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

preservation  of  the  American  continent  for  the  Ameri- 
can peoples.  It  inaugurated  no  attempt  to  build  a 
Chinese  Wall  of  exclusion  round  the  rising  states  of  the 
New  World,  and  thus  cut  them  off  from  dangerous 
European  influences.  "  Cultivate  peace  and  harmony 
with  all "  wrote  the  great  Father  of  his  country,  and 
the  statesmen  who  succeeded  him  held  themselves 
bound  to  put  in  practice  this  part  of  his  political  testa- 
ment as  well  as  the  other.  Indeed  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine itself  is  a  proof  of  their  solicitude  as  to  both.  Its 
enunciation  was  preceded,  and  to  some  extent  caused, 
by  negotiations  in  which  England,  France,  Russia  and 
Spain  were  concerned.  To  George  Canning,  the  bril- 
liant Foreign  Secretary  of  Great  Britain,  the  Message 
of  President  Monroe  brought  great  joy.  Its  uncompro- 
mising declaration  against  possible  interference  on  the 
part  of  the  Holy  Alliance  with  the  revolted  South  and 
Central  American  Republics  which  had  declared  their 
independence  of  Spain,  came  as  a  most  welcome  aid  in 
his  diplomatic  struggle  with  the  forces  of  militant 
despotism  in  Europe. 

Europe  on  its  part  never  attempted  to  exclude  the 
American  Republics  from  the  Society  of  Nations,  or 
bade  them  withdraw  and  start  a  separate  society  of 
their  own.  Even  in  those  early  days  of  which  we  have 
been  speaking  their  commercial  and  social  ties  with  the 
Old  World,  their  community  of  religion  and  culture, 
and  their  recognition  of  the  sacred  claims  of  humanity, 
prevented  anything  of  the  kind.  And  the  recent  action 
of  President  Wilson  and  the  United  States  Congress  in 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  37 

joining  the  great  Confederation  against  aggressive  and 
autocratic  Germany  has  been  received  by  the  free  peo- 
ples of  Europe  so  joyfully  and  enthusiastically  as  to 
make  it  clear  that  no  severance  between  the  two  groups 
of  states  will  be  contemplated  in  future.  Civilised 
humanity  must  hold  together  if  it  is  to  work  out  its 
own  salvation.  It  must  learn  to  put  down  wanton  dis- 
turbers of  the  peace,  punish  deliberate  violations  of 
good  faith  and  humanity,  and  lead  the  backward  races 
along  the  paths  of  progress.  For  these  purposes  it 
needs  the  counsel  and  strength  of  all  the  nations  which 
compose  it.  No  one  has  set  forth  this  noble  idea 
more  forcibly  in  the  midst  of  a  world  orgy  of 
destruction  and  bloodshed  than  the  present  Chief 
Magistrate  of  the  United  States.  To  no  one  do  we 
look  with  more  confidence  for  wise  and  valiant  efforts 
to  realise  it  when  peace  returns.  The  formation  of 
the  Pan-American  Union  in  recent  times  is  quite  con- 
sistent with  it.  The  object  of  the  Union  is  the  bringing 
together  of  all  the  independent  states  of  North  and 
South  America  for  the  development  of  their  natural 
resources,  and  the  strengthening  of  the  spiritual  bonds 
between  their  peoples.  These  things  may  be  done  with- 
out any  disregard  of  the  welfare  of  the  world  at  large. 
They  may  instead  help  it  forward  in  no  small  degree. 

We  are  now  able  to  lay  down  with  confidence  the 
proposition  that  the  period  between  the  age  of  Grotius 
and  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  has  seen  the 
gathering  together  into  one  great  Society  of  all  states 
with  any  pretensions  to  advanced  civilisation.     This 


38  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

Society  arose  at  first  among  the  Christian  nations  of 
Europe.  It  developed  internally  by  simplification, 
which  greatly  reduced  the  original  number  of  its  mem- 
bers while  it  turned  them  into  a  somewhat  loosely  or- 
ganised body  of  international  units.  At  the  same  time 
it  developed  externally  by  amplification  till  it  embraced 
all  the  independent  states  of  Europe  and  North  and 
South  America,  and  most  of  the  independent  states  of 
Asia.  Even  this  is  not  all,  for  in  reality  it  covers  the 
greater  part  of  the  land-area  of  the  globe.  The  states 
possessed  of  colonies  and  dependencies,  protectorates 
and  spheres  of  influence,  speak  for  them  in  international 
intercourse.  At  international  conferences  the  voice  of 
Great  Britain,  for  instance,  is  really  the  voice  of  the 
whole  British  Empire,  including  India  and  the  self- 
governing  Dominions.  In  the  same  way  the  voice  of 
France  is  really  the  voice  of  all  the  French  possessions, 
including  Algeria  in  Africa  and  Indo-China  in  Asia, 
while  the  United  States  of  America  represents  Hawaii, 
the  Philippine  Islands  and  Porto  Rico,  as  well  as  its 
continental  domains.  Thus  nearly  the  whole  world  is 
taken  into  account  when  all  its  civilised  states  meet,  as 
they  have  done  once  in  history  at  the  Hague  Conference 
of  1907  and  may  do  often  again.  It  is  quite  true  that 
at  The  Hague  the  representation  was  crude  and  unsat- 
isfactory, the  methods  of  discussion  confused,  and  the 
means  for  giving  practical  effect  to  the  decisions 
reached  lamentably  inefficient.  But  in  process  of  time 
remedies  may  be  found  for  these  crying  evils.  Mean- 
while a  very  great  thing — one  of  the  greatest  things 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  39 

in  all  history — has  come  to  pass.  Civilised  humanity 
has  met,  and  endeavoured  to  act  in  concert  for  the 
common  good. 

The  world-wide  Society  of  which  we  have  been 
speaking  has  its  grades  like  other  social  bodies.  We 
will  not  stop  to  speak  here  of  the  differences  between 
sovereign  and  part-sovereign,  neutralised  and  non- 
neutralised  states.  They  are  too  technical  for  our 
present  purpose;  but  there  is  one  distinction  so  impor- 
tant that  it  cannot  be  passed  over.  I  refer  to  the  sepa- 
ration between  the  Great  Powers  and  the  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Family  of  Nations.  It  is  a  distinction 
based  rather  upon  differences  of  position  and  influence 
than  differences  of  legal  rights.  The  Great  Powers 
are  those  which  by  reason  of  their  strength  and  size 
and  activity  have  a  preponderant  voice  in  the  con- 
claves of  the  nations.  If  they  are  agreed,  other  states 
find  it  difficult  to  say  them  nay.  The  leadership  of  the 
Society  of  Nations  is  tacitly  conceded  to  them;  and  they 
admit  others  into  their  body  from  time  to  time  by  a 
sort  of  common  impulse,  springing  from  a  regard  to 
obvious  facts.  The  system  arose  in  Europe,  but  has 
recently  spread  beyond  its  boundaries  as  International 
Society  itself  ceased  to  be  European  only  and  became 
world-wide.  The  number  of  Great  Powers  has  varied 
from  time  to  time.  The  international  settlement  which 
followed  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  made  them  five — 
England,  France,  Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia.  These 
were  called  the  five  Great  Powers  of  Europe;  and  five 
they  remained  all  through  the  middle  period  of  the 


4o  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

nineteenth  century.  The  consolidation  of  Italy  into 
one  Kingdom  under  the  House  of  Savoy  brought  a 
fresh  element  within  the  European  equilibrium.  Note 
was  taken  of  this  new  fact  when  in  1867  the  Great 
Powers  invited  her  to  join  them  at  the  Conference  of 
London,  which  settled  for  the  time  the  dangerous 
Luxemburg  question  by  neutralising  the  Grand  Duchy. 
This  invitation  raised  the  new  Kingdom  to  the  rank  of 
a  Great  Power,  and  from  that  time  there  were  six  of 
them  instead  of  five.  But  soon  the  growing  wealth  and 
population  of  the  United  States,  and  the  commercial 
and  humanitarian  interests  which  forced  it  almost 
against  its  will  to  take  part  in  the  settlement  of  mo- 
mentous questions  which  arose  outside  the  two  Ameri- 
cas, caused  it  to  be  regarded  as  a  Great  Power.  An 
American  representative  attended  the  Congo  Confer- 
ence of  1 884-1 885  and  signed  its  Final  Act,  which 
opened  up  the  vast  interior  of  the  African  Continent 
to  the  enterprise  of  the  civilised  world,  settled  to  some 
extent  the  distribution  of  territory  within  it,  and  made 
war  upon  the  Liquor  Traffic  with  the  natives  and  the 
more  infamous  Slave  Trade.  A  little  later,  American 
plenipotentiaries  took  a  prominent  and  beneficent  part 
in  both  the  Hague  Conferences  and  also  in  the  Algeciras 
Conference  of  1906  which  warded  off  for  a  time  the 
danger  of  European  War  over  the  Morocco  question. 

But  this  is  not  all.  As  the  Society  of  Nations  ex- 
tended over  the  world,  its  inner  circle  was  enlarged  by 
the  admission  of  the  new  elements.  We  have  just 
seen  how  the  United  States  entered  the  ranks  of  the 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  41 

Great  Powers  from  America.  Soon  Asia  supplied  a 
further  reinforcement  in  the  person  of  Japan.  This 
happened  in  1907  when  the  second  Hague  Conference 
was  engaged  in  an  attempt  to  create  an  International 
Prize  Court  of  Appeal.  It  was  then  decided  that  eight 
states  should  always  have  a  representative  judge  among 
the  fifteen  who  were  to  form  the  court,  the  seven  other 
judges  being  assigned  to  the  remaining  thirty-six  states 
by  rota.  The  states  thus  singled  out  from  the  rest 
were  Great  Britain,  France,  Austria,  Germany,  Italy, 
Russia,  the  United  States  and  Japan,  which  last  was 
thus  raised  to  the  rank  of  a  Great  Power.  At  present, 
therefore,  there  are  eight  of  them,  and  they  are  no 
longer  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  but  Great  World- 
Powers.  To-day  it  is  parochial  to  think  in  continents. 
We  have  now  to  consider  the  whole  globe.  Moreover, 
there  is  nothing  mystic  or  final  in  the  number  eight. 
Doubtless  other  states  may  from  time  to  time  be  added 
to  the  group  of  Great  Powers,  and  it  is  possible  that 
some  may  drop  out  of  it.  In  the  Society  of  Nations  as 
well  as  in  the  society  of  individuals,  a  process  of  ebb 
and  flow  is  constantly  going  on,  and  a  state  like  a  human 
being  may  fall  from  a  position  of  consideration  and 
leadership.1  Indeed  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  what 
may  be  called  the  collective  hegemony  of  the  Great 
Powers  will  prove  more  than  a  passing  phenomenon. 
In  the  reconstruction  of  International  Society  that  must 
be  effected  after  the  present  war  it  may  vanish  alto- 

1  The  position  of  Austria  at  the  present  moment   (Nov.,  1918)   is  a 
case  in  point. 


42  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

gether.  But  on  the  other  hand  it  may  develop  in  an 
altered  and  improved  form  into  a  means  of  entrust- 
ing to  a  body  representative  of  the  whole  of  civilised 
humanity  the  all-important  task  of  making  peacefully 
such  changes  in  the  international  order  as  may  be  re- 
quired from  time  to  time.  Questions  such  as  this  I  hope 
to  discuss  in  the  last  two  lectures.  I  merely  refer  to  it 
now  to  shew  the  possibilities  that  may  lurk  in  that  dis- 
tinction between  the  Great  Powers  and  ordinary  states 
which  I  have  been  compelled  to  describe  as  a  fact  of 
present-day  international  life. 

Having  noted  the  chief  stages  of  the  development 
of  the  Society  of  Nations  in  form  and  extent  since  the 
Peace  of  Westphalia,  we  must  now  attempt  to  trace  the 
growth  of  the  influences  which  moulded  its  ideas  and 
shaped  the  rules  which  arose  from  them.  We  have 
seen  that  Grotius  and  his  predecessors  convinced  the 
world  of  the  existence  of  a  real  Society  of  Nations, 
which  instead  of  being  lawless  and  abominable  was 
subject  to  rules  which  could  be  made  approximately 
just  and  righteous  even  in  the  midst  of  war.  We  have 
also  tried  to  discover  to  what  sources  they  looked  for 
these  rules,  and  have  found  that  one  of  the  chief  was 
the  customs  followed  by  states  in  their  mutual  inter- 
course. But  here  comes  in  a  great  difficulty.  By  what 
process  was  it  possible  to  sift  good  customs  from  bad, 
and  enable  mankind  to  distinguish  between  those  that 
were  to  be  followed  and  those  that  were  to  be  repro- 
bated? And  behind  this  problem  lurked  another  which 
jurists  call  the  question  of  sanction.     How,  that  is  to 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  43 

say,  can  rules,  when  made,  be  enforced  in  cases 
where  they  are  not  obeyed  willingly  because  of  a  con- 
scientious belief  in  their  goodness  and  usefulness  ?  This 
matter  cannot  be  discussed  at  present,  though  I  hope 
to  deal  with  it  at  some  length  before  the  course  is  over. 
But  the  former  must  be  touched  on  here;  and  I  will 
endeavour  to  clear  it  as  far  as  possible  from  mere  tech- 
nicalities, and  concentrate  attention  on  a  few  essential 
points. 

Grotius  believed  in  a  Natural  Law,  which  he  based 
on  what  he  called  "  the  rational  and  social  nature  of 
man"  1  and  used  as  a  touchstone  to  distinguish  between 
what  was  to  be  followed  and  what  was  to  be  avoided  in 
the  intercourse  of  human  beings.  Natural  reason,  he 
declared,  dictated  certain  rules  which  were  so  sacred 
and  immutable  that  even  the  Almighty  could  not  alter 
them.  They  were  part  of  the  very  nature  and  essence 
of  things,  and  God  Himself  submitted  to  be  judged  by 
them.2  They  bound  states  as  well  as  individuals,  and 
were  the  fundamental  basis  of  International  Law.  But 
beyond  them  were  rules  that  could  be  traced  to  general 
consent  alone,  "  for  what  cannot  be  deduced  from  cer- 
tain principles  by  solid  reasoning,  and  yet  is  seen  and 
observed  everywhere  must  have  its  origin  from  the  will 
and  consent  of  all."  3  Here  Grotius  seems  to  have 
remembered  that  general  consent  might  be  used  to 
justify  practices  which  neither  Christianity  nor  enlight- 

1  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pads,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  I,  §  12. 
a  Ibid.,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  I,  §  10. 
*  Ibid.,  Prolegomena,  §  40. 


44  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

ened  reason  could  approve.  Accordingly  a  little  fur- 
ther on  he  qualifies  his  appeal  to  the  consent  of  all 
nations  by  adding  "  at  least  the  more  civilised,"  and 
quotes  with  approval  those  who  "  agree  that  the  more 
savage  nations  are  of  less  weight  in  such  an  estimate."  ■ 
In  fact  while  reading  his  pages  one  is  never  quite  sure 
whether  he  relies  most  on  his  Consent  of  Nations  or 
on  his  Natural  Law.  Still  both  are  there  most  unmis- 
takably; and  he  uses  all  the  resources  of  a  vast,  though 
uncritical,  erudition  to  prove  his  general  consent  by 
quotations  from  writers  of  all  sorts,  opinions  of  states- 
men, and  declarations  of  military  commanders. 

We  must  now  turn  to  the  successors  of  Grotius,  and 
see  how  they  built  up  the  edifice  he  and  his  forerunners 
had  founded.  In  this  connection  we  will  deal  in  the 
first  place  with  the  Philosophical  Jurists,  or  rather  a 
few  of  the  most  important  among  them.  The  place 
of  honour  next  to  Grotius  must  be  given  to  Samuel 
Pufendorf.  He  was  a  native  of  Chemnitz  in  Saxony, 
and  became  Professor  at  Heidelberg  in  1661.  It  was 
there  he  developed  the  ideas  afterwards  embodied  in 
his  great  work  De  Jure  Naturcc  et  Gentium,  published 
in  1672  at  Lund  in  Sweden,  whither  its  author  had  re- 
moved two  years  before.  He  remained,  however,  in 
close  touch  with  Germany  throughout  his  life,  and  died 
at  Berlin  in  1694.  He  differed  from  Grotius  in  dis- 
pensing entirely  with  custom  as  a  source  of  Inter- 
national Law.  Not  only  did  he  boldly  proclaim  the 
all-sufficiency  of  the  so-called  Law  of  Nature,  but  he 

1  De  Jure  Belli  ar.  Pads,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  I ;  §  12. 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  45 

connected  it  inseparably  with  a  mythical  State  of  Na- 
ture, in  the  existence  of  which  there  is  no  evidence  to 
show  that  Grotius  had  the  slightest  belief.  The  great 
Dutchman  ignores  it.  The  great  German  makes  it  the 
cornerstone  of  his  philosophical  system.  He  took  the 
notion  from  Thomas  Hobbes  of  Malmesbury,  the  great 
English  Political  Philosopher  of  the  middle  of  the 
seventeenth  century.  It  assumed  that  there  was  a  time 
when  each  individual  man  ran  wild  in  the  woods,  doing 
what  was  right  in  his  own  eyes,  free  from  authority  of 
any  kind,  and  absolutely  ignorant  of  social  restraints. 
Placed  thus  alone  in  an  almost  empty  world,  the  noble 
savage  guided  his  conduct  by  the  light  of  his  natural 
reason,  and  by  that  alone.  Anything  less  like  what  we 
now  know  to  have  been  the  condition  of  primitive  man 
it  is  impossible  to  conceive.  But  most  of  the  thinkers 
of  the  period  devoutly  believed  in  it,  and  attributed 
to  the  beings  they  had  divested  of  all  restraints,  ideas 
that  could  come  only  from  long  centuries  of  social  dis- 
cipline. For  instance,  it  is  always  assumed  that  men 
in  a  State  of  Nature  attached  the  highest  importance  to 
promises,  and  kept  them  with  scrupulous  good  faith, 
whereas  in  reality  the  notion  of  contract  with  its 
mutual  obligations  is  a  late  growth  of  fairly  advanced 
civilisation.  Ask  any  traveller  who  has  had  the  ex- 
perience of  wrestling  with  native  carriers  in  the  forests 
of  Central  Africa  what  sort  of  appreciation  unsophis- 
ticated savages  have  of  the  sanctity  of  the  plighted 
word,  and  you  will  receive  an  answer  more  vigorous 
than    complimentary    to    his    black    brethren.      But, 


46  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

though  the  existence  of  a  State  of  Nature  was  accepted 
in  most  quarters  as  an  axiom  of  all  reasoning  about 
the  origin  of  government,  its  characteristic  features 
differed  according  to  the  cast  of  thought  of  the  writers 
who  described  them.  Thus  Hobbes  held  that  it  was  a 
state  of  constant  war  of  each  against  all.  The  evils  of 
incessant  conflict  were  so  terrible  that  at  last  human 
beings  met  and  established  by  mutual  consent  states  and 
governments.  Pufendorf,  on  the  other  hand,  declared 
that  primitive  man  was  a  social  animal  who  strove  to 
live  in  amity  with  his  fellows,  and  agreed  to  establish 
rule  and  authority  for  the  safeguarding  of  the  com- 
mon weal.  In  his  great  work  he  dealt  first  with  indi- 
vidual conduct  and  the  mutual  rights  and  duties  of 
rulers  and  ruled,  and  then  towards  the  end  turned  to 
the  task  of  prescribing  rules  for  states  in  their  inter- 
course with  each  other.  As  he  had  already  established 
to  his  own  satisfaction  the  existence  of  a  State  of  Na- 
ture, this  final  step  was  easy.  Since  states  had  no 
common  superior  they  were  related  to  one  another  as 
individuals  were  before  civil  authority  was  established 
over  them,  and  accordingly  they  too  were  under  the 
Law  of  Nature.  Grotius  had  written  concerning  the 
Law  of  War  and  Peace.  Pufendorf  wrote  concerning 
the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations.  To  him  the  Law  of 
Nations  was  nothing  but  the  Law  of  Nature  applied 
to  nations;  and  to  nations  he  attributed  a  personality 
and  a  will  analogous  to  those  of  individuals. 

This  was  one  of  the  legacies  left  by  the  philosopher 
of  Heidelberg  to  the  jurists  who  came  after  him.    His 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  47 

Law  of  Nature,  considered  as  actual  law  and  not  as  an 
ideal  to  which  law  should  ever  reach  forward,  has  long 
ago  been  relegated  to  the  limbo  of  discarded  theories. 
His  State  of  Nature  collapsed  into  dust  at  the  first  onset 
of  the  Historical  School.  But  by  insisting  on  the  per- 
sonality of  states  he  did  much  to  familiarise  thinkers 
with  the  idea  that  civilised  political  units  constitute  a 
great  family,  the  members  of  which  flourish  by  per- 
forming brotherly  acts  towards  each  other,  and  con- 
tributing according  to  their  power  to  the  common  good. 
This  truly  Christian  idea  seems  at  first  sight  so  obvious- 
ly right  that  it  cannot  be  contested.  But  a  little  obser- 
vation shows  that  it  has  still  to  fight  its  own  way  against 
the  old,  barbaric,  and  anti-human  notion  that  states  can 
flourish  only  at  the  expense  of  other  states,  and  conse- 
quently their  first  duty  is  to  strengthen  themselves  at  all 
points  in  order  that  they  may  grab  as  much  as  possible 
of  the  good  things  of  the  world,  and  hold  what  they 
have  succeeded  in  seizing  against  the  attacks  of  those 
who  are  ready  to  snatch  it  from  them.1  In  the  age-long 
struggle  between  the  international  theory  of  the  family 
and  the  international  theory  of  the  pig-sty,  Pufendorf 
is  one  of  the  forces  that  make  for  righteousness.  So 
strong  was  his  sense  of  the  sacred  ties  of  our  common 
humanity  that  he  maintained  what  in  his  day  was  the 
startling  proposition  that  all  peoples,  and  not  Christian 
peoples  only,  were  included  within  the  purview  of  the 
Law  of  Nations. 

For  a  time  the  system  of  Pufendorf  held  the  field 

1  F.  Naumann,  Brief e  iiber  Religion,  5th  ed.,  pp.  68-87. 


48  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

in  Germany,  and  was  received  with  favour  and  defer- 
ence elsewhere.  But  by  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century  a  partial  reversion  to  Grotian  methods  set  in 
under  the  influence  of  Christian  Wolff,  the  uncrowned 
King  of  German  philosophy  in  the  generation  before 
Kant.  He  attempted  in  1749  a  study  of  our  subject  by 
what  he  called  a  scientific  method,  which  distinguished 
between  a  natural  law  of  nations,  and  a  law  which  arose 
from  voluntary  agreement  and  custom,  both  being  nec- 
essary for  a  complete  presentation  of  the  subject.  He 
is  now  almost  forgotten;  but  in  his  time  he  had  a  great 
vogue,  and  made  his  mark  on  the  development  of  Inter- 
national Law,  partly  by  recalling  attention  to  those 
customary  rules  which  Grotius  had  appealed  to  and 
Pufendorf  decried,  and  partly  by  his  own  particular 
doctrine  of  the  inherent  rights  of  states.  Moreover, 
he  accentuated,  and  at  the  same  time  exaggerated,  the 
wholesome  idea  of  a  Society  or  Family  of  Nations,  by 
maintaining  that  just  as  individual  citizens  make  up  the 
state,  so  the  whole  body  of  states  make  up  a  civitas 
maxima,  a  sort  of  superstate  of  which  all  are  members, 
and  in  which  they  have  rights  to  enjoy  and  duties  to 
perform.  No  such  world-state  existed  in  his  time;  but 
in  the  midst  of  the  most  awful  war  that  ever  devastated 
humanity  we  have  begun  to  feel  acutely  the  needof  some 
authority  in  the  Society  of  Nations,  which  shall  secure 
obedience  to  its  laws  and  provide  for  new  needs  as  they 
arise.  I  will  not  anticipate  here  what  I  shall  have  to 
enlarge  upon  later  in  this  course,  but  I  may  say  at  once 
that  there  are  signs  of  the  development  in  the  inter- 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  49 

national  body  of  organs  fitted  to  satisfy  its  most  crying 
needs,  and  that  the  settlement  which  must  follow  the 
present  war  should,  if  we  are  true  to  our  highest  aims, 
show  marked  progress  in  this  direction.  Time  may 
thus  vindicate  Wolff's  insight  into  tendencies  hidden 
from  his  fellows.  He  may  pass  muster  as  a  prophet, 
though  as  a  recorder  of  historic  fact  he  was  entirely 
wrong. 

It  may  be  said  with  truth  that  the  writers  we  have 
been  discussing  were  moralists  and  scholars  first  and 
foremost,  and  only  statesmen  or  lawyers  afterwards,  if 
at  all.  But  it  would  be  wrong  to  deny  their  usefulness 
on  that  account.  As  thinkers  they  gave  to  International 
Law  a  philosophic  basis  which  secured  for  it  the  respect 
of  an  age  when  all  who  troubled  to  reason  about  the 
problems  of  society  and  government  believed  in  Nature 
and  her  Law.  It  was  no  slight  achievement  to  convince 
the  world  that  this  exalted,  if  somewhat  obscure  and 
mysterious  code,  laid  down  just  and  humane  rules  for 
the  guidance  of  human  conduct  in  a  department  of  life 
too  often  dominated  by  force  and  fraud.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  men  who  did  this  frequently  confused 
the  ideal  with  the  real,  and  failed  to  distinguish  with 
sufficient  clearness  between  what  ought  to  be  and  what 
is.  But  they  rendered  a  great  service  to  humanity  when 
they  obtained  for  their  new  science  of  International 
Law  a  place  among  the  institutions  the  world  was 
bound  to  recognise  and  develop. 

The  development  of  the  science  was  the  work  of  later 
writers,  most  of  whom  were  men  of  affairs,  experienced 


5o  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

in  the  practical  business  of  government  and  diplomacy, 
or  advocates  and  judges  in  courts  of  law.  They  de- 
voted their  attention  mainly  to  an  investigation  of  the 
actual  practices  of  states  in  their  mutual  dealings. 
From  a  study  of  negotiations,  treaties  and  wars,  they 
endeavoured  to  discover  the  rules  by  which  states 
guided  their  conduct  in  the  various  exigencies  of  inter- 
national life.  But  they  connected  themselves  with  the 
theories  they  inherited  from  their  predecessors  through 
the  doctrine  that  the  Law  of  Nature  was  what  right 
reason  dictated  to  mankind,  and  nothing  contrary  to  it 
could  be  allowed.  Having  thus  made  their  bow  to  the 
popular  notion  of  Natural  Law,  they  passed  it  by  re- 
spectfully, and  went  on  to  build  the  edifice  of  their  con- 
structive work  on  the  alternative  Grotian  foundation  of 
general  consent.  Foremost  among  them  were  Bynker- 
shoek,  the  Dutchman,  and  Vattel,  the  German-Swiss. 
The  former  was  a  lawyer  by  profession,  and  became 
President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Holland.  In  his 
De  Dominio  Maris  and  his  Quccstiones  Juris  Publici, 
published  in  1721  and  1737  respectively,  he  exalts  cus- 
tom as  a  source  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  and  turns  to 
treaties  and  the  actions  of  statesmen  and  rulers  as  the 
best  evidence  of  it.  It  is  true  he  asserts  that  no  human 
authority  can  prevail  over  right  reason,  but  goes  on  to 
declare  that  in  many  cases  reason  may  be  doubtful,  and 
then  custom  alone  must  decide.  Moreover  he  shows  no 
slavish  deference  to  classical  antiquity;  for  when  he 
endeavours  to  deduce  a  rule  of  action  from  practice,  we 
find  that  he  takes  his  instances  from  recent  history. 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  51 

Vattel,  whose  Droits  des  Gens  first  saw  the  light  in 
1758,  follows  much  the  same  method.  He  had  held  a 
diplomatic  post  under  the  Elector  of  Saxony,  and  was 
afterwards  a  Privy  Councillor.  In  his  great  work  he 
drew  largely  on  the  experience  he  had  thus  acquired. 
These  two  remarkable  men,  and  others  whom  they  in- 
fluenced, worked  mainly  on  positive  lines,  though  they 
did  not  emancipate  themselves  entirely  from  the  old 
naturalistic  theories. 

We  must  now  turn  to  what  I  have  called  the  Suc- 
cession of  Great  Publicists.  By  this  phrase  I  mean  the 
series  of  writers  on  International  Law  who  came  too 
late  to  be  reckoned  among  its  founders,  but  whose 
works  are  nevertheless  referred  to  as  authoritative 
wherever  in  the  civilised  world  men  of  competent 
knowledge  discuss  questions  concerned  with  the  mutual 
relations  of  states  in  peace  or  war.  Their  opinions  are 
not,  of  course,  held  to  be  decisive.  They  are  not  law- 
givers; they  are  only  commentators  on  law.  Their 
position  in  the  chancelleries  of  the  nations  is  somewhat 
analogous  to  that  of  Selden  or  Blackstone  in  an  English 
Court.  Just  as  a  statement  in  the  works  of  one  of 
them  could  not  override  the  plain  sentences  of  a  Statute 
passed  by  Parliament,  so  the  printed  word  of  a 
Wheaton,  a  Bluntschli,  a  Hall,  a  Von  Martens  or  a 
Rivier  could  not  prevail  against  an  unequivocal  clause 
of  a  great  international  treaty.  But  when  a  new  point 
or  a  doubtful  point  is  in  dispute,  the  side  which  can 
quote  such  writers  in  its  favour  has  a  great  advantage 
in  argument  over  the  side  which  can  marshal  to  sup- 


52  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

port  it  no  views  of  world-renowned  authorities.  They 
are  experts;  and  though  all  the  world  knows  that  ex- 
perts may  err,  it  is  only  the  blatant  and  foolish  portion 
of  the  world  that  pays  no  respect  to  expert  opinion. 
Of  course  it  often  happens  that  such  opinion  is  pretty 
evenly  divided;  and  then  all  that  can  be  done  is  to 
argue  the  matter  out  with  the  aid  of  the  best  materials 
and  the  best  authorities  that  can  be  found.  But  the 
great  writers  on  International  Law  do  much  more  than 
discuss  isolated  theories  or  particular  cases.  They  sift 
vast  masses  of  matter, — piles  of  official  documents, 
mountains  of  memoranda,  stacks  of  treaties,  libraries 
of  history  and  biography — and  reduce  them  to  shape 
and  order.  They  arrange  and  systematise.  Out  of 
their  labours  often  comes  a  great  improvement  in  some 
department  of  international  intercourse  that  had  hither- 
to been  chaotic.  Their  subject  owes  to  them  whatever 
scientific  form  it  may  possess.  The  Apostolic  Suc- 
cession of  jurists  and  publicists  includes  men  of  spe- 
cial knowledge  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  The 
area  from  which  writers  on  International  Law  are 
drawn  has  increased  as  fresh  tracts  have  been  won 
for  civilisation  and  fresh  peoples  brought  within  the 
circle  of  the  Family  of  Nations.  The  Western  coun- 
tries of  Europe  still  hold  their  old  pre-eminence;  but 
its  Eastern  realms  have  entered  into  friendly  competi- 
tion with  them,  while  the  New  World  supplies  a  large 
contingent  of  recognised  authorities  drawn  from  both 
North  and  South  America,  and  far  away  across  illimi- 
table tracts  of  ocean  the  political  thinkers  of  Japan  are 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  53 

producing  works  in  French  and  English  which  are  read 
with  delight  and  quoted  with  respect  wherever  the 
Jus  Gentium  is  studied  and  applied.  The  Law  of 
Nations  is  as  truly  international  in  its  expositors  as  it 
is  in  its  provisions.  From  the  beginning  the  authorities 
upon  it  were  familiar  with  one  another's  writings  and 
took  note  of  one  another's  views.  In  spite  of  contro- 
versies and  prejudices  the  greater  among  them  exercised 
considerable  influence  over  their  fellows.  By  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nineteenth  century  the  various  national 
rills  that  contributed  their  separate  quotas  towards  the 
creation  of  the  one  great  stream  of  true  International 
Law  had  begun  to  combine  together,  and  before  it 
closed  International  Jurists  had  organised  themselves 
into  world-wide  societies  for  meetings  and  discussions, 
and  a  noble  river  of  justice  and  humanity  was  fertilis- 
ing the  wastes  of  diplomacy  and  war. 

Side  by  side  with  the  work  of  great  writers  we  must 
consider  the  corresponding  work  of  great  Judges. 
When  Grotius  wrote,  the  sea -borne  commerce  of  the 
modern  world  was  in  its  infancy.  It  arose  when  the 
universal  piracy  which  characterised  the  dark  ages  be- 
gan to  succumb  to  the  efforts  of  enlightened  rulers,  the 
spread  of  improved  views  of  morality,  and  the  sense 
that  more  wealth  was  to  be  made  by  honest  trade  than 
by  indiscriminate  plunder.  As  soon  as  oceanic  inter- 
change of  commodities  became  at  all  common,  the 
goods  of  an  enemy  found  at  sea  were  regarded  as  the 
lawful  prey  of  any  belligerent  who  could  send  armed 
vessels  to  capture  them.    At  once  such  questions  as  the 


54  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

following  arose: — What  were  enemy's  goods?  Did 
their  fate  in  any  way  depend  on  the  national  character 
of  the  ships  that  carried  them?  Could  the  goods  of 
non-belligerents  be  captured,  and,  if  so,  under  what 
circumstances?  Might  a  warship  make  an  attack 
anywhere  on  the  waters,  or  were  certain  portions  of 
them  to  be  regarded  as  free  from  the  operations  of 
war?  These  and  many  other  problems  had  to  be  set- 
tled by  belligerent  governments  in  the  interests  of  their 
own  internal  law  and  order;  for  the  proprietary  rights 
of  many  of  their  citizens  often  depended  upon  them. 
Hence  came  the  establishment  of  what  we  English  call 
Courts  of  Admiralty  in  the  maritime  states  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  and  the  gradual  growth  of  such  mediaeval 
Maritime  and  Commercial  Codes  as  the  Laws  of 
Oleron  and  the  more  famous  Consolato  del  Mare.  But 
it  was  not  till  the  modern  epoch  dawned  at  the  time  of 
the  Reformation  and  the  Renaissance  that  over-seas 
commerce  took  great  strides  forward.  It  was  only  be- 
ginning to  do  so  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, and  consequently  there  is  comparatively  little  to 
be  found  about  it  in  the  earliest  treatises  on  Inter- 
national Law.  But  soon  the  questions  just  indicated, 
and  many  others  also  which  were  largely  concerned  with 
the  rights  and  claims  of  neutrals,  forced  themselves 
into  prominence.  Then  came  the  opportunity  of  the 
Courts  of  Admiralty  and  their  judges.  In  England  it 
was  seized  by  Dr.  Zouch  and  Sir  Leoline  Jenkins  in 
the  seventeenth  century,  and  by  the  great  Sir  William 
Scott,   afterwards   Lord   Stowell,   at  the   end  of  the 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  55 

eighteenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth.  And 
during  the  same  period  in  the  young  Republic  of  the 
United  States  Chief  Justice  Marshall  made  the  most 
of  a  similar  opening.  As  always  happens,  these  great 
Judges  really  legislated.  They  stated  the  law,  and  in 
stating  developed  and  improved  it,  while  purporting  to 
do  no  more  than  apply  what  already  existed.  Few 
abler  judges  than  Lord  Stowell  have  ever  adorned  the 
Bench,  and  to  few  has  it  been  given  to  create  to  so 
great  an  extent  that  which  he  was  in  appearance  merely 
administering.  The  law  of  maritime  capture  in  time  of 
war,  prize-law  as  it  is  called,  was  a  formless  chaos 
when  he  went  to  the  Court  of  Admiralty  in  1798,  and  a 
reasoned  system  when  he  left  it  in  1828.  The  decisions 
of  a  Court  of  one  nation  in  matters  of  international 
right  as  between  belligerents,  or  belligerents  and  neu- 
trals, are  not  of  course  legally  binding  on  the  Courts 
of  another;  but  they  are  often  quoted  with  a  respect 
proportionate  to  the  reputation  of  the  Judge  for  learn- 
ing and  impartiality.  In  Lord  Stowell's  time  foreign 
jurists,  with  the  exception  perhaps  of  those  of  the 
United  States,  were  inclined  to  regard  his  decisions  as 
biassed  unduly  by  the  belligerent  interests  of  Great 
Britain.  But  after  his  death  his  work  gradually  per- 
meated the  whole  body  of  accepted  Prize  Law,  and 
many  of  the  principles  he  laid  down  have  been  embod- 
ied in  the  Law  of  Nations  through  the  operation  of 
some  of  those  Law-making  Treaties  which  we  must 
now  briefly  mention. 

Hitherto  in  dealing  with  the  growth  of  International 


5  6  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

Law  we  have  spoken  of  the  consent  of  Nations  as 
necessary  to  give  it  validity.  But  that  consent  has  al- 
ways meant  tacit  consent,  a  consent  evidenced  by  com- 
mon practice  and  the  expressions  of  opinion  to  be 
found  in  the  writings  and  declarations  of  prominent 
men  in  all  the  countries  of  the  civilised  world.  Tacit 
consent  is  a  plant  of  slow  growth.  It  takes  many  years 
for  a  new  opinion  to  march  round  the  globe,  or  for  a 
new  rule  to  establish  itself  in  the  practice  of  all  or  most 
states.  But  in  the  infancy  of  the  Society  of  Nations  no 
one  ever  dreamed  that  its  members  could  come  to- 
gether for  the  purpose  of  establishing  by  discussion 
and  agreement  rules  of  war,  or  even  rules  of  peaceful 
intercourse.  The  utmost  that  could  be  done  by  way  of 
common  action  was  to  gather  together  those  who  were 
belligerents  in  a  great  war,  in  order  that  by  common 
conference  they  might  settle  the  conditions  of  peace. 
This  was  accomplished  successfully  at  the  end  of  the 
terrible  Thirty  Years'  War  by  the  twin  Congresses  of 
Osnaburg  and  Miinster  in  1 644-1 648.  But  after  an 
interval  of  nearly  two  centuries  states  began  to  make 
by  treaties  or  other  international  instruments  express 
agreements  on  points  of  International  Law  and  prac- 
tice. By  the  joint  action  of  the  Congresses  of  Vienna 
of  18 1 5  and  Aix-la-Chapelle  of  18 18  the  rank  and 
precedence  of  diplomatic  ministers  were  settled,  and  in 
1856  by  a  Declaration  signed  and  negotiated  at  Paris 
along  with  the  great  Treaty  which  concluded  the  Cri- 
mean War  the  signatory  powers  in  effect  settled  several 
disputed  matters  connected  with  the  laws  of  war  at  sea. 


THE  GROWTH  OF  SOCIETY  57 

This  was  a  piece  of  informal  international  legislation, 
and  since  then  the  method  of  express  consent  has  ad- 
vanced by  giant  strides.  In  the  next  lecture  we  shall 
endeavour  to  trace  its  development;  and  meanwhile  it 
will  not  be  amiss  to  place  on  record  the  important  fact 
that  the  great  majority  of  those  who  have  thought  most 
seriously  upon  the  international  settlement  that  must 
come  when  the  present  war  is  over  are  convinced  that 
the  only  firm  basis  on  which  a  new  international  order 
can  be  established  is  common  agreement  embodied  in 
great  law-making  treaties,  and  supported  by  sufficient 
force  to  compel  obedience  in  the  last  resort. 


LECTURE  III. 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AS  IT  STOOD  IN 
JULY,  1 9 14. 

We  have  found  in  the  course  of  our  enquiries  into 
the  origin  of  modern  International  Law  that  from  the 
beginning  its  rules  were  based  to  some  extent  on  cus- 
tom evidenced  by  general  consent.  But  we  have  also 
seen  that  the  consent  referred  to  was  tacit  consent 
alone.  It  had  to  be  deduced  by  a  process  of  reasoning 
from  the  records  of  negotiations  and  wars,  and  the 
opinions  of  writers  and  speakers.  Grotius  declares 
that  he  made  use  of  the  testimony  of  philosophers,  his- 
torians, poets  and  orators  as  witnesses  to  this  consent. 
But  nowhere  does  he  cite  any  stipulation  signed  by  all 
or  most  nations.  And  the  reason  is  all-sufficient.  In 
his  time  no  such  stipulations  existed.  Treaties  there 
were  in  abundance;  but  none  of  them  set  forth  rules  of 
international  conduct  based  on  express  agreement  be- 
tween those  who  came  under  them.  Those  assemblies 
of  the  representatives  of  many  states  which  we  call 
Congresses  or  Conferences  were  unknown.  The  first 
in  European  history  were  the  Congresses  of  Osnaburg 
and  Miinster,  which  were  really  two  divisions  of  one 
great  gathering,  the  Protestant  powers  meeting  at  the 
first-named  place,  the  Roman  Catholic  at  the  second. 

58 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  1914      59 

But  they  assembled  for  the  purpose  of  making  peace 
after  a  great  war,  and  not  for  the  elaboration  of  gen- 
eral rules;  and  the  same  is  true  of  their  immediate 
successors.  The  two  Congresses  just  mentioned  gave 
us  in  1648  the  epoch-making  Peace  of  Westphalia.  The 
Congress  of  Ryswick  arranged  terms  in  1697  between 
Louis  XIV  of  France  and  his  ally  Spain  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other  the  great  coalition  against  him 
organised  by  William  III  of  England.  The  Congress 
of  Utrecht  in  17 13  ended  formally  the  long  struggle 
called  in  history  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession, 
though  in  effect  the  chief  terms  were  arranged  behind 
its  back  by  the  British  and  French  Ministers.  Neither 
of  these,  and  none  of  those  that  followed  during  the 
eighteenth  century,  did  more  than  lay  down  the  con- 
ditions on  which  a  group  of  warring  powers  were  con- 
tent to  sheathe  the  sword.  This  alone  was  a  great 
achievement.  But  it  cannot  be  described  as  a  step  to- 
wards the  evolution  of  anything  even  remotely  resem- 
bling a  legislature  for  states.  The  utmost  we  can  say 
is  that  it  created  a  position  of  honour  and  dignity  for 
the  big  assemblies  of  authoritative  and  official  national 
representatives  which  we  call  Conferences  and  our  fore- 
fathers called  Congresses.  We  must  however  note  that 
these  organs  were  very  imperfectly  developed.  There 
was  no  general  understanding  as  to  what  number  of 
states  must  come  together  in  order  to  constitute  a  Con- 
gress. Nor  was  there  any  rule  as  to  the  calling  of 
Congresses.  They  happened  more  or  less  by  accident, 
generally  after  a  great  war  had  been  for  some  time  in 


60  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

progress.  Questions  of  honour  and  precedence  at  them 
occupied  a  most  disproportionate  amount  of  attention 
and  energy.  The  shape  of  a  table,  for  instance,  was 
of  great  importance.  As  no  agreement  could  be  reached 
about  the  order  of  sitting  at  an  ordinary  long  rect- 
angular piece  of  furniture,  round  tables  were  intro- 
duced, and  for  a  time  all  was  harmony.  Then  some 
genius  discovered  that  the  place  of  honour  at  them  was 
opposite  the  door,  and  chaos  reigned  again.1  Now  a 
better  spirit  exists,  and  these  and  similar  matters  are 
quietly  settled  by  more  or  less  formal  agreement. 

The  first  Congresses,  then,  were  not  general  meet- 
ings of  the  Society  of  Nations  and  assumed  no  functions 
resembling  in  any  way  those  of  legislation.  But  a 
change  began  at  Vienna  in  1815.  The  assembled 
plenipotentiaries,  who  had  come  together  to  re-draw 
the  map  of  Europe  after  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  added 
to  their  labours  by  attacking  certain  other  questions, 
especially  those  concerned  with  the  use  of  great  arterial 
rivers  which  are  navigable  from  the  sea  for  a  long  dis- 
tance inland  and  run  through  the  territory  of  two  or 
more  states.  It  is  obvious  that  as  soon  as  any  of  them 
becomes  a  highway  of  commerce  many  questions  must 
arise,  as  to  the  navigation  of  its  waters.  The  primitive 
practice  was  to  stretch  an  obstruction  across  the  stream 
or  erect  a  battery  on  its  banks,  and  exact  as  heavy  a 
.toll  as  possible  for  permission  to  pass.  For  generations 
International  Law  took  no  notice  of  the  matter.  The 
questions  which  arose  in  connection  with  it  were  fought 

1  Lawrence,  International  Problems  and  Hague  Conferences,  p.  27. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14      61 

out  between  the  individuals  or  governments  directly 
concerned.  The  results  were  so  unsatisfactory  that 
some  form  of  international  regulation  was  desired,  and 
this  the  Congress  of  Vienna  endeavoured  to  supply. 
It  therefore  added  to  its  chief  purpose  of  negotiating 
an  European  peace  the  further  function  of  laying  down 
general  principles  for  dealing  with  these  matters,  and 
also  with  the  Slave  Trade,  the  rank  of  Diplomatic 
Representatives,  and  the  neutralisation  of  Switzerland, 
all  of  which  were  held  at  length  to  be  ripe  for  settle- 
ment by  common  consent.  And  on  this  occasion  the 
consent  was  embodied  in  the  formal  words  of  a  great 
international  agreement,  not  inferred  with  much  doubt 
and  some  hesitation  from  the  more  or  less  general 
practice  of  states.  Mankind  was  approaching  an  epoch 
of  something  not  altogether  unlike  legislation  by  ex- 
press consent. 

This  method  was  applied  to  the  creation  of  a  new 
class  of  diplomatic  agents  in  18 18,  and  the  neutralisa- 
tion of  Belgium  in  1831.  But  the  next  step  forwards 
was  taken  in  1856,  when  the  Conference  which  met  in 
Paris  to  end  the  Crimean  War  not  only  embodied  in  the 
Treaty  it  drew  up  ways  and  means  for  the  application 
to  the  Danube  of  the  principle  of  freedom  of  naviga- 
tion laid  down  in  18 15,  but  also  determined  a  number 
of  disputed  questions  connected  with  the  operations  of 
maritime  warfare.  This  last  was  done  by  a  separate 
document  negotiated  at  the  same  time  as  the  Treaty, 
but  not  set  forth  in  the  clauses  thereof.  It  was  called 
the  Declaration  of  Paris,  to  distinguish  it  from  the 


62  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

Treaty  of  Paris.  The  mere  recitation  of  its  provisions 
shews  their  great  importance.    They  ran  thus: 

i.    Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished. 

2.  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods  with  the 
exception  of  contraband  of  war. 

3.  Neutral  goods  with  the  exception  of  contraband 
of  war  are  not  liable  to  capture  under  the  enemy's 

flag. 

4.  Blockades  to  be  binding  must  be  effective. 

It  was  felt  that  such  comprehensive  developments  of 
International  Law  required  in  order  to  give  them  as- 
sured validity  the  express  consent  of  all,  or  at  least  the 
great  majority,  of  the  civilised  states  of  the  world. 
But  seven  powers  only  had  gathered  by  their  repre- 
sentatives round  the  Council-board  in  Paris.  Accord- 
ingly it  was  agreed  that  the  Declaration  should  be 
brought  to  the  notice  of  those  which  had  taken  no  part 
in  the  Congress,  and  that  their  formal  accession  should 
be  invited.  This  proviso  was  accompanied  by  another 
to  the  effect  that  "  the  present  Declaration  is  not,  and 
shall  not  be,  binding  except  between  those  powers  who 
have  acceded  or  shall  accede  to  it."  Within  a  few 
years  the  accession  of  nearly  every  state  had  been  given, 
while  the  few  who  still  held  aloof  acted  in  practice 
as  if  they  had  signed.  Thus  the  principle  of  altering 
or  adding  to  the  Law  of  Nations  by  formal  assent, 
which  had  been  implied  rather  than  stated  by  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  in  18 15,  received  direct  endorsement 
in  1856  by  the  Congress  of  Paris.  It  did  not  of  course 
diminish  the  validity  of  the   tacit  consent  evidenced 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  1914      63 

by  general  custom.    But  it  introduced  a  new  epoch  of 
legislative  or  quasi-legislative  activity. 

At  first  it  was  a  case  of  legislation  without  a 
legislature.  No  organised  body  existed  whose  function 
it  was  to  make  laws.  There  was  only  a  general  feeling 
that  if  all,  or  almost  all,  civilised  states  agreed  together 
as  to  a  rule  of  international  intercourse,  and  signed  a 
document  to  that  effect,  the  rule  in  question  was  binding 
on  the  entire  Society  of  Nations.  But  no  one  had 
authority  to  call  states  together  for  the  consideration 
of  such  a  rule.  Advantage  was  taken,  as  we  have  just 
seen,  of  the  assemblage  of  a  great  Congress  or  Confer- 
ence for  another  purpose  to  get  its  members  to  make  a 
few  laws  as  a  sort  of  by-product.  These  laws  were 
in  the  beginning  smuggled  as  it  were  into  the  Society 
of  Nations  as  part  of  a  Treaty  of  Peace.  Then  they 
were  enshrined  by  themselves  in  a  separate  document, 
and  the  attention  of  the  civilised  world  was  pointedly 
called  to  it.  The  civilised  world  responded  by  acclaim- 
ing the  new  rules,  and  admitting  them  into  the  code 
which  regulated  the  common  life.  Still  it  had  not  got 
beyond  the  point  of  regarding  express  consent  as  a 
valuable  source  of  law.  No  procedure  had  been  evolved 
for  convening  an  assembly  of  states  in  order  to  take 
their  opinion  on  proposals  placed  before  them  for 
discussion,  nor  was  there  any  accepted  method  for 
formulating  such  proposals.  Everything  was  left  to 
the  hazard  of  the  moment,  and  any  state  that  chose 
might  take  the  initiative  on  the  chance  of  being  fol- 
lowed by  the  rest.    Indeed  it  might  come  from  private 


64  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

individuals  in  the  first  place,  if  only  they  could  in  the 
end  induce  some  government  to  make  corresponding 
diplomatic  approaches  to  other  governments. 

This  was  the  case  with  the  first  Geneva  Convention, 
that  of  1864.  Two  Swiss  citizens,  MM.  Moynier 
and  Dunant,  witnessed  the  awful  sufferings  of  the 
wounded  at  the  battles  of  Magenta  and  Solferino  in 
1859,  and  were  so  horrified  thereby  that  one  of  them 
wrote  a  terribly  descriptive  book  on  the  subject,  and 
both  moved  the  Swiss  Government  to  summon  a  Con- 
ference for  the  purpose  of  finding  means  to  alleviate 
the  miseries  of  the  stricken  soldiers.  Twelve  powers 
came  together  and  adopted  the  principle  of  what  was 
called  the  neutralisation  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  and 
also  of  all  the  persons  and  things  concerned  with  the 
proper  care  of  them.  This  principle  was  worked  out 
in  a  great  international  document  by  the  representatives 
of  the  twelve  states  who  attended  the  Conference.  The 
product  of  their  labours  was  called  the  Geneva  Con- 
vention from  the  place  where  it  was  drawn  up.  In  the 
years  that  followed  all  other  civilised  powers  signified 
their  adhesion  to  it;  and  when  in  1906  the  time  for 
revision  came,  the  representatives  of  no  less  than  thirty- 
six  states  attended  a  second  Geneva  Conference,  and 
drew  up  a  second  Geneva  Convention  more  complete 
and  satisfactory  than  the  first. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  humanity  the  Geneva 
Convention  of  1864  marked  a  great  advance;  but  as 
regards  the  evolution  of  a  legislative  authority  for 
states  it  registered  no  progress.    It  did  but  continue  the 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14      65 

method  first  adopted  in  1856,  when,  as  we  have  just 
seen,  a  comparatively  few  powers  met  and  originated  a 
great  reform,  but  did  not  deem  it  binding  except  as 
between  those  who  had  originally  adopted  it,  or  had 
afterwards  given  their  adhesion  to  it.  The  same  thing 
may  be  said  of  the  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg,  ne- 
gotiated in  1868  by  the  military  delegates  of  eighteen 
states,  who  met  together  at  the  instance  of  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  II  of  Russia,  and  endeavoured  to 
place  restrictions  on  the  use  of  explosive  bullets  in  war. 
They  agreed  to  prohibit  any  projectile  below  14  oz.  in 
weight  "  which  is  either  explosive  or  charged  with  ful- 
minating or  inflammable  substances."  But  they  did 
not  deem  their  mission  accomplished  till  all  other 
civilised  states  had  been  invited  to  accede  to  the  Decla- 
ration they  had  drawn  up,  and  most  had  responded 
favourably.  The  case  helps  to  show  that  in  the  middle 
of  the  last  century  states  accepted,  almost  without 
knowing  it,  the  principle  that  consent  given  in  express 
words  by  all  or  most  of  the  civilised  powers  of  the 
world  would  turn  a  rule  so  supported  into  binding  Inter- 
national Law,  even  when  it  was  not  deduced  from 
general  usage,  but  admittedly  initiated  a  practice  un- 
known before. 

Moreover  there  seems  to  have  been  a  feeling  abroad 
that  Europe  must  take  the  lead  in  these  matters.  None 
but  European  states  were  summoned  to  the  Confer- 
ence at  Geneva  in  1864,  and  of  the  eighteen  who  came 
together  at  St.  Petersburg  in  1868  only  one,  Persia, 
summoned  because  she  had  a  permanent  diplomatic 


66  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

representative  at  the  Russian  Court,  was  entirely  non- 
European,  a  second,  Turkey,  being  partly  within  and 
partly  without  the  geographical  limits  of  Europe.  And 
further,  when  in  1874  Russian  initiative  again  gathered 
together  a  Conference,  this  time  at  Brussels,  for  the 
purpose  of  elaborating  an  International  Code  for  the 
conduct  of  war  on  land,  none  but  European  powers, 
if  we  may  count  Turkey  as  such,  took  part  in  the  pro- 
ceedings. On  the  other  hand  a  little  further  on  we 
find  the  United  States  of  America  represented,  mainly 
for  humanitarian  reasons,  in  the  Congo  Conference 
of  1884  and  the  Brussels  Anti-Slavery  Conference  of 
1890. 

This  brings  us  to  the  first  of  the  so-called  Peace 
Conferences  at  The  Hague.  The  date  of  it  was  1899. 
At  the  end  of  an  old  century  it  sought  to  inaugurate  a 
new  era  in  international  relations,  and  met  with  a  far 
greater  measure  of  success  than  is  commonly  supposed. 
If  it  failed  in  its  first  purpose,  which  was  "  the  main- 
tenance of  the  general  peace,  and  a  possible  reduction 
of  the  excessive  armaments  which  were  burdening  all 
nations,"  it  nevertheless  revealed  to  the  world  the 
possibility  of  creating  an  international  legislature,  and 
gave  an  enormous  accession  of  strength  to  the  cause  of 
international  arbitration.  It  may  be  doubted  whether 
these  things  were  contemplated  by  the  original  pro- 
moter of  the  Conference,  Nicholas  II,  the  weak  and 
unfortunate  Tsar  whose  career  as  a  ruler  has  lately 
come  to  such  an  ignominious  end.  He  has  fallen  now, 
and  there  are  none  so  poor  as  to  do  him  reverence;  but 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  1914      67 

when  all  that  can  be  said  against  him  has  been  uttered, 
it  should  be  remembered  in  his  favour  that  almost  as 
soon  as  he  entered  the  ranks  of  the  world's  high 
rulers  he  strove  to  use  his  new  power  to  give  effect  to 
the  idealism  of  his  early  youth. 

Many  things  happened  in  the  interval  between  1874 
and  1899.  The  world  grew  bigger  in  one  sense  and 
smaller  in  another — bigger,  in  that  state  after  state 
in  the  New  World  and  in  Asia  endeavoured  as  it  be- 
came stronger  and  more  civilised  to  play  its  part  in  the 
charmed  circle  of  the  Society  of  Nations,  smaller,  in 
that  the  old  isolations  were  found  to  be  no  longer 
possible  with  the  advent  of  quicker  means  of  communi- 
cation. This  double  process  enlarged  to  a  remarkable 
degree  the  horizon  of  statesmen.  They  had  to  take 
into  consideration  the  views  of  governments  and  peo- 
ples who  had  been  previously  ignored.  If  Europe  was 
still  the  centre  it  no  longer  contained  the  circumference 
also  of  the  international  circle.  Though  the  old 
phrases  about  European  civilisation,  European  public 
law  and  the  European  family  of  nations  were  constantly 
repeated,  and  for  the  matter  of  that  are  repeated  still, 
virtue  had  begun  to  go  out  of  them.  It  was  felt  that 
international  society  was  as  wide  as  the  globe,  and  that 
the  Great  Powers  were  World  Powers  instead  of  mere- 
ly European  Powers.  In  consequence  when  Russia 
began  to  ventilate  her  new  Tsar's  ideas  about  peace  and 
disarmament,  her  Foreign  Office  addressed  a  circular 
letter  in  1898  to  all  the  states  who  sent  diplomatic 
representatives  to  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg,  whether 


68  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

they  were  European,  American  or  Asiatic.  Accordingly 
the  representatives  of  twenty-six  states  assembled  in 
1 899  in  the  Knights'  Hall  at  The  Hague.  But  this  was 
only  a  beginning.  When  eight  years  afterwards  the 
second  Peace  Conference  came  together,  the  widening 
process  begun  in  1899  was  extended  almost  to  the 
furthest  limits  possible.  On  the  most  liberal  computa- 
tion there  are  barely  fifty  civilised  and  independent 
states  in  the  world.  At  The  Hague  in  1907  forty- 
four  of  them  were  represented,  and  of  these  twenty- 
one  were  European,  nineteen  American,  and  four 
Asiatic. 

Before  we  pass  on  to  consider  the  work  of  these 
Hague  Conferences  we  must  dwell  for  a  few  moments 
on  their  form.  The  first  of  them  was  a  tentative  effort 
to  bring  civilised  mankind  together  by  the  representa- 
tives of  their  governments;  and  while  it  made  a  good 
beginning  it  did  not  achieve  complete  success  in  this  re- 
spect. The  second  approached  the  end  in  view  so  very 
nearly  that  it  may  be  held  for  all  practical  purposes  to 
have  attained  it.  The  civilised  world  came  together 
for  the  first  time  in  history,  and  remained  in  consulta- 
tion for  four  long  months.  This  was  in  itself  a  won- 
derful achievement.  It  convinced  the  most  sceptical 
of  the  reality  of  what  many  had  regarded  as  a  mere 
humanitarian  dream;  for  no  one  can  deny  the  existence 
of  a  Society  of  Nations  when  the  records  of  a  pro- 
longed General  Meeting  can  be  produced  to  confute 
him.  Nor  is  the  significance  of  this  great  fact  seriously 
diminished  when  it  is  pointed  out,  with  a  good  deal  of 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14      69 

malice  as  well  as  a  good  deal  of  truth,  that  the  pro- 
cedure was  chaotic,  the  results  disproportionate  to  the 
labour  expended,  and  the  lofty  professions  of  the  lead- 
ing states  often  belied  by  self-seeking  and  intrigue.  It 
is  a  common  device  of  the  opponents  of  progress  to 
decry  the  efforts  of  reformers  on  the  ground  that  their 
work  is  not  perfect  nor  their  characters  flawless.  The 
existing  order  may  have  a  thousand  defects,  and  it  is 
nevertheless  supported.  But  if  ten  can  be  found  in 
what  is  proposed  as  a  substitute,  the  world  rings  with 
denunciation.  The  real  question  is  not  whether  the 
new  is  perfect,  but  whether  it  is  not  so  superior  to  the 
old  as  to  make  worth  while,  and  more  than  worth 
while,  the  labour  and  upheaval  of  the  change.  And 
surely  few  will  be  found  to  declare  that  haphazard 
gatherings  got  together  on  the  spur  of  the  moment  are 
better  instruments  of  progress  in  the  international 
sphere  than  solemn  assemblies  of  all  the  powers  whose 
voices  have  any  reasonable  title  to  be  heard. 

The  second  Hague  Conference  did  undoubtedly  con- 
template a  series  of  such  gatherings,  for  in  its  Final 
Act  it  recommended  "  the  assembly  of  a  third  Peace 
Conference,  which  might  be  held  within  a  period  corre- 
sponding to  that  which  has  elapsed  since  the  preceding 
Conference,  at  a  date  to  be  fixed  by  common  agreement 
between  the  Powers."  The  troubles  in  the  Balkan 
peninsula,  and  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  pre- 
vented the  carrying  out  of  this  recommendation,  though 
a  considerable  amount  of  preparation  for  a  third  meet- 
ing had  taken  place.    One  of  the  great  questions  to  be 


70  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

decided  at  the  return  of  peace  is  whether  the  present 
rudimentary  organisation  is  to  be  improved,  or 
whether  the  powers  are  to  lapse  into  the  worse  than 
barbaric  condition  of  never  coming  together  to  deal 
with  common  affairs  by  common  deliberations. 

We  can  now  see  plainly  that  when  the  World-War 
broke  out  in  1914  the  Society  of  Nations  had  been  for 
almost  exactly  a  century  working  its  way  towards  an 
international  legislature,  and  had  almost  reached  the 
goal.  Though  the  development  was  unconscious  it  was 
none  the  less  real.  It  began  by  the  recognition  of  ex- 
press consent  as  a  source  of  the  laws  which  regulate  the 
intercourse  of  states,  side  by  side  with  the  tacit  consent 
embodied  in  binding  customs.  Then  an  organ  was 
slowly  evolved  for  the  formal  annunciation  and  regis- 
tration of  that  express  consent.  This  organ  was  a 
periodical  assemblage  of  representatives  of  the  gov- 
ernments of  all  civilised  states.  When  in  1907  it  came 
into  action  for  the  second  time,  its  membership  was 
well-nigh  complete;  but  it  found  itself  hampered  at 
every  turn  by  the  absence  of  authoritative  rules  of 
procedure.  Each  state  had  a  vote;  yet  in  a  rough  and 
ready  way  votes  were  weighed  as  well  as  counted; 
and  it  was  recognised  that  nothing  was  to  be  regarded 
as  passed  which  was  strongly  opposed  by  a  minority 
considerable  either  in  numbers  or  in  weight.  The 
Conference  was  divided  into  Committees,  but  their 
work  sometimes  overlapped,  and  it  depended  on  the 
will  of  a  Chairman  whether  a  given  subject  was  dis- 
cussed or  ruled  out  as  irrelevant.     The  question  of 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14       71 

giving  votes  on  a  basis  of  population,  wealth,  or  terri- 
tory, or  some  combination  of  all  these,  was  too  thorny 
to  be  discussed.  But  the  further  question  of  prepar- 
ing the  business  beforehand,  and  bringing  out  a  pro- 
gramme which  the  Governments  concerned  could  study 
in  advance,  was  carefully  considered,  with  the  result 
that  a  very  reasonable  proposition  was  put  forward  in 
the  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  of  1907.  It  was  sug- 
gested that  "  some  two  years  before  the  probable  date 
of  the  meeting  (of  a  third  Conference)  a  preparatory 
Committee  should  be  charged  by  Governments  with  the 
task  of  collecting  the  various  proposals  to  be  submitted 
to  the  Conference,  of  ascertaining  what  subjects  are 
ripe  for  embodiment  in  an  International  Regulation, 
and  of  preparing  a  programme  which  the  Governments 
should  decide  upon  in  sufficient  time  to  enable  it  to  be 
carefully  examined  by  the  countries  interested."  It 
added  that  "  This  committee  should  further  be  en- 
trusted with  the  task  of  proposing  a  system  of  organi- 
sation and  procedure  for  the  Conference  itself." 

An  agitation  for  the  appointment  of  this  Inter- 
national Committee  was  going  on,  and  some  states  had 
already  set  small  groups  of  officials  and  experts  to 
work  in  gathering  information  and  forming  conclusions 
for  their  own  guidance,  when  the  great  catastrophe  of 
the  World-War  overwhelmed  us.  Then  came  the  day 
when  the  firm  foundations  of  the  earth  rocked  beneath 
our  feet,  and  the  light  of  the  sun  of  progress  was 
quenched  in  the  red  mist  of  war.  Before  we  attempt 
to  describe  the  overthrow  let  us  look  round,  and  see 


72  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

how  the   fabric  of  International  Law  stood  on  the 
fateful  31st  July,  19 14. 

We  find  in  the  first  place  the  beginnings  of  an 
Arbitral  Jurisprudence.  The  reference  to  Arbitration 
of  disputes  between  states  which  the  parties  concerned 
are  not  able  to  settle  for  themselves  is  almost  as  old 
as  war.  Instances  of  it  can  be  found  in  Greek  History, 
and  indeed  in  nearly  all  history  if  we  give  a  wide  inter- 
pretation to  the  phrase.  The  Vir  pietate  gravis,  the 
man  weighty  because  of  his  character,  has  been  called  in 
by  savage  tribes,  as  well  as  by  cultured  Hellenic  cities, 
to  compose  their  quarrels,  and  prevent  by  a  just  decision 
an  appeal  to  the  sword.  But  Arbitration  as  an  orga- 
nised system  for  referring  to  acknowledged  experts 
in  the  laws  and  customs  of  states  differences  between 
two  or  more  of  them  which  their  diplomacy  cannot 
clear  up,  is  a  product  of  the  nineteenth  century.  It 
presupposes  two  things  neither  of  which  had  a  vigor- 
ous and  widespread  existence  till  then.  The  first  is  a 
system  of  legal  rules  and  accepted  customs  covering 
many,  if  not  all,  of  the  occasions  likely  to  arise  in  the 
mutual  intercourse  of  states;  and  the  second  is  a  con- 
siderable body  of  men  well  versed  in  these  laws  and 
customs,  and  able  by  reason  of  their  ability  and  integ- 
rity to  apply  them  without  fear  or  favour  to  the  cases 
brought  under  their  notice.  All  through  the  century 
International  Law  grew  apace.  Towards  the  end  of 
it  the  conviction  that  in  four  cases  out  of  five  it  was 
safe  to  arbitrate  spread  rapidly.  After  the  important 
Geneva  Arbitration  of   1872   between   Great   Britain 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14      73 

and  the  United  States,  on  what  were  termed  collectively 
the  Alabama  Claims,  the  cases  became  much  more  nu- 
merous, and  took  more  decidedly  the  form  of  pleading 
between  parties  before  a  High  Court  of  Justice.  It  is 
almost  impossible  to  obtain  figures  that  are  absolutely 
correct,  but  we  may  say  without  much  risk  of  contradic- 
tion that  there  were  about  177  cases  from  1794  to  the 
end  of  1900,1  and  add  that  between  1900  and  19 17  as 
many  as  50  more  can  be  found.  As  a  rule  Arbitrators 
were  chosen  not  because  they  were  kings  and  rulers,  or 
even  men  of  high  character  and  sound  judgment  who 
could  be  expected  to  reach  an  equitable  decision  by  the 
light  of  nature,  but  because  they  had  special  knowledge 
of  the  Jus  Gentium,  and  might  be  trusted  to  give  judg- 
ment according  to  its  rules  and  principles.  States  were 
far  more  willing  to  submit  their  claims  to  an  expert  in 
a  known  law  than  they  had  been  to  invoke  the  aid  of  a 
non-professional  umpire.  In  that  frame  of  mind  they 
came  to  the  first  Hague  Conference  in  1899,  and  there 
agreed  to  provide  the  Society  of  Nations  with  what  they 
called  a  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration.  What  fol- 
lows shows  that  this  was  a  misnomer;  but  the  institu- 
tion to  which  it  was  applied  marked  a  very  great  ad- 
vance in  the  provision  of  means  for  the  Pacific  Settle- 
ment of  International  Disputes.  Every  power  which 
signed  the  Convention  with  this  title  negotiated  at  the 
Conference,  received  the  right  of  nominating  "  four 
persons  at  the  most,  of  known  competency  in  questions 

1  Dr.   James   Brown   Scott,    The  Hague    Conferences,   Vol.   I,    pp. 
224-225. 


74  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

of  International  Law,  of  the  highest  moral  reputation, 
and  disposed  to  accept  the  duties  of  Arbitrator."  1 
From  the  long  list  thus  obtained  the  powers  which 
decide  to  have  recourse  to  the  so-called  Permanent 
Court  may  choose  their  judges  by  agreement  between 
themselves.  But  if  they  fail  to  agree,  each  side  is  to 
nominate  two  from  the  list,  and  these  four  together 
choose  an  Umpire.  To  this  it  was  added  in  1907  that 
only  one  of  the  two  chosen  by  each  party  can  be  its  citi- 
zen or  an  Arbitrator  nominated  by  it.  What  is  perma- 
nent in  this  arrangement  is  not  the  Court,  but  the  list 
of  persons  from  among  whom  the  Court  is  to  be  con- 
stituted. There  it  is  always;  though  the  individuals 
of  whom  it  is  composed  may  change.  Each  is  appointed 
for  six  years,  and  may  be  reappointed  by  his  govern- 
ment at  the  end  of  that  time. 

But  though  strictly  speaking  there  is  no  Permanent 
Court  the  continuous  existence  of  the  means  of  making 
a  Court  whenever  it  is  wanted  is  a  great  improvement 
upon  the  previous  state  of  affairs,  when  two  disputants 
already  heated  by  a  diplomatic  controversy  had  to 
agree  at  the  last  moment  not  only  on  the  employment 
of  an  Arbitral  Tribunal,  but  also  on  how  to  create  it 
and  what  its  procedure  should  be.  These  last  mat- 
ters are  dealt  with  in  the  Hague  Convention  for  the 
Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes  as  nego- 
tiated in  1899  and  revised  in  1907. 2     But  it  must  be 

1  See  Article  23  of  the  Convention  of  1899,  and  Article  44  of  the 
similar  Convention  of  1907. 
*See  Chs.  II-IV. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  1914      75 

carefully  noted  that  there  is  nothing  compulsory  about 
the  whole  scheme.  The  powers  who  made  it  did  not 
thereby  bind  themselves  to  use  the  machinery  they 
created.  They  need  not  arbitrate  at  all;  or,  if  they 
arbitrate,  they  may  call  into  existence  a  tribunal  fash- 
ioned according  to  any  plan  that  seems  good  to  them  at 
the  time,  or,  if  they  use  the  Hague  Tribunal,  they  may 
vary  the  prescribed  procedure  as  they  think  fit. 

The  Peace  Conference  of  1907  went  so  far  as  to 
proclaim  in  its  Final  Act  its  unanimity  "  in  admitting 
the  principle  of  compulsory  arbitration,"  but  lamented 
its  inability  to  conclude  a  General  Convention  in  that 
sense.  Nevertheless  it  gave  a  broad  hint1  to  the  powers 
to  conclude  among  themselves  particular  Conventions 
binding  the  parties  to  arbitrate  in  all  cases  not  spe- 
cially excepted  in  the  agreement  itself;  and  this  hint 
has  been  followed  by  the  negotiation  of  nearly  two  hun- 
dred such  Conventions.  It  also  made  a  serious  and 
long-sustained  effort  to  create  a  great  High  Court  of 
Arbitral  Justice  which,  like  the  Law  Courts  of  civilised 
states,  should  have  a  continuous  existence  and  sit  at 
regular  intervals  to  deal  with  any  disputes  which  might 
be  brought  before  it.  But  the  attempt  failed  owing  to 
the  insistence  by  some  states  on  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  equality  to  such  matters  as  the  appoint- 
ment of  Judges.  In  the  end  the  Conference  had  to  be 
content  with  calling  the  attention  of  the  Signatory  Pow- 
ers to  "  the  advisability  of  adopting  the  annexed  draft 

1  Hague  Convention  of  1907,  For  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  Interna- 
tional Disputes,  Art.  40. 


76  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

Convention  for  the  creation  of  a  Judicial  Arbitration 
Court,  and  of  bringing  it  into  force  as  soon  as  an 
agreement  has  been  reached  respecting  the  selection  of 
the  Judges  and  the  constitution  of  the  Court.1 

After  making  all  possible  deductions  on  account  of 
this  and  other  failures,  we  cannot  but  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  by  the  end  of  the  year  1907  a  very  great 
step  had  been  taken  towards  the  creation  of  a  world- 
wide system  of  Arbitral  Courts.  Especially  is  this 
borne  in  upon  us  when  we  remember  that  fourteen  in- 
ternational controversies  have  been  settled  by  Hague 
Tribunals  since  they  were  called  into  existence  in  1899. 
Some  of  these  quarrels,  like  the  age-long  Atlantic  Fish- 
eries dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  America,  had 
more  than  once  brought  powerful  states  to  the  verge  of 
war.  Moreover  many  more  differences  that  diplomacy 
failed  to  remove  have  yielded  to  the  influence  of  boards 
of  Arbitration  created  by  the  parties  themselves.  Of 
course  International  Law  grew  in  the  process  of  ap- 
plication. As  the  number  of  Arbitrations  increased 
something  like  an  Arbitral  Jurisprudence  began  to 
spring  up;  and  we  know  from  experience  of  our  own 
British  and  American  legal  procedure  that  the  invoca- 
tion of  precedents  often  leads  to  an  almost  imper- 
ceptible extension  of  the  rules  on  which  they  are 
based. 

This  mention  of  rules  brings  us  to  the  further  con- 
clusion, that  there  was  when  the  war  broke  out  in  the 
Summer  of  19 14  a  rapidly  increasing  Statute  Book  of 

1  Final  Act  of  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907,  Voeu  1. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14      77 

the  Law  of  Nations.  To  make  the  matter  quite  clear 
we  must  refer  back  for  a  moment  to  what  has  been 
already  said  regarding  the  general  recognition  of  ex- 
press consent  as  a  source  of  International  Law.  Di- 
rectly states  were  agreed  on  this  their  willingness  to 
make  new  rules,  or  clear  up  disputed  interpretations 
of  old  ones,  would  depend  upon  the  strength  or  weak- 
ness of  their  sense  of  a  need  for  them.  We  have  seen 
that  the  general  consciousness  of  such  need  was  so 
great  that  the  institution  called  the  Hague  Conference, 
originally  devised  as  an  expedient  of  the  moment  to 
fulfil  another  purpose,  was  when  the  World-War  broke 
out  in  process  of  being  turned  into  a  permanent  organ 
for  the  satisfaction  of  legislative  necessities.  The  first 
of  the  two  so-called  Peace  Conferences  that  have  been 
held  at  The  Hague  produced  three  Conventions — one 
for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes, 
one  concerning  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on  Land, 
and  one  for  the  Adaptation  of  the  Principles  of  the 
Geneva  Convention  to  Maritime  Warfare.  These 
Conventions  were  in  effect  International  Statutes  bind- 
ing the  signatory  powers,  and  the  same  may  be  said 
of  the  Declarations  embodied  in  the  Final  Act.  The 
one  Resolution  which  affirmed  the  desirability  of  the 
restriction  of  military  budgets,  but  took  no  steps  to- 
wards the  attainment  of  this  desirable  end,  cannot  be 
placed  in  the  same  category;  neither  can  the  six  Wishes 
which  merely  set  forth  a  programme  for  the  future. 
The  second  Conference  succeeded  in  negotiating  no  less 
than  thirteen  Conventions.     These  of  course  are  In- 


78  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

ternational  Statutes  in  the  same  sense  as  the  Conven- 
tions of  the  first  Conference;  and  what  has  just  been 
said  of  its  Declarations,  Resolutions  and  Wishes  ap- 
plies with  equal  force  to  those  of  the  second.  The  two 
together  have  produced  a  large  number  of  quasi- 
legislative  documents,  some  of  which  rise  in  length  and 
importance  almost  to  the  dimensions  of  codes.  In 
addition  we  have  to  remember  that  even  if  we  rule 
out  of  account  the  little  bits  of  legislation  sometimes 
contained  in  treaties  dealing  with  other  matters,  there 
are  pre-Hague  documents,  such  as  the  Declarations 
of  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg  and  the  two  Geneva  Con- 
ventions, that  must  rank  along  with  the  legislative 
transactions  of  the  Conferences.  Taking  them  to- 
gether they  form  a  considerable  volume  which  we  may 
with  justice  call  the  first  Statute  Book  of  the  Law  of 
Nations.  And  in  giving  it  that  exalted  name,  we  may 
venture  to  hope  that  it  will  in  time  be  followed  by  many 
similar  volumes.  But  we  must  be  on  our  guard  against 
the  assumption  that  this  Statute  Book  contains  all  the 
rules  which  states  are  bound  to  observe  in  their  mutual 
relations.  Those  based  on  tacit  consent  must  be  added. 
The  two  together  make  up  the  observances  which  have 
gained  authority  in  the  Society  of  Nations.  It  is  im- 
possible to  go  through  the  whole  code  or  any  consider- 
able part  of  it  in  a  single  lecture;  but  special  attention 
must  be  called  to  two  or  three  matters,  if  we  are  to 
obtain  a  clear  idea  of  how  International  Law  stood  in 
the  early  Summer  of  19 14.  We  will  begin  with  the 
attempts  which  were  made  from  time  to  time  to  codify 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  1914      79 

the  Laws  of  War  on  Land.  Their  history  illustrates 
in  a  remarkable  way  the  gradual  growth  of  Inter- 
national Law,  showing  the  influence  of  both  custom  and 
express  consent,  and  containing  excellent  examples  of 
the  work  of  private  individuals,  Associations,  and 
Governments. 

A  large  share  of  the  labours  of  Grotius  was  devoted, 
as  we  saw  in  the  first  lecture,  to  the  improvement  of 
the  laws  of  war,  and  undoubtedly  his  writings  had  a 
great  effect  in  humanising  them.  In  spite  of  occasional 
lapses  into  savagery  there  was  a  steady  improvement 
in  them  from  his  time  to  the  Wars  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution, and  again  from  18 15  onwards.  But  no  attempt 
was  made  to  bring  them  together  in  one  comprehensive 
set  of  regulations  till  1863,  when  in  the  midst  of  the 
American  Civil  War  the  Government  of  Washington 
issued  "  Instructions  "  for  the  guidance  of  its  armies. 
These  were  compiled  by  Dr.  Lieber,  a  learned  German 
who  had  emigrated  in  his  youth  to  the  United  States, 
and  became  an  American  citizen.  His  work  was  well 
done;  and  the  example  of  President  Lincoln  in  provid- 
ing the  Federal  troops  with  such  a  guide  was  followed 
by  the  rulers  of  several  important  states.  But  no  at- 
tempt was  made  to  create  a  common  Code  for  all 
states  by  international  agreement  till  1874,  when  at 
the  instance  of  Alexander  II  of  Russia  a  Conference 
of  representatives  of  fourteen  European  powers  was 
held  at  Brussels  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  up  such  a 
body  of  rules,  based  upon  the  best  customs  of  the  most 
enlightened  nations  and  containing  what  improvements 


8o  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

and  modifications  could  command  general  assent.  The 
Conference  succeeded  in  performing  the  task  of  codifi- 
cation assigned  to  it.  In  the  process  it  made  much  use 
of  the  American  "  Instructions."  Its  Code  was  by  no 
means  complete,  but  it  embodied  as  far  as  it  went  a 
high  standard  of  humanity  and  respect  for  the  life, 
property  and  honour  of  non-combatant  civilians.  But 
for  a  variety  of  reasons  its  work  failed  to  obtain  ratifi- 
cation from  the  Governments  concerned,  and  therefore 
had  none  of  the  binding  force  that  comes  from  express 
consent.  The  matter  was  next  taken  up  by  the  Institut 
de  Droit  International,  an  Association  of  the  leading 
International  Jurists  of  the  civilised  world,  who  meet 
together  from  time  to  time  to  discuss  legal  questions 
connected  with  the  mutual  relations  of  states.  After 
long  study  and  much  debate  they  passed  a  Manual  of 
the  Laws  of  War  on  Land  at  their  Oxford  Session  in 
1880.  It  had,  of  course,  no  binding  force  on  nations 
and  governments,  but,  like  other  pronouncements  of 
the  Institut,  it  possesses  the  authority  which  the  consid- 
ered opinion  of  the  best  experts  in  a  given  subject  must 
always  have  with  intelligent  people.  It,  and  the  Brus- 
sels Declaration,  and  the  American  "  Instructions " 
were  the  chief  sources  of  the  famous  Reglement  at- 
tached to  the  Hague  "  Convention  concerning  the  Laws 
and  Customs  of  War  on  Land."  This  was  drawn  up  at 
the  first  Peace  Conference  in  1899,  and  revised  at  the 
Second  in  1907.  The  Convention  to  which  it  was  ap- 
pended did  not  include  the  Regulations  themselves.  But 
it  bound  the  signatory  powers  to  issue  to  their  armed 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14      81 

land  forces  instructions  in  conformity  with  them; x  and 
by  stipulating  that  the  provisions  contained  in  them 
"  are  only  binding  between  the  contracting  powers,  and 
only  if  all  the  belligerents  are  parties  to  the  Conven- 
tion," 2  it  certainly  implied  that  in  all  other  circum- 
stances they  were  binding.  Moreover  the  revised  Con- 
vention of  1907  contained  a  new  Article,  which  declares 
that  a  belligerent  which  violated  the  Convention  should 
be  liable  to  make  compensation,  and  should  be  respon- 
sible for  all  acts  committed  by  persons  forming  part  of 
its  armed  forces.3  In  the  face  of  stipulations  like  these 
it  is  idle  to  argue,  as  Germany  does,  that  nothing  be- 
yond a  sort  of  platonic  approval  of  the  Code  is  re- 
quired from  the  powers  who  accepted  the  Convention.4 
The  Code  or  Reglement  is  by  no  means  complete. 
Certain  matters  were  deliberately  omitted,  such  as  re- 
prisals, and  the  treatment  of  those  who  are  sometimes 
called  war-rebels,  because,  as  the  preamble  to  the  Con- 
vention says,  it  is  not  possible  "  to  agree  forthwith  on 
provisions  embracing  all  the  circumstances  that  may 
occur  in  practice."  But  that  same  preamble  went  on 
to  guard  especially  against  the  assumption  "  that  the 
cases  not  provided  for  should,  for  want  of  a  written 
provision,  be  left  to  the  arbitrary  judgment  of  the 
military  commanders."       It  did  so  in  the  remarkable 

1  Hague  Convention  concerning  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on 
Land,  Art.  i. 
'Ibid.,  Art.  2. 

*  Ibid.,  Art.  3.     (1907.) 

*  See   Introduction   to  Kriegsbrauch   im   Landkriege    (The   German 
Official  War  Book). 


82  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

words  that  "  Until  a  more  complete  Code  of  the  laws 
of  war  can  be  issued,  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
think  it  expedient  to  declare  that  in  cases  not  included 
in  the  Regulations  adopted  by  them,  populations  and 
belligerents  remain  under  the  protection  and  the  rule 
of  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations,  as  they  result 
from  the  usages  established  between  civilised  peoples, 
from  the  laws  of  humanity,  and  the  requirements  of  the 
public  conscience."  It  is  curious  to  reflect  that  the 
signature  of  a  German  plenipotentiary  was  affixed  to 
this  document  only  eleven  years  ago,  and  still  more 
curious  to  attempt  to  fathom  "  the  requirements  of  the 
public  conscience  "  of  Germany.  Apparently  this  pecu- 
liar faculty  condemns  common  courtesy  and  humanity 
to  prisoners  of  war,  approves  of  the  destruction  of 
sick  and  wounded  who  believe  themselves  in  safety 
under  the  Red  Cross,  and  applauds  the  drowning  at  sea 
of  helpless  women  and  children. 

The  next  point  to  be  emphasised  is  that  by  the  mid- 
dle of  the  year  19 14  parts  of  the  Law  of  War  at  Sea 
had  been  settled,  while  the  unratified  Declaration  of 
London  of  1909  and  the  unofficial  Oxford  Manuel  of 
19 13  represented  attempts  to  settle  other  portions  also. 
Among  the  subjects  dealt  with  by  the  Second  Peace 
Conference  at  The  Hague  were  submarine  mines,  bom- 
bardments by  naval  forces,  the  duties  and  immunities 
of  hospital  ships,  the  exemption  from  capture  of  coast 
fishing  boats  and  certain  other  craft,  the  legal  position 
of  enemy  merchant  vessels  at  the  outbreak  of  hostili- 
ties,  the   conversion   of   merchantmen   into   warships, 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  19 14       83 

and  the  rights  and  duties  of  neutral  states  in  maritime 
warfare.  On  this  great  cluster  of  subjects  authoritative 
rules  were  laid  down,  sometimes  in  a  thorough  and  sat- 
isfactory manner,  sometimes  very  incompletely.  Taken 
as  a  whole  they  marked  a  great  advance  towards  a  real 
code  for  the  regulation  of  war  at  sea.  Moreover  the 
process  commenced  by  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907 
was  carried  on  by  the  much  smaller  Naval  Conference 
of  London  summoned  by  Great  Britain  in  the  autumn 
of  1908.  Early  in  1909  it  produced  the  ill-starred 
Declaration  of  London,  whose  misfortune  was  that  it 
came  either  too  late  or  too  soon — too  late  for  the  regu- 
lation of  a  sea-order  about  to  perish  owing  to  advances 
of  science  and  retrogressions  of  morality,  and  too  soon 
for  the  regulation  of  a  new  order  whose  outlines  are 
yet  in  the  making.  It  failed  as  we  all  know;  but  had  it 
succeeded  it  would  have  given  the  authority  of  the 
leading  maritime  states  to  a  great  act  of  reconciliation 
and  construction.  A  similar  statement  cannot  of  course 
be  made  concerning  the  Manuel  of  the  laws  of  war  as 
between  belligerents  passed  at  the  Oxford  meeting  of 
the  Institute  of  International  Law  in  19 13.  But  we 
may  say  of  it  that  it  shewed  statesmen  with  what  clear- 
ness and  impartiality  jurists  can  handle  the  legal  intri- 
cacies that  arise  from  a  great  conflict  at  sea. 

The  third  and  final  matter  to  be  noted  in  connection 
with  the  period  of  quasi-legislative  activity  we  have 
been  considering  is  that  within  it  the  Judicial  Arbitra- 
tion Court  previously  mentioned  and  also  an  Inter- 
national Prize  Court  of  Appeal  were  planned  and  well- 


84  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

nigh  established.  The  Declaration  of  London  would 
have  settled,  had  the  old  order  continued,  age-long 
differences  between  the  powers  with  regard  to  Blockade, 
Contraband  of  War,  Unneutral  Service,  and  various 
minor  matters.  Could  this  have  been  done  two  most 
important  consequences  would  have  followed.  On  the 
one  hand  the  way  would  have  been  paved  for  the  ad- 
vent of  a  complete  Code  for  the  regulation  of  war  at 
sea,  and  its  adoption  by  the  express  consent  of  all  mari- 
time states,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  last  obstacles 
would  have  been  removed  from  the  path  of  the  Inter- 
national Prize  Court  of  Appeal  which  the  powers  de- 
cided in  1907  to  set  up,  according  to  a  wise  and  states- 
manlike plan  embodied  in  the  Twelfth  Convention  of 
the  Second  Hague  Conference.  But  the  failure  of  the 
Declaration  of  London  to  secure  ratification  sealed  the 
fate  of  the  International  Prize  Court.  No  one  wanted 
a  Court  of  Final  Appeal,  when  the  law  it  was  to  ad- 
minister remained  uncertain  as  to  matters  of  the  utmost 
importance.  If  such  a  Court  comes  at  all,  it  will  come 
as  a  part  of  the  new  and  better  system  for  the  regula- 
tion of  maritime  conflicts  which  must  be  established 
after  the  war,  if  sea-borne  commerce  is  to  continue  and 
neutrals  to  be  preserved  from  outrage  and  ruin.  A 
blessed  reaction  from  the  brutality  of  to-day  may  give 
the  next  generation  its  Judicial  Arbitration  Court,  and 
its  International  Prize  Court  of  Appeal  also. 

We  may  sum  up  by  saying  that  when  the  fateful 
moment  came  in  the  Summer  of  19 14  there  was  a  real 
and  world-wide  Society  of  Nations  so  far  organised  as 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  JULY,  1914       85 

to  possess  a  Quasi-legislative  Assembly,  a  rapidly  grow- 
ing system  of  law,  a  rudimentary  judiciary,  and  a  small 
executive,  which  last  is  to  be  found  in  the  International 
Bureau  and  the  Permanent  Administrative  Council  at 
The  Hague.1  Till  a  few  weeks  before  the  storm  broke 
there  was  a  reasonable  prospect  of  the  rapid  growth  of 
this  Society.  It  seemed  to  be  developing  special  organs 
for  the  performance  of  functions  essential  to  the  wel- 
fare of  all  its  members,  without  destroying  the  national 
independence  and  State  Sovereignty  of  each.  The  ex- 
tension and  improvement  of  its  laws,  the  strengthening 
of  its  tribunals,  and  the  bringing  into  existence  of  effi- 
cient means  for  the  restraint  of  unruly  powers,  appeared 
to  have  come  within  the  limits  of  possibility.  The  more 
sanguine  among  us  deemed  that  they  might  in  a  few 
decades  be  the  prizes  of  wise  and  sustained  effort.  But 
we  have  witnessed  retrogression  instead  of  progress; 
and  we  can  see  now  that  the  order  we  hoped  to  mould 
to  our  ideals  contained  within  itself  germs  of  destruc- 
tion. It  lacked  any  means  of  obliging  its  members  to 
bestir  themselves  for  the  enforcement  of  the  perform- 
ance of  their  common  duties.  Each  state  was  bound 
to  obey  the  rules  of  the  International  Society;  but  no 
state  was  bound,  in  the  absence  of  express  stipulations, 
to  see  that  other  states  obeyed  them.  The  result  was 
that  any  ill-disposed  member  might  violate  its  obliga- 
tions, not  exactly  with  impunity,  but  with  nothing  cer- 
tain in  the  way  of  penalty  or  compulsion.   Others  might 

1  Hague  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Dis- 
putes, Ch.  II. 


86  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

interfere,  or  again  they  might  not.  There  was  a  chance 
of  castigation,  but  a  chance  of  impunity  also.  Further 
we  have  discovered  by  awful  experience  that  science  can 
be  the  handmaid  of  destruction  with  quicker  efficiency 
than  she  can  be  the  builder  of  comfort  and  happiness. 
War  has  now  invaded  the  air  above  and  the  depths 
below.  And  what  we  experience  to-day  is  but  a  begin- 
ning. It  seems  as  if  no  limit  can  be  set  to  the  possi- 
bilities of  slaughter  and  ruin  which  lurk  in  the 
development  of  modern  armaments.  Moreover  the 
organisation  of  nations  for  war  has  made  such  rapid 
strides  that  the  old  distinction  between  combatants  and 
non-combatants  is  on  the  point  of  vanishing  altogether. 
And  lastly  the  German  doctrine  of  Kriegsraison,  which 
is  in  brief  that  any  accepted  restraint  in  warfare  may 
be  set  aside  to  gain  a  useful  advantage  or  save  a  severe 
disaster,1  has  ceased  to  be  the  vagary  of  a  few  pro- 
fessors and  become  the  creed  of  the  greatest  military 
power  in  the  world.  What  all  this  has  meant  I  shall 
attempt  to  describe  in  the  next  lecture. 

1  Holtzendorff,  Handbuch  des  Volkerrechts,  Vol  IV,  §§  65,  66. 


LECTURE  IV. 

THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW  OF  INTER- 
NATIONAL  LAW. 

Not  long  ago  I  was  sitting  at  breakfast  opposite  to 
a  young  and  thoughtful  medical  man  who  had  spent  a 
year  in  service  at  the  front.  Our  hostess  passed  him 
a  copy  of  the  syllabus  of  these  lectures,  and  asked  his 
opinion  on  it.  He  answered  by  a  criticism  on  the  pres- 
ent title — The  Partial  Overthrow  of  International 
Law.  "  I  should  call  the  overthrow  complete,"  said 
he.  My  answer  was,  "  That  is  just  what  I  expected 
you  to  say.  But  I  am  sure  you  are  wrong.  A  very 
large  part  of  International  Law  is  concerned  with  the 
pacific  intercourse  of  states,  and  that  part  remains 
almost  untouched.  It  is  the  rules  that  deal  with  war 
and  neutrality  which  have  been  broken  into  frag- 
ments." 

This  seems  to  me  to  sum  up  the  situation  accurately. 
The  outlook  is  indeed  bad,  so  bad  that  I  doubt  whether 
we  can  find  its  like  since  the  Thirty  Years'  War  came 
to  an  end  in  1648.  But  we  need  not  make  it  out  to  be 
worse  than  it  is.  Much  of  the  fabric  of  the  Jus 
Gentium  stands  intact,  and  much  more  is  capable  of 
repair.  But  before  we  can  profitably  discuss  the  ques- 
tion of  rebuilding,  we  must  survey  the  ruins  carefully 

87 


88  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

and  endeavour  to  decide  where  it  is  necessary  to  lay 
fresh  foundations,  where  we  can  make  use  of  founda- 
tions already  in  existence,  and  where  we  may  rest 
content  with  a  few  judicious  repairs  to  walls  and 
towers.  To  execute  this  survey  is  the  object  of  the 
present  lecture,  and  to  discuss  the  most  effective 
methods  of  rebuilding  will  be  the  task  of  the  two  that 
follow. 

It  will  be  wise  to  begin  our  examination  by  recalling 
what  was  said  at  the  end  of  the  last  lecture  about  the 
absence  of  any  general  obligation  to  enforce  existing 
laws.  As  we  have  seen,  they  rest  upon  express  or  tacit 
consent;  and  the  kind  of  consent  given  or  understood  on 
the  part  of  a  state  is  a  consent  to  observe  them  in  its 
own  conduct.  No  promise  is  made  to  act  the  part  of 
policeman,  and  enforce  them  on  others  who  ought  to 
obey  them,  but  do  not.  An  obligation  of  this  latter 
kind  is  assumed  only  in  the  case  of  Treaties  of  .Guar- 
antee, and  they  are  rare.  In  the  early  stages  of  the 
present  war,  when  the  calculated  atrocities  of  the  Ger- 
man troops  in  Belgium  were  horrifying  the  civilised 
world,  the  United  States  were  sometimes  blamed  in 
England  because  they  took  no  steps  to  secure  the  ob- 
servance by  Germany  of  the  Hague  Convention  of 
1907  on  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  Neutral  Powers  and 
Persons  in  War  on  Land,  though  they  were  among  the 
signatory  powers.  Those  who  put  forward  this  view 
can  hardly  have  read  the  Convention.  If  they  had, 
they  would  have  found  no  stipulation  binding  the  par- 
ties to  prevent  or  punish  one  another's  violations.    In- 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW  89 

stead  there  is  in  Article  5  a  provision  to  the  effect  that 
a  neutral  power  "  is  not  bound  to  punish  acts  in  viola- 
tion of  neutrality  unless  such  acts  have  been  committed 
on  its  own  territory."  America,  as  an  independent 
state,  had  the  right  to  make  war  or  remain  at  peace 
as  she  thought  fit.  At  first  she  chose  to  remain  outside 
the  conflict;  but  at  length  there  came  a  time  when  the 
outrageous  treatment  of  her  Government  and  her  citi- 
zens by  Germany  forced  her  to  enter  it;  and  when  she 
did  so  her  determination  was  sharpened  by  indigna- 
tion at  German  breaches  of  neutral  rights  all  over  the 
world.  But  the  fact  that  she  had  signed  Conventions 
which  Germany  constantly  violated  imposed  on  her  no 
legal  obligation  to  take  up  arms  in  order  that  the 
offending  state  might  be  forced  to  keep  its  plighted 
word. 

When  a  Treaty  of  Guarantee  is  in  question  the  case 
is  different.  The  parties  to  such  a  treaty  bind  them- 
selves not  only  to  observe  it  in  their  own  proper  per- 
sons, but  also  to  prevent  the  violation  of  it  by  others. 
For  instance  when  the  Kingdom  of  Belgium  was  estab- 
lished by  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  early  in  the  last 
century,  they  guaranteed  its  independence  and  perpetual 
neutrality  by  the  treaties  of  1831  and  1839.  They 
thus  bound  themselves  to  interfere  on  its  behalf  should 
it  be  attacked,  as  long  as  it  observed  the  condition  of 
abstaining  from  any  warlike  or  diplomatic  action  that 
had  other  ends  in  view  than  the  protection  of  its  in- 
tegrity and  neutrality.  We  must  remember  that  in  the 
thirties  of  last  century  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe 


9o  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

were  five  in  number,  the  five  being  Great  Britain, 
France,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia.  In  the  place  of 
Prussia  now  stands  the  German  Empire,  which  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Society  of  Nations  has  assumed  the  legal 
clothing  of  the  old  Prussian  Kingdom.  In  1870  when 
it  was  in  the  intermediate  stage  of  development  from 
the  one  to  the  other,  and  was  called  the  North  German 
Confederation,  it  not  only  acknowledged  that  it  in- 
herited the  obligation  to  respect  the  Belgian  frontiers 
in  its  war  with  France,  but  held  up  the  latter  power  to 
the  reprobation  of  the  civilised  world  because  of  a 
secret  intrigue  against  Belgian  independence  in  which 
Napoleon  III,  when  Emperor,  had  been  skilfully  en- 
tangled by  Bismarck.  Since  then  Germany  has  on 
several  occasions  admitted  its  obligations  towards  its 
weak  but  prosperous  neighbour,  and  proclaimed  its 
resolution  to  observe  them.  As  late  as  19 13,  Herr  Von 
Jagow,  its  Foreign  Secretary,  declared  in  the  Budget 
Committee  of  the  Reichstag  that  "  Belgian  Neutrality 
is  determined  by  international  Conventions  which  Ger- 
many is  resolved  to  respect." 

The  statesmen  of  Belgium  were  nervously  anxious 
to  do  nothing  that  would  give  an  ambitious  neighbour  a 
pretext  for  charging  them  with  a  breach  of  neutral 
obligations.  They  did  well  to  be  careful.  The  posi- 
tion of  their  country  between  France  and  Germany 
made  it  open  to  invasion  from  either;  and  if  had  not 
sufficient  strength  to  protect  itself  against  a  great  mili- 
tary power,  though  it  strained  its  resources  in  fortify- 
ing its  frontiers  and  increasing  its  army.    But  there  was 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW  91 

always  the  reassuring  consciousness  that  its  "  neutrali- 
sation," as  it  was  called,  was  recognised  as  an  essential 
part  of  the  public  law  of  Europe.1 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  little  kingdom  remained 
unmolested  for  the  greater  part  of  a  century.  When  it 
was  in  danger  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War  in  1870 
Great  Britain  was  ruled  by  one  of  the  most  pacific  ad- 
ministrations that  ever  controlled  her  destinies.  Never- 
theless she  stood  boldly  by  the  side  of  her  weak  neigh- 
bour, and  covenanted  to  assist  in  the  defence  of  its 
neutrality  against  whichever  of  the  two  belligerents 
might  venture  to  attack  it.  The  result  was  that  neither 
made  any  hostile  attempt;  and  for  many  years  Belgium 
felt  comparatively  safe.  France  became  its  sincere 
friend,  while  British  solicitude  on  its  behalf  was  in  no 
way  abated.2  But  towards  the  close  of  the  last  century 
it  became  apparent  that  Germany  in  her  restless  search 
for  points  of  vantage,  and  easy  roads  into  France  un- 
barred by  fortresses  and  entrenched  camps,  was  casting 
greedy  eyes  across  the  Belgian  frontiers.  German 
strategic  railways,  unwanted  for  any  purposes  of  com- 
merce, were  built  in  close  proximity  to  its  borders,  and 
a  school  of  German  publicists  declared  in  no  obscure 
terms  that  its  territory  ought  to  form  part  of  the 
Fatherland.  Still  constant  protestations  of  friendli- 
ness were  made  by  the  German  Government,  and  any 
intention  of  violating  Belgian  neutrality  was  disclaimed. 
The  last  assurance  was  given  on  July  31,  1914,  when 

1  Leon  Van  Der  Essen,  The  Invasion,  Ch.  I. 

1  Ellery  C.  Stowell,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  igi 4,  pp.  4-7. 


92  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

Herr  Von  Below,  the  German  Minister  at  Brussels, 
informed  the  Belgian  Foreign  Office  that  he  was  cer- 
tain the  views  of  his  government  had  not  changed. 
He  repeated  this  statement  on  August  2nd,  yet 
a  few  hours  afterwards  this  same  diplomatist 
demanded  free  passage  through  Belgium  for  the 
German  Armies  on  pain  of  instant  hostilities  if  it 
was  refused! x 

But  this  was  not  the  worst.  Scarcely  was  the 
treacherous  deed  consummated,  and  the  shamefaced  ex- 
cuse of  the  German  Chancellor  made  that  its  wrong- 
fulness was  justified  by  its  overwhelming  necessity, 
than  all  sorts  of  falsehoods  were  trumped  up  to  shew 
that  it  was  not  a  wrong  at  all,  but  a  righteous  retribu- 
tion. There  was  the  cock-and-bull  story  of  the  motor 
cars  driven  by  disguised  French  officers  through  Bel- 
gian territory  to  attack  the  Rhineland,2  the  fictitious 
tales  of  British  marines  in  Ostend  and  French  guns  in 
Liege  some  days  before  the  commencement  of  hostili- 
ties, and  the  mendacious  reports  of  French  military 
violations  of  the  German  frontier  which  were  deemed 
sufficient  justification  for  the  charge  that  France  was 
about  to  march  her  forces  through  Belgium  to  the  in- 
vasion of  Germany.3  Then,  as  time  went  on  and  the 
German  troops  were  stained  deeper  and  deeper  every 
day  with  the  crimes  that  accompanied  their  occupation 

*  Leon  Van  Der  Essen,  The  Invasion,  Chs.  IT  and  III. 

2  Proclamation  issued  by  General  Von  Emmich  on  August  4.,  19T4, 
and  given  in  Appendix  C  of  the  Report  of  the  Bryce  Committee  on 
the  Alleged  German  Outrages  [Cd.  7895,  p.  183]. 

•  Ellery  C.  Stowell,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  1914.,  pp.  419-4211 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW  93 

of  Belgian  territory,  wjiile  German  statesmen  were 
more  closely  entangled  in  the  we6  of  their  own  fictions 
and  contradictions,  a  discovery  was  made  by  their 
agents  in  the  archives  at  Brussels.  It  consisted  of  a 
few  notes  of  discussions  between  Belgian  and  British 
officers  in  1906  and  191 2  with  a  view  to  concerting 
measures  of  defence  should  the  necessity  for  them 
arise.  These  conversations  were  immediately  described 
as  Conventions,  and  published  to  the  world  with  the 
deliberate  perversion  of  an  important  passage.  They 
were  accompanied  by  a  triumphant  commentary  to  the 
effect  that  Belgium  had  by  her  own  act  and  deed  aban- 
doned her  neutrality  long  before  the  war,  and  was  only 
reaping  the  just  reward  of  breaking  her  treaty  obliga- 
tions and  plotting  against  her  Teutonic  neighbour.  No 
one  can  for  a  moment  imagine  that  German  statesmen 
are  not  well  aware  of  the  difference  between  planning 
a  crime  and  planning  the  means  of  preventing  a  crime. 
But  it  suited  them  to  ignore  it;  and  ever  since  their 
obsequious  press  has  been  repeating  the  calumny  they 
invented,  and  their  tame  jurists  have  been  engaged  in 
demonstrating  that  the  treaties  they  falsely  accuse  Bel- 
gium of  violating  either  never  did  protect  Belgian  ter- 
ritory, or  have  been  cancelled  by  subsequent  documents, 
or  destroyed  by  change  of  circumstances.  These  and  a 
number  of  other  mutually  contradictory  propositions  do 
but  serve  to  shew  that  German  hatred  of  those  whom 
Germany  has  so  shamelessly  injured  has  deprived  her 
authorities  of  all  sense  of  logic  in  argument  or  decency  in 


94  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

action.1  They  first  ravished  Belgium  and  then  slandered 
her.  For  pure,  sheer,  unmitigated  blackguardism  their 
conduct  can  only  be  compared  to  that  of  some  vile 
guardian  who,  having  overcome  by  a  mixture  of  force 
and  fraud  the  resistance  of  a  blameless  ward,  brazenly 
maintains,  in  order  to  shield  himself  from  general 
reprobation,  that  she  had  previously  been  little  better 
than  a  common  woman.  And  let  us  not  forget  that  the 
German  outrage  is  continuous.  It  is  not  merely  that 
one  unlawful  and  cowardly  blow  has  been  struck,  one 
foul  crime  committed.  The  armies  of  Germany  still 
stand  on  the  violated  territory,  the  satraps  of  Germany 
still  plunder  and  oppress  the  Belgian  nation,  and  the 
German  campaign  of  calumny  against  them  still  goes 
glibly  on.  There  can  be  no  safety  for  the  Society  of 
Nations,  no  vindication  before  the  world  of  good  faith 
and  rudimentary  justice,  till,  failing  the  repentance  and 
complete  reparation  of  which  there  are  no  signs,  the 
perjured  rulers  are  made  to  relinquish  their  prey,  and 
the  robber  hosts  are  shattered  in  a  mighty  overthrow.2 
At  present  we  have  but  begun  the  indictment  against 
the  powers  responsible  for  the  ruin  of  some  of  the 
noblest  parts  of  the  great  structure  that  goes  by  the 
name  of  International  Law.     It  would  be  wrong  to 

1  Professor  Ch.  de  Visscher,  Belgium's  Case,  Ch.  Ill;  Ellery  C. 
Stowell,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  IQI4,  pp.  376-456,  626-638. 
The  documents  given  in  these  passages  render  superfluous  further 
reference  to  the  voluminous  literature  of  the  subject;  but  it  may 
be  well  to  add  that  an  impartial  summary  of  the  points  at  issue  con- 
cerning the  military  conversations  will  be  found  in  Bevan,  The 
Method  in  the  Madness,  pp.  205-212. 

1  It  seems  now  (Nov.,  1918)  as  if  both  these  anticipations  would  soon 
be  realised. 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW  95 

represent  them  as  the  only  sinners  in  a  Society  where 
absolute  integrity  had  hitherto  been  the  rule.  But  this 
we  may,  nay  must,  say.  They  have  done  deliberately, 
systematically  and  continuously  what  others  may  have 
done  in  moments  of  passion,  spasmodically  and  occa- 
sionally. Moreover  they  have  done  it  so  thoroughly 
that  if  their  foul  web  of  falsehood  and  deceit  is  not 
completely  unravelled,  and  their  offence  severely  pun- 
ished, good  faith  will  vanish  from  the  future  of  inter- 
national transactions,  and  civilised  humanity  will  sink 
back  into  the  condition  of  Italy  in  the  time  of  Caesar 
Borgia.  And  unfortunately  what  is  true  of  faith  and 
honour  is  true  of  justice  and  mercy  also.  They,  too, 
are  in  danger.  There  is  nothing  so  catching  as  success- 
ful crime.  German  "  Rightfulness  "  has  inflicted  a 
severe  blow  on  that  sense  of  the  binding  nature  of 
mortal  law  which  has  often  been  a  great  restraining 
power  in  the  midst  of  warfare  and  bloodshed.  Unless 
the  German  nation  and  its  rulers  and  satellites  are 
taught  by  painful,  but  blessed,  experience  that  their 
utter  disregard  of  all  the  laws  of  humanity  in  war  does 
not  bring  them  one  inch  nearer  their  ultimate  aims,  but 
on  the  contrary  arrays  against  them  the  greater  part  of 
the  civilised  world,  there  is  little  hope  of  the  future  of 
the  human  race.  It  cannot  hug  a  cancer  to  its  bosom, 
and  expect  to  escape  rottenness  and  destruction. 

The  accusation  against  Germany  and  her  allies  is  not, 
let  us  remember,  that  their  troops  have  sometimes  got 
out  of  hand,  and  been  guilty  of  abominable  deeds.  This 
happens  occasionally  in  all  armies,  even  the  best  dis- 


96  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

ciplined.  It  stands  to  reason  that  every  great  host  must 
contain  a  certain  number  of  ruffians,  and  that  every 
war  must  give  to  some  of  them  greater  opportunities 
for  indulging  their  worst  propensities  than  occur  in 
civil  life.  Moreover  it  is  a  well-known  fact  that  priva- 
tion, or  the  excitement  of  furious  conflict,  or  the  sight 
of  cruelly-injured  comrades,  will  sometimes  madden 
troops,  and  cause  men  who  are  ordinarily  well-behaved 
to  indulge  in  orgies  of  drunkenness,  lust,  and  cruelty. 
Humane  commanders  strive  their  best  to  prevent  these 
atrocities;  and  as  the  world  has  grown  more  civilised 
they  have  become  rarer  and  rarer.  But  there  is  little 
prospect  of  stamping  them  out  altogether.  Only  if  all 
men  were  perfect  could  it  be  done;  but  then  there 
Would  be  no  war.  I  am  not  thinking  of  things  like  these 
when  I  declare  that  German  "  frightfulness "  is  a 
danger  to  the  whole  fabric  of  human  Society.  What  I 
have  in  my  mind  are  the  breaches  of  the  laws  of  war 
deliberately  planned  by  the  German  High  Command, 
and  systematically  carried  out  by  soldiers  acting  under 
orders  in  most  cases,  but  in  some  perhaps  only  given  to 
understand  that  if  they  robbed,  or  burnt,  or  violated, 
or  slew,  no  notice  would  be  taken  of  it. 

Is  there  any  sane  man  In  the  whole  world  who  now 
believes  that  no  atrocities  were  committed  on  the  popu- 
lation when  the  German  armies  invaded  Belgium? 
That,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  the  first  assertion  that 
proceeded  from  the  Fatherland  in  answer  to  the  chorus 
of  horror  provoked  by  the  deeds  of  its  soldiers.  The 
next  was  that  the  burnings  and  shootings  complained 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW  97 

of  were  a  just  punishment  for  cruel  and  foul  outrages 
committed  on  German  wounded  and  stragglers  by  Bel- 
gian civilians.  We  need  not  be  so  quixotic  as  to  declare 
that  no  peasant  could  ever  have  shot  or  stabbed  a  sol- 
dier who  had  lost  his  way,  or  no  woman  ever  mutilated 
a  wounded  enemy.  But  when  we  remember  that  the 
Government  of  Belgium  took  every  possible  means  by 
proclamations  and  by  seizure  of  arms  to  remove  from 
the  civil  population  both  the  will  and  the  means  of  re- 
sistance, and  when  we  read  the  flimsy  stories  of  anony- 
mous witnesses  that  the  German  official  publications 
expect  us  to  regard  as  evidence,  we  are  more  than 
sceptical  of  any  rising  against  the  invaders  in  any  dis- 
trict, or  of  the  commission  upon  them  of  any  appreci- 
able number  of  cruelties.1  Instead,  there  is  strong  evi- 
dence for  the  belief  that  the  general  attitude  of  the 
peasantry  was  one  of  pitiable  and  hopeless  terror.  They 
made  constant  attempts  to  conciliate  the  German  sol- 
diery by  gifts  of  food  and  drink  and  portable  property.2 
On  the  other  hand  how  is  it  possible  to  explain  the 
appliances  for  fire-raising  carried  by  the  invading 
troops,  the  carefully-prepared  means  for  the  packing 
and  removing  of  loot,  the  damning  confessions  found 

1  This  is  the  main  argument  of  the  German  White  Book  on  the 
Alleged  Offenses  against  International  Law  in  the  conduct  of  the 
war.  It,  and  the  evidence  brought  forward  in  support  of  it,  are 
subjected  to  a  most  damaging  analysis  by  Professor  T.  H.  Morgan 
in  the  introductory  chapter  of  his  German  Atrocities. 

2  The  evidence  of  Mr.  L.  Mokveld,  a  Dutch  journalist  who  was 
on  the  spot  in  the  early  days  of  August,  1914,  is  conclusive  as  to 
this.  See  his  book,  The  German  Fury  in  Belgium,  pp.  68,  69,  77, 
92-94,  and  other  passages. 


98  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

in  private  letters,  and  the  ferocious  threats  of  German 
proclamations,1  except  by  a  plan  to  terrorise  the  people 
of  both  hostile  and  neutral  countries,  and  force  them 
to  believe  that  nothing  but  ruin  could  come  from  oppo- 
sition to  German  demands?  It  is  here  that  the  abomi- 
nable doctrine  of  Kriegsraison  comes  in.  It  holds  that 
since  there  is  a  great  military  advantage  in  filling  the 
breasts  of  enemies,  actual  or  possible,  with  abject  fear, 
therefore  whatever  does  this  is  allowable,  even  though 
forbidden  by  the  ordinary  laws  of  war.  For  "  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  in  cases  of  real  necessity  ravage, 
burning  and  devastation,  even  on  a  large  scale  as  of 
whole  neighbourhoods  and  tracts  of  country,  may  be 
practised,  where  it  is  not  a  question  of  any  particular 
determinate  result  of  strategical  operation,  but  only  of 
more  general  measures,  in  order,  for  instance,  to  make 
the  further  advance  of  the  enemy  impossible,  or  even 
to  shew  him  what  war  is  in  earnest  when  he  persists  in 
carrying  it  on  without  serious  hope."  2 

The  policy  inaugurated  during  the  first  weeks  of  the 
war  has  been  continued  ever  since.  After  a  time  the 
indiscriminate  shootings,  outrages  and  burnings  in  Bel- 
gium ceased.  But  we  are  not  likely  to  forget  Dinant, 
Aerschot  and  Louvain,  though  Brussels  still  stands, 
and  Bruges  has  not  been  systematically  looted,  and  the 

1  Overwhelming  evidence  on  these  points  is  to  be  found  in  the 
Appendix  to  the  Bryce  Report,  and  the  Belgian  and  French  Reports. 
Their  specific  allegations  are  not  disproved  by  general  denials,  an 
aspect  of  the  case  admirably  presented  by  Bevan,  The  Method  in  the 
Madness,  pp.  215-225. 

2  Holtzendorff,  Ilandbuch  des  Volkerrechts,  Vol.  IV,  p.  484. 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW  99 

women  of  Ghent  have  hitherto  escaped  wholesale  vio- 
lation. But  the  wicked  system  of  which  the  first  atro- 
cities were  the  product  is  still  applied  though  in  some- 
what different  forms.  The  Hague  Reglement,  or  Code 
for  War  on  Land,  says,  "  Neither  requisitions  in  kind 
nor  services  can  be  demanded  from  communes  or  in- 
habitants except  for  the  necessities  of  the  army  of  oc- 
cupation. They  must  be  in  proportion  to  the  resources 
of  the  country."  1  The  Germans  have  stripped  the 
country  of  supplies  and  left  the  bulk  of  the  people  to 
be  fed  by  a  charitable  organisation  in  neutral  hands, 
indulging  now  and  then  in  the  sport  of  torpedoing  a 
grain  ship  carrying  food  for  their  victims  under  a  safe- 
conduct  granted  by  their  own  authorities. 

The  Hague  Reglement  prohibits  the  levy  of  money 
contributions  above  and  beyond  the  ordinary  taxes  in 
the  occupied  territory,  except  "  for  military  necessities 
or  the  administration  of  such  territory."  2  The  Ger- 
mans have  in  countless  instances  exacted  forced  con- 
tributions to  an  enormous  extent  amounting  by  this 
time  to  something  like  seventy  millions  sterling.  In 
addition  they  have  taken  machinery,  goods  and  raw 
material,  as  well  as  cash  and  securities,  and  this  in  spite 
of  the  plain  proviso,  "  Private  property  cannot  be  con- 
fiscated." 3  And  be  it  remembered  that  all  this  takes  no 
account  of  the  requisitions  levied  in  kind  which  were 
dealt  with  in  the  previous  paragraph. 

The  Hague  Reglement  forbids  a  belligerent  "  to 
destroy  or  seize  the  enemy's  property,  unless  such  de- 

1  Article  52.  'Article  49.  'Article  46. 


ioo  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

struction  or  seizure  be  imperatively  demanded  by  the 
necessities  of  War,"  '  and  provides  that  "  in  sieges  and 
bombardments  all  necessary  steps  should  be  taken  to 
spare  as  far  as  possible  buildings  devoted  to  religion, 
art,  science  and  charity,  historic  monuments,  hospitals, 
and  places  where  the  sick  and  wounded  are  collected, 
provided  that  they  are  not  used  at  the  same  time  for 
military  purposes."  2  The  Germans  have  destroyed 
many  of  them,  including  some  of  the  most  beautiful 
examples  in  the  world  of  mediaeval  architecture,  such 
as  the  Library  of  Louvain  and  the  Cloth  Hall  of 
Ypres. 

The  Hague  Reglement  lays  down  that  services  de- 
manded by  the  invaders  must  not  be  "  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  imply  for  the  population  any  obligation  to  take 
part  in  operations  of  war  against  their  own  country,"  3 
and  repeats  the  prohibition  in  another  article.4  It  also 
lays  upon  the  occupying  forces  the  duty  of  respecting 
11  family  honour  and  rights,"  5  and  insuring  "  public 
order  and  safety."  6  In  the  face  of  this  the  Germans 
have  deported  thousands  of  men  and  women  from  Bel- 
gium. The  number  is  reported  to  have  by  this  time 
exceeded  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand.  Some  of 
these  have  been  carried  off  like  cattle  into  Germany, 
and  others  into  the  parts  of  Northern  France  in  Ger- 
man occupation.  Large  numbers  of  them  have  been 
set  to  work  in  mines,  in  factories,  and  in  digging 
trenches  under  the  fire  of  their  own  friends  and  allies. 

1  Article  23  g.  *  Article  52.  "  Article  46. 

*  Article  27.  *  Article  23  h.  *  Article  43. 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         101 

Others  have  been  forced  to  labour  in  domestic  occupa- 
tions, the  young  girls  in  many  cases  being  told  off  by  a 
refinement  of  lustful  cruelty  to  be  "  servants  "  to  Ger- 
man officers  in  the  field.  Unwilling  workers  most  of 
these  unfortunate  deportees  turned  out  to  be;  and  con- 
sequently all  the  resources  of  military  brutality  were 
employed  against  them.  They  were  kicked  and  cuffed, 
and  well-nigh  starved,  till  their  strength  was  broken 
and  not  even  a  German  martinet  could  get  any  more 
work  out  of  them.  When  this  stage  was  reached  they 
were  sent  home  to  die.  My  business  in  this  lecture  is 
to  describe  for  you  how  a  large  part  of  International 
Law  has  been  overthrown  in  the  course  of  the  present 
war;  but  it  is  hard  not  to  leave  the  passionless 
domain  of  jural  discussion,  and  give  vent  to  the  fierce 
indignation  the  recital  inspires. 

The  whole  tale  has  not  been  told,  nor  can  it  be  told 
within  the  limits  of  a  lecture.  What  has  been  done  in 
Belgium  has  been  done  with  equal  if  not  superior  bru- 
tality in  the  occupied  districts  of  Northern  France. 
They,  too,  have  been  subjected  to  such  enormous  re- 
quisitions and  contributions  that  the  inhabitants  have 
been  brought  to  the  verge  of  starvation.  They,  too, 
have  seen  their  most  sacred  fanes,  their  most  historic 
monuments,  wantonly  destroyed.  They  too  have  been 
stripped  of  a  large  portion  of  their  inhabitants,  who 
have  been  most  abominably  treated  and  in  many 
cases  made  to  labour  on  the  German  lines  of  defence. 
And  in  addition  to  all  this  they  have  undergone  an  ex- 
perience that  circumstances  have  not  yet  enabled  the 


102  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

German  commanders  to  inflict  on  Belgium.1  The  Teu- 
ton hosts  were  forced  in  19 17  to  evacuate  many  French 
towns  and  villages,  and  before  leaving  they  devastated 
the  delivered  districts  with  a  thoroughness  that  Attila 
and  his  Huns  might  well  have  envied.  All  the  resources 
of  science  were  called  in  to  increase  the  destructiveness 
of  baffled  malice.  Even  in  the  first  fury  of  Islamic 
conquest  a  line  was  drawn  which  it  has  been  reserved 
for  the  modern  apostles  of  Kultur  to  pass  over.  In 
A.D.  633  Abu-Bekr,  the  immediate  successor  of  Ma- 
homet, when  sending  his  troops  to  the  conquest  of 
Syria,  laid  on  them  these  commands,  "  In  your  pro- 
gress through  the  enemy's  land  cut  down  no  palms  or 
other  fruit  trees;  destroy  not  the  products  of  the 
earth;  ravage  no  fields;  burn  no  dwellings;  from  the 
stores  of  the  enemy  take  only  what  you  need  for  your 
wants.  Let  no  destruction  be  made  without  necessity. 
.  .  .  Treat  the  prisoner  and  him  who  surrenders  him- 
self to  your  mercy  with  pity.  .  .  .  Do  not  disturb  the 
quiet  of  the  monk  or  hermit,  and  destroy  not  their 
abodes."  2  But  the  German  generals  of  the  year  19 17 
bade  their  men  destroy  universally.  They  cut  down 
the  blossoming  orchards.  They  devastated  till  not  a 
house,  a  beast,  or  a  plough  was  left.  They  poisoned 
wells.  They  ruined  and  desecrated  churches.  They 
even  violated  the  last  resting-places  of  the  dead, 
breaking  open  the  tombs  and  wantonly  scattering  their 
contents.  Belgium  eagerly  awaits  the  long-deferred 
hour  of  her  deliverance.     When  it  comes  may  she  be 

1  It  was  inflicted  as  fully  as  time  allowed  in  the  Autumn  of  1918. 
*  Quoted  by  Walker,  History  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  p.  76. 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         103 

spared  the  miseries  that  attended  the  liberation  of 
parts  of  Northern  France. 

So  far  we  have  confined  our  statements  to  Belgium 
and  Northern  France.  For  these  countries  our  in- 
formation is  voluminous,  if  not  complete.  But  for 
other  lands  it  is  at  present  considerably  less.  We  do 
know,  however,  that  dying  babes  have  been  found  in 
hundreds  in  the  arms  of  dead  mothers  by  the  roadsides 
of  Russian  Poland,  while  the  mouths  of  many  corpses 
have  contained  grass  half-devoured  in  the  madness  of 
hunger.  We  also  know  that  about  a  third  of  the  popu- 
lation of  Serbia  has  been  wiped  off  the  face  of  the 
earth  by  Austrian,  German  and  Bulgarian  cruelties,  and 
that  in  Turkey  a  campaign  of  torture  and  massacre  has 
been  carried  on  against  unresisting  Armenians  with 
such  fiendish  thoroughness  that  only  a  few  hundred 
thousands  of  them  remain  alive.1  One  word  from  the 
Kaiser  would  have  stopped  the  holocaust,  but  it  has 
never  been  spoken;  and  in  some  localities  German 
agents  have  egged  on  the  Turkish  officials  in  their  hell- 
ish work.  Moreover  by  the  recent  Treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  which  was  practically  dictated  by  German  di- 
plomatists, Armenian  districts,  liberated  during  the 
war  by  the  arms  of  Russia,  have  been  handed  back  to 
the  control  of  the  assassins.2 

All  these  things  were  deemed  necessary  for  the  ag- 
grandisement of  Germany  and  the  success  of  her  cause, 

1  British   Parliamentary   Papers,    The    Treatment   of  Armenians   in 
the  Ottoman  Empire  [Miscellaneous,  No.  31   (1916)]. 
'  See  Article  4. 


io4  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

and  have  therefore  been  condoned  by  her  rulers  and 
people.  There  is  no  need  to  deny  the  assertion  of  the 
writers  of  the  Fatherland  when  they  repeat  with  parrot- 
like iteration  the  familiar  phrase,  "  The  German  con- 
science is  clear."  No  doubt  it  is;  and  by  the  reality 
of  its  ease  may  be  measured  the  depth  of  its  degrada- 
tion. It  has  thoroughly  assimilated  during  the  last 
generation  the  lesson  taught  it  by  Professor  Lueder  in 
1889,  "  When  the  circumstances  are  such  that  the  at- 
tainment of  the  object  of  the  war,  and  the  escape  from 
extreme  danger,  would  be  hindered  by  observing  the 
limitations  imposed  by  the  laws  of  war,  and  can  only 
be  accomplished  by  breaking  through  those  limitations, 
the  latter  is  what  ought  to  happen."  *  And  in  the  pres- 
ent war  it  has  happened  again  and  again.  We  have 
by  no  means  exhausted  in  the  preceding  recital  the 
long  catalogue  of  the  horrors  which  her  doctrine  of 
Kriegsraison  enables  Germany  to  let  loose  on  the  world 
with  a  conscience  that  remains  clear  instead  of  being 
haunted  by  the  furies  of  remorse.  The  list  must  be 
extended  still  further;  and  even  then  it  will  not  be 
complete;  for  almost  every  week  adds  some  new 
atrocity  to  those  that  have  gone  before. 

In  1868  a  benighted  world  accepted  the  principle 
that  no  weapons  were  to  be  used  which  inflicted  tor- 
tures that  were  needless  for  the  attainment  of  the  mili- 
tary object  of  destroying  an  enemy's  fighting  efficiency.2 
The  German  War  Book  denounced  this  as  mere  super- 

1  Holtzendorff,  Handbuch  des  Volherrechts,  Vol.  IV,  p.  254. 
3  Preamble  of  the  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg. 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         105 

stition; *  and  early  in  the  War  Germany  treated  it  as 
such,  and  used  a  poisonous  gas  which  tortured  strong 
men  for  three  awful  days  before  it  finally  killed  them. 
She  also  pumped  liquid  fire  into  the  ranks  of  the  Allies, 
though  her  signature  stood  with  theirs  at  the  bottom 
of  a  document  which  made  it  illegal  "  to  employ  arms, 
projectiles  or  material,  of  a  nature  to  cause  superfluous 
injury."  2  Further,  she  sent  her  aircraft  to  drop  bombs 
indiscriminately  on  crowded  towns  and  open  country- 
sides irrespective  altogether  of  military  objects,  though 
the  same  document  said,  "  The  attack,  by  any  means 
whatever,  of  towns,  villages,  habitations,  or  buildings 
which  are  not  defended  is  forbidden."  3 

Sea  warfare  is  new  to  Germany;  but  she  has  carried 
into  it  the  same  spirit  of  ruthless  and  arrogant  brutality 
that  marks  her  war  on  land.  Much  of  what  falls  to  be 
said  on  this  subject  must  come  under  our  next  head, 
which  is  concerned  with  neutral  rights,  or  rather  with 
their  violation.  But  here,  while  we  are  still  considering 
"  frightfulness  "  as  between  the  belligerents,  we  must 
point  out  that  Germany  and  her  subservient  allies  have 
worsened  and  degraded  maritime  warfare  as  well  as 
warfare  on  land.  Wherever  a  German  vessel  sails  the 
old  chivalry  of  the  sea  has  vanished.  To  rescue  per- 
ishing foes;  to  see  in  the  enemy's  sick  and  wounded 
brothers  in  distress  and  relieve  their  wants  fully  and 
freely,  to  clasp  the  hands  of  valiant  prisoners  and  miti- 

1  See  last  two  paragraphs  of  the  Introduction. 
*  Hague  Reglement,  Art.  23  e. 
'  Ibid.,  Art.  25. 


106  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

gate  to  the  utmost  the  hardships  of  their  captivity, 
were  as  proud  a  boast  of  the  fighting  navies  of  the  civil- 
ised world  as  prowess  in  battle  or  skill  in  navigation. 
But  now  all  this  has  vanished,  at  least  from  one  group 
of  combatants.  Germany  has  not  only  sown  the  open 
sea  with  uncontrolled  and  unanchored  floating  mines  in 
flagrant  violation  of  the  Hague  Convention  on  the  sub- 
ject,1 but  she  has  turned  the  newly-invented  submarine 
into  an  instrument  for  inflicting  swift,  sudden,  and  vio- 
lent death  on  surrendered  enemy  combatants,  and  inno- 
cent enemy  civilians,  including  even  women  and  chil- 
dren. If  any  of  these  last  happen  to  be  members  of 
the  crew  of  a  British  merchantman,  or  passengers  on 
board  her,  they  are  sent  to  the  bottom  by  the  German 
U-boats  with  as  little  compunction  as  if  they  had  been 
actively  engaged  in  a  naval  battle.  Nor  does  the  lust 
for  slaughter  stop  at  enemy  subjects.  Ruthless  destruc- 
tion has  from  time  to  time  been  the  lot  of  neutrals  who 
were  exercising  their  undoubted  right  to  travel  on  a 
British  vessel  of  commerce. 

Submarine  craft  are  lawful  weapons  when  used 
against  the  fighting  fleets  of  an  enemy.  Warships  must 
rely  on  their  own  watchfulness  and  their  own  arma- 
ment to  guard  them  against  torpedoes,  and  the  fact 
that  a  torpedo  is  launched  from  a  submerged  vessel 
instead  of  from  a  vessel  on  the  surface  makes  no  dif- 
ference as  regards  the  legality  of  its  use.  But  as 
against  merchantmen  the  right  of  the  enemy  is  capture, 

1  Convention  of  1907  on  Automatic  Submarine  Contact  Mines, 
Arts.  1-3. 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         107 

not  destruction,  still  less  destruction  without  warning, 
destruction  leaving  no  trace  behind.  International  Law 
has  laid  down  with  exactness  the  course  to  be  followed 
when  a  belligerent  cruiser  meets  an  enemy  vessel  of 
commerce.  It  must  first  signal  her  to  stop,  and  send 
on  board  her  an  officer  with  a  boat's  crew  to  examine 
her  papers  and,  if  necessary,  search  her.  It  may  then 
make  a  prize  of  her,  and  the  goods  she  carries  also  if 
they  are  contraband  of  war  or  destined  to  a  blockaded 
port.  Having  taken  possession  of  her,  and  put  what  is 
called  a  prize  crew  on  board  of  her,  it  must  send  her 
into  one  of  its  own  ports  where  a  Prize  Court  is  sitting, 
and  this  Court  must  give  judgment  on  the  legality  of  the 
capture.  But  the  cargo  must  not  be  taken  out  of  the 
captured  vessel  before  she  reaches  the  Prize  Court, 
nor  may  she  be  sunk  unless  it  is  practically  impossible 
to  send  her  in  for  adjudication,  and  even  then  the  safety 
of  her  crew  and  passengers  must  be  provided  for.  Of 
all  these  proceedings  the  first  two  only  can  be  carried 
out  by  a  German  submarine.  It  can  signal  to  an  enemy 
merchantman  to  stop,  and  it  can  send  an  officer  on 
board  to  examine  papers  and  search.  But  it  cannot 
take  possession  of  her  for  lack  of  men;  nor  can  it  spare 
a  Prize  Crew  to  take  her  in  for  adjudication  for  the 
same  reason.  Moreover  it  dare  not  attempt  to  escort 
her  to  one  of  its  own  ports,  because  that  would  mean 
a  voyage  on  the  surface  with  the  almost  certain  result 
that  it  would  be  captured  or  destroyed  by  a  British  or 
Allied  warship.  Being  unable,  therefore,  to  fulfil  the 
legal  conditions  of  capture,  it  cannot  lawfully  be  used 


108  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

for  that  purpose.  Warfare  is  full  of  such  restraints. 
The  guns  you  may  use  against  enemy  fortifications  or 
enemy  troops  you  may  not  turn  on  an  open  and  unde- 
fended enemy  town.  The  bombs  you  may  throw  into 
the  enemy's  trenches  you  may  not  drop  on  his  museums 
or  churches.  But  the  German  mind  does  not  reason  in 
this  way.  If  a  weapon  cannot  be  used  for  a  certain 
purpose  without  flagrant  breach  of  the  law,  then  the 
law  must  be  broken.  If  only  the  weapon  is  sufficiently 
destructive  no  limits  need  be  placed  on  its  use.  Why 
should  any  scruples  of  humanity  and  mercy  block  the 
way  to  victory  ? 

We  see  the  same  line  of  reasoning  used  to  justify 
the  dastardly  practice  of  sinking  Hospital  Ships  in 
spite  of  the  Hague  Convention  which  gives  them  im- 
munity from  attack.  The  statement  that  they  have  been 
used  as  transports  has  been  put  forward  as  an  excuse. 
It  is  absolutely  untrue;  and  one  cannot  but  believe  that 
the  German  naval  authorities  knew  it  to  be  untrue  when 
they  made  it.  Even  had  any  Allied  captain  disgraced 
himself  in  the  manner  attributed  to  us,  the  Hague  Con- 
vention for  the  Adaptation  of  the  Principles  of  the 
Geneva  Convention  to  Maritime  War  provided  a  rem- 
edy. Under  it  any  German  cruiser  would  have  the 
right  to  search  the  suspected  vessel,  and  capture  it  if 
the  commander  found  his  suspicions  justified.1  But 
German  cruisers  dare  not  scour  the  seas  for  prizes. 
Practically  the  only  vessels  flying  the  flag  of  the  Father- 
land who  can  rove  in  search  of  victims  are  the  sub- 

1  Articles  4,  8. 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         109 

marines;  and  if  they  cannot  capture  and  take  in  for 
adjudication,  they  can  at  least  destroy  without  warning, 
and  incidentally  massacre.  Accordingly  they  are  set  to 
do  it;  and  though  sick  and  wounded  men  with  their 
noble  doctors  and  devoted  nurses  are  doomed  thereby 
to  perish,  the  foulness  of  the  deed  does  not  make  it 
abhorrent  to  Germany.  Its  doers  are  acclaimed  as 
heroes,  and  a  national  subscription  is  raised  to  make 
presentations  to  them  when  alive,  and  erect  monuments 
in  their  honour  after  death.  The  naval  artillerymen 
who  turn  their  guns  on  open  boats  full  of  unarmed 
sailors  and  passengers,  the  cultured  officers  who  first 
deprive  captured  foes  of  their  life-belts  and  then  sub- 
merge, leaving  them  to  sink  in  the  icy  waves,  are  quite 
equal  to  this  further  occasion.  The  atrocity  of  the  deed 
seems  to  add  zest  to  the  doing  of  it.  It  is  supposed  to 
further  the  German  cause,  and  that  is  held  to  be  ample 
justification. 

We  now  pass  on  to  consider  the  blow  to  neutral 
rights  struck  by  the  widespread  application  of  the  Doc- 
trine of  Reprisals.  This  presents  one  of  the  most 
dangerous  and  difficult  problems  in  the  whole  range  of 
international  affairs.  It  is  impossible  here  to  do  more 
than  glance  at  that  portion  of  it  which  refers  to  war- 
fare. It  is  held  that  when  an  act  that  goes  beyond  the 
admitted  rules  and  customs  of  civilised  war  is  commit- 
ted by  one  belligerent,  the  other  may  retaliate  by  simi- 
lar and  even  more  severe  acts,  in  order  thereby  to  make 
his  adversary  comply  in  future  with  the  established 
practice.     As  a  matter  of  fact  this  result  is  rarely 


no  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

reached.  The  whole  subject  is  one  long  illustration  of 
the  essential  barbarity  of  war.  To  begin  with  the  rule 
of  violence  is  often  inaugurated  with  a  light  heart. 
Reprisals  are  frequently  resorted  to  when  the  acts  al- 
leged against  the  enemy  have  not  been  properly  veri- 
fied, or  when  the  rule  alleged  to  have  been  broken  is 
one  that  is  by  no  means  accepted  on  all  hands.  Con- 
stantly they  have  been  excessive  in  extent  or  in  violence. 
More  often  than  not  the  innocent  are  punished  for  the 
guilty.  There  are  numerous  instances  in  which  the  severi- 
ties resorted  to  by  way  of  reprisal  have  led  to  increased 
barbarity  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  instead  of  bringing 
about  a  return  to  ordinary  rules. 

Various  instances  of  this  have  occurred  within  our 
own  experience  in  the  present  war.  When  the  Germans 
began  their  illegal  submarine  warfare  early  in  19 15,  we 
retaliated  by  placing  our  U-boat  prisoners  in  stricter 
captivity  than  the  others.  Germany  immediately  picked 
out  some  of  the  most  highly-born  and  delicately  nur- 
tured British  officers  among  her  prisoners,  and  sub- 
jected them  to  such  rigorous  and  cruel  confinement  that 
their  lives  and  reason  were  in  danger.  In  the  end  we, 
and  not  the  German  naval  authorities,  gave  way,  and 
the  U-boat  warfare  has  continued  with  unabated  and 
even  increased  barbarity.  Again,  at  a  later  period  in 
the  war  one  of  our  air  squadrons  bombed  the  open 
town  of  Freiburg  in  Baden  in  reprisal  for  German  air- 
raids on  London  and  other  centres  of  civilian  popula- 
tion. The  result  was  that  we  stained  our  hands  in 
vain  with  the  blood  of  a  few  German  mothers  and 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         in 

babes.  Instead  of  giving  up  her  malpractices,  Germany 
moved  into  the  area  we  had  attacked  a  large  number  of 
our  officers  whom  she  held  as  prisoners.  We  refrained 
from  further  bombing  in  the  district  in  question  for 
fear  of  killing  our  own  people,  and  German  air-raids 
on  England  have  continued  ever  since,  and  increased  in 
numbers  and  severity.  In  a  competition  of  barbarism 
the  side  which  is  most  callous  and  unscrupulous  to  start 
with  is  bound  to  win  in  the  end.  There  are  some  things 
which  a  self-respecting  belligerent  will  not  do  even  to 
gain  a  great  military  advantage,  just  as  a  self-respecting 
man  will  not  forge  a  cheque  to  save  his  business,  or  a 
self-respecting  woman  sell  her  honour  to  save  her  home. 
The  only  real  remedy  is  to  make  it  both  the  right  and 
the  duty  of  the  whole  civilised  world  to  see  that  during 
and  after  a  war  all  serious  allegations  of  illegal  vio- 
lence are  enquired  into  by  an  appropriate  tribunal,  and 
those  found  guilty  punished  according  to  their  deserts, 
if  necessary  by  the  infliction  of  the  death  penalty. 

But  the  conduct  of  Germany  in  the  matter  of  naval 
reprisals  during  the  present  war  surpasses  in  guilt  any- 
thing we  have  hitherto  set  forth.  She  has  turned  upon 
neutrals,  as  well  as  foes,  refraining  from  no  means  of 
injuring  an  enemy,  even  though  her  blow  against  him 
had  to  be  struck  through  the  sides  of  a  friend.  The 
Autumn  of  19 17  provided  a  conspicuous  instance.  I 
refer  to  the  affair  in  the  North  Sea  on  October  17, 
when  German  cruisers  attacked  a  number  of  neutral 
merchantmen  under  the  convoy  of  the  two  light  British 
destroyers  Mary  Rose  and  Strongboiv.    The  destroyers 


ii2  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

fought  to  the  death,  but  were  too  weak  to  drive  off  the 
far  more  heavily  armed  cruisers.  The  latter  not  only 
set  at  naught  all  the  chivalry  of  the  sea  by  refusing  to 
rescue  their  drowning  foes;  but  smashed  with  shot  and 
shell  the  boats  of  the  merchantmen  when  the  unarmed 
crews  strove  to  escape  in  them,  and  finally  made  off 
without  paying  the  slightest  heed  to  cries  for  mercy, 
leaving  the  sailors  and  a  few  poor  women  also  to  perish 
in  the  stormy  waves.  From  what  I  have  already  said 
you  will  understand  that  they  had  a  right  to  capture 
these  merchantmen  and  bring  them  in  for  adjudication 
by  a  German  Prize  Court.  And  the  Court  would  have 
had  a  right  to  condemn  them  as  good  prize,  since  they 
had  accepted  enemy  convoy.  But  they  had  no  sort  of 
right  to  destroy,  still  less  to  leave  crews  and  passengers 
to  perish,  after  killing  some  by  their  brutal  fusillade. 

If  you  had  asked  them  why  they  did  this  murderous 
deed — for  it  was  nothing  less — they  would  have  replied 
that  it  was  all  a  matter  of  reprisal  and  therefore  abun- 
dantly justified.  Were  not  these  so-called  neutrals  trad- 
ing with  the  English  foe  ?  Were  they  not  sailing  across 
a  tract  of  sea  which  Germany  had  declared  to  be  a 
War  Zone,  and,  as  such,  closed  to  all  traffic?  Had  they 
not  been  warned  in  German  official  documents  again  and 
again  that  all  who  attempted  to  cross  this  Zone  would 
be  liable  to  destruction  by  German  mines,  and  the  Ger- 
man U-boats  and  cruisers  who  were  blockading  the 
British  Isles  in  reprisal  for  what  they  deemed  the  illegal 
British  blockade  of  the  ports  and  harbours  of  Ger- 
many? This  statement  assumes,  of  course,  a  good  deal 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         113 

which  the  jurists  and  statesmen  of  the  Fatherland 
would  find  it  hard  to  prove.  But  passing  by  the  legal 
contentions  connected  with  the  so-called  British  block- 
ade let  us  take  up  the  question  of  the  German  reprisals, 
since  our  subject  at  the  present  moment  is  concerned 
with  them.  Their  violence  on  this  occasion,  amounting 
as  it  did  to  actual  slaughter,  was  a  fearful  outrage 
upon  neutrals.  Let  Germany  punish  us,  her  foes,  by 
reprisals,  if  she  must,  since  International  Law  still 
allows  such  a  sorry  travesty  of  justice.  But  what 
vestige  of  right  can  she  have  to  destroy  Swedish, 
Danish,  and  Norwegian  life  and  property  because 
England  is  carrying  on  the  war  against  her  in  a  way 
she  has  chosen  to  regard  as  illegal? 

As  her  reprisals  are  the  climax  of  brutality,  so  are 
her  War  Zones  the  climax  of  illegality.  For  three  cen- 
turies International  Law  has  declared  that  the  open 
ocean  is  the  common  highway  of  the  world.  All  may 
pass  and  repass  over  it  on  their  lawful  occasions.  Only 
the  pirate  is  warned  off  and  destroyed,  and  that  because 
he  is  the  common  enemy  of  mankind.  Belligerents  may 
fight  on  the  high  seas;  and  while  they  are  engaged  in 
active  operations  wise  neutrals  will  keep  out  of  the  way 
lest  they  should  suffer  from  stray  shots.  But  the  mo- 
ment the  action  ceases  they  may  resume  their  voyages, 
and  pass  to  and  fro  through  what  has  just  been  the  area 
of  conflict,  if  their  course  leads  them  that  way.  Belli- 
gerents have  no  more  right  to  close  it  against  neutrals 
than  neutrals  have  to  warn  belligerents  off  it.  I  am 
not  sure  that  we  are  altogether  blameless  in  this  matter 


ii4  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

of  War  Zones;  but  at  any  rate  when  we  have  pro- 
claimed one  we  have  indicated  safe  passages  through 
it;  whereas  Germany  in  similar  circumstances  has 
threatened  to  destroy  all  neutral  vessels  that  attempt  to 
cross  it,  and  has  carried  out  her  threat  again  and  again 
in  circumstances  of  the  foulest  barbarity. 

But  she  has  not  been  content  with  this.  She  must 
needs  add  loathsome  hypocrisy  to  callous  brutality,  and 
pose  before  the  world  as  the  champion  of  the  freedom 
of  the  seas.  Yet  so  brazen  is  the  personation,  so 
clumsy  the  sham,  that  one  after  another  in  long  pro- 
cession the  nations  of  the  world  are  joining  the  combina- 
tion against  her.  No  less  than  twenty  are  in  it  now; 
and  but  for  fear  of  the  fate  of  Belgium  and  Serbia 
there  would  be  scarce  a  neutral  left.  Let  the  German 
Armies  in  the  West  suffer  a  signal  overthrow,  and 
tortured  Holland  with  outraged  Scandinavia  will  rush 
to  arms,  and  open  to  the  forces  of  the  Allies  a  broad 
way  into  the  heart  of  the  Rhineland.  Perhaps  then  its 
industrial  population  will  begin  to  realise  the  position 
into  which  their  country  has  been  guided.  The  lessons 
of  justice  and  consideration  for  others,  to  which  they 
were  impervious  in  the  days  of  their  prosperity,  may  be 
learnt  in  the  sharp  school  of  adversity.  For  the  wel- 
fare of  humanity  at  large,  and  in  the  highest  interests 
of  the  German  people  as  well  as  our  own,  we  must  fight 
on  till  the  whole  system  of  military  rule,  with  the  cult  of 
force  and  fraud  to  which  it  leads,  has  been  discredited 
and  destroyed. 

The  mental  and  spiritual  condition  of  Germany  to- 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         115 

day  is  a  terrible  object-lesson  to  shew  the  world  what 
happens  when  a  great  people  is  delivered  up,  body  and 
soul,  to  the  worship  of  power,  power  in  the  crude  form 
of  force  embodied  in  the  state  and  the  various  organs 
of  its  authority.  The  philosophy  of  Nietzsche,  the  his- 
torical theories  of  Treitschke,  the  politico-biological 
speculations  of  Bernhardi,  have  not  been  poured  forth 
in  vain.  A  whole  nation,  full  of  magnificent  enthusiasm 
for  knowledge,  marvellous  in  its  erudition,  justly  re- 
nowned throughout  the  world  for  its  conquests  in  the 
domain  of  science  and  its  skill  in  many  of  the  arts,  has 
slowly  debased  itself  till  it  is  in  danger  of  becoming  a 
terribly  efficient  instrument  in  the  destruction  of  human 
freedom  and  the  banishment  of  justice  and  humanity 
from  international  intercourse.  The  great  corrupting 
influence  has  been  the  doctrine  that  no  rule  of  right,  no 
dictate  of  mercy  and  gentleness,  must  prevail  to  block 
the  way  to  any  advantage  in  war,  diplomacy  or  in- 
ternal administration.  Throughout  the  foregoing  re- 
cital we  have  stood  aghast  at  the  moral  blindness,  the 
perversions  in  sentiment  and  atrocities  in  action,  to 
which  it  has  led.  But  we  found  no  place  in  the  story 
for  wrongs  which  did  not  spring  from  violations  of  the 
laws  of  war  and  neutrality.  And  yet  how  frequent  and 
how  flagrant  these  have  been! — everywhere  the  same 
arrogant  hectoring  of  weaker  states;  everywhere  the 
same  double-dealing  diplomacy;  everywhere  the  same 
unscrupulous  attempts  to  set  neighbours  against  one 
another.  Shameless  mendacity,  unlimited  corruption, 
loathsome  treachery — these  were  the  weapons  which 


n6  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

Germany  stooped  to  wield.  She  made  use  of  them  in 
the  cabinet  and  the  press,  in  commerce  and  industry, 
and  indeed  wherever  and  whenever  men  came  together 
for  mutual  intercourse.  All  the  old  sanctities  were 
forgotten,  all  the  old  restraints  ignored.  What,  for 
instance,  can  be  more  abominable  than  the  use  of  a 
diplomatic  staff  at  neutral  capitals  for  the  purpose  of 
instigating  breaches  of  the  laws  of  neutrality,  and  plan- 
ning outrages  on  neutral  soil  against  neutral  life  and 
property  in  order  to  injure  a  foe  ?  It  poisons  the  whole 
atmosphere  of  international  intercourse.  And  yet  Ger- 
many resorted  to  it  again  and  again  in  the  United  States 
and  other  countries,  till  her  own  falsity  drove  them 
from  their  neutrality  into  the  ranks  of  the  confederacy 
against  her. 

But  the  diffusion  of  a  pestilential  atmosphere  may 
place  in  great  jeopardy  those  who  are  fighting  the 
plague.  It  is  necessary  for  us  to  be  on  our  guard  lest 
the  poison  of  German  political  philosophy  should  in- 
fect our  own  moral  being.  We  are  giving  our  firstborn 
for  the  Fatherland's  transgression,  the  fruit  of  fair 
English  bodies  for  the  sin  of  the  Kaiser's  soul.  Is  not 
this  enough?  Must  we  in  addition  adopt  the  accursed 
doctrine  that  so-called  military  necessity  justifies  the 
most  atrocious  deeds?  Must  we  give  up  our  humanity, 
and  the  strong  sense  of  justice  that  has  distinguished 
us  for  centuries?  Hitherto  we  have  been  proud  to 
wage  this  war  with  clean  hands.  But  now  large  num- 
bers of  us  are  crying  aloud,  not  only  for  the  bombing  of 
German   fortresses,  munition  works  and  communica- 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         117 

tions,  which  is  a  terrible  but  lawful  operation  of  war, 
but  for  the  deliberate  slaughter  of  our  enemy's  women 
and  babes,  which  is  a  ghastly  atrocity  by  whomsoever 
done  and  whatsoever  be  the  provocation.  In  effect  we 
are  urged  to  become  murderers,  because  the  Germans 
have  murdered,  and  to  lull  our  consciences  we  are  told 
the  palpable  falsehood  that  only  thus  we  can  stop  the 
atrocities  of  the  enemy.  May  God  keep  us  from  such 
a  degradation  of  ourselves  and  our  holy  cause ! 

In  the  course  of  this  lecture  I  have  given  ample 
proof  that  the  International  Law  of  War  has  been 
battered  into  ruins  by  the  German  attacks  upon  it.  It 
needs  rebuilding  from  its  foundations  if  it  is  ever  again 
to  act  as  a  restraint  on  the  worst  passions  of  mankind. 
Much  of  the  old  material  is  good,  but  much  needs  re- 
placing with  new.  And  above  all  things  it  is  necessary 
that  the  doctrine  of  Kriegsraison  should  be  condemned 
and  disavowed.  In  future  the  Laws  of  War  must  be 
made  to  be  observed,  not  to  be  violated  at  pleasure  by 
any  belligerent  who  chooses  to  urge  military  necessity 
as  his  excuse.  They  must  themselves  provide  for  ex- 
ceptional cases,  and  tribunals  must  be  established, 
backed  up  in  the  last  resort  by  the  whole  force  of 
civilised  humanity,  to  punish  violations  of  them  by 
judicial  process,  and  thus  rid  the  world  of  the  legalised 
iniquity  of  reprisals.  In  addition  it  will  be  found  that 
the  organisation  of  whole  nations  for  war  has  made 
such  enormous  progress  during  the  present  world- 
conflict  that  the  distinction  between  combatants  and  non- 
combatants  bids  fair  to  become  obsolete.    We  will  at- 


n8  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

tempt  in  the  next  lecture  to  shew  what  this  implies,  and 
discuss  whether  remedies  can  be  found  for  the  enor- 
mous evils  it  threatens. 

With  the  hard  facts  of  the  present  conflict  before  us 
it  is  impossible  to  escape  from  another  conclusion.  We 
cannot  fail  to  see  that  the  Law  of  Neutrality  is  in  little 
better  case  than  the  Law  of  War.  The  Central  Powers 
have  played  havoc  with  it  on  land  and  sea;  and  the  Al- 
lies have  devised  restraints  on  neutral  trade  which  they 
justify  as  developments  of  existing  rules  rendered  nec- 
essary by  the  new  conditions  of  maritime  commerce 
and  the  lawless  conduct  of  the  enemy.  We  must  wait 
for  the  calmer  days  that  will  come  when  the  war  is  over 
before  we  know  how  far  these  justifications  will  be 
deemed  sufficient  by  the  general  consent  of  the  civilised 
world.  But  it  may  be  said  at  once,  and  without  fear  of 
contradiction,  that  the  Allied  fleets  have  been  as  careful 
of  human  life  as  the  Germans  have  been  careless,  and 
have  endeavoured  by  all  means  in  their  power  to  miti- 
gate the  hardships  caused  to  neutrals  by  the  fresh  rules 
they  have  enforced. 

But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  because  the  sketch 
already  drawn  reveals  widespread  ruin,  the  rest  of  the 
picture  is  equally  discouraging.  The  whole  of  what  is 
generally  called  The  International  Law  of  Peace  stands 
with  little  injury.  It  is  true,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
that  German  diplomatists  have  been  revealed  as  unscru- 
pulous plotters  against  the  well-being  of  states  whose 
friends  they  professed  to  be.  But  as  soon  as  their  mis- 
deeds were  discovered  the  law  proved  equal  to  dealing 


THE  PARTIAL  OVERTHROW         119 

with  them.  The  offending  envoys  were  sent  packing 
with  exhilarating  celerity.  And  some  of  them  owed 
their  safe  return  to  the  generosity  of  an  opponent  they 
never  ceased  to  vilify.  But  for  British  safe-conducts 
Dr.  Dumba  and  Count  Von  Bernstorff  might  still  be 
languishing  in  some  distant  land,  far  away  from  the 
governments  who  have  rewarded  them  and  the  admirers 
who  deem  that  they  have  done  yeoman's  service  to 
their  cause.  No  one  suggests  that  the  Law  of  Diplo- 
macy needs  recasting  in  consequence  of  their  offences. 
The  Law  of  Jurisdiction  still  stands  firm  on  the  founda- 
tion of  territorial  sovereignty;  while  the  rules  under 
which  states  can  acquire  unoccupied  territory,  and  es- 
tablish civilised  government  in  it,  may  perhaps  require 
development,  but  call  for  little  alteration. 

It  may  be  urged  that  the  downfall  of  a  large  portion 
of  a  building  must  weaken  the  rest.  But  this  is  not  a 
truth  of  universal  application.  It  is  possible  that  the 
part  destroyed  was  kept  in  position  by  the  strength  of 
the  remainder,  which  may  stand  firmer  than  before 
when  released  from  the  strain.  In  any  case  there  is  the 
probability  that  the  crash  may  lead  to  a  rebuilding  on 
better  lines  and  with  more  carefully  chosen  materials. 
All  depends  on  the  value  of  the  edifice  in  the  eyes  of 
those  who  own  it,  and  in  the  energy  and  resource  they 
display  in  their  efforts  after  restoration.  In  the  case 
before  us  it  is  clear  that  civilised  humanity  does  not 
desire  to  destroy  International  Law,  but  rather  to 
improve  and  strengthen  it;  for  nearly  the  whole  world 
has  armed,  or  is  arming,  in  its  defence. 


*  LECTURE  V. 

THE  CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION. 

Those  who  have  at  heart  the  welfare  of  their  kind, 
and  have  not  fallen  victims  to  the  German  heresy  of  the 
absolute  right  to  domination  possessed  by  the  super- 
man and  the  super-state,  must  draw  but  one  conclusion 
from  the  facts  I  have  laid  before  you.  They  cannot 
fail  to  see  that  the  work  of  building  up  the  shattered 
edifice  of  International  Law  concerns  the  whole  of 
civilised  humanity.  Neutrals  as  well  as  belligerents 
are  affected  to  an  enormous  extent  by  many  of  the 
incidents  of  the  present  struggle.  It  is  not  a  question 
of  loss  or  inconvenience  to  a  few  traders  here  and 
there,  but  of  widespread  national  distress.  Whole 
populations,  like  those  of  Holland  and  Norway,  have 
been  reduced  to  acute  discomfort,  if  not  actual  want; 
and  whole  classes,  such  as  seamen,  have  been  placed  in 
peril  of  their  lives.  War  as  it  is  waged  to-day  means 
for  many  neutrals  at  least  as  much  danger  and  distress 

*  The  victories  which  secured  the  triumph  of  the  cause  upheld  in 
these  pages  were  won  while  this  Lecture  and  the  next  were  in  the 
press.  Recent  events  have  thus  strengthened  the  conclusions  reached 
beforehand.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to  ask  the  reader  to  alter  a 
good  many  assertions  from  the  present  to  the  past  tense,  and  regard 
as  affirmations  several  statements  that  are  set  forth  in  the  text  in 
the  language  of  anticipation  and  probability. 

120 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     121 

as  falls  to  the  average  civilian  in  the  belligerent  coun- 
tries. It  is  essential  therefore  that  neutral  states 
should  have  a  voice  in  shaping  the  better  order  that  is 
to  render  such  conditions  impossible  in  the  future.  And 
this  is  the  more  necessary  because  of  three  great 
changes  that  have  come  into  general  notice  since  July, 
19 14,  though  their  beginnings  can  be  traced  back  to 
earlier  years. 

The  first  of  these  events  is  the  practical  obliteration 
of  the  all-important  distinction  between  combatants  and 
non-combatants.  The  division  of  the  people  of  a 
belligerent  state  into  these  two  great  classes,  and  the 
grant  to  the  second  of  far  more  favourable  treatment 
than  is  accorded  to  the  first,  was  not  embodied  in  the 
Law  of  War  till  comparatively  recent  times.  The  dis- 
tinction slowly  emerged  during  the  century  after 
Grotius,  and  became  one  of  the  most  humanising  in- 
fluences to  be  found  in  the  whole  history  of  mankind. 
In  the  earliest  days  of  recorded  history  either  slaughter 
or  slavery  was  the  lot  of  conquered  populations.1  As 
time  went  on  the  lives  of  the  peaceful  inhabitants  of 
an  enemy's  country  were  spared,  though  they  were  still 
led  into  captivity.  Then  special  classes  were  left  un- 
molested, some  on  account  of  the  harmlessness  of  their 
lives,  and  others  because  of  the  sacredness  of  their 
functions.  Among  those  whom  it  was  deemed  unlawful 
to  slay  or  enslave  were  women,  children,  husbandmen, 
artisans  and  ministers  of  religion.2     Finally,   as  the 

1  Grotius,  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pacts,  Bk.  Ill,  Ch.  IV. 
1  Ibid.,  Bk.  Ill,  Ch.  XI,  §§  9-12. 


122  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

result  of  generations  of  progress  in  the  direction  of 
mercy,  a  great  generalisation  was  made,  and  all  non- 
combatants  were  deemed  to  be  exempt  from  the  worst 
severities  of  warfare.  They  were  to  be  protected  from 
outrage  and  allowed  to  go  about  their  ordinary  avoca- 
tions, as  long  as  they  sent  no  military  information  to 
their  own  side,  submitted  quietly  to  the  control 
of  the  invaders,  and  neither  planned  nor  executed  any 
warlike  operations  against  them.  The  principles  thus 
briefly  sketched  were  embodied  in  the  Military  Code 
annexed  to  the  Hague  Convention  on  the  Laws  and 
Customs  of  War  on  Land.1  Its  rules  represent  the 
highest  point  to  which  the  tide  of  humanity  has  yet 
risen  in  military  matters.  We  have  already  seen  in 
Lecture  IV,  how  shamefully  many  of  them  have  been 
violated  during  the  present  war  by  the  invading  armies 
of  the  Central  Powers,  and  what  terrible  treatment 
has  often  been  meted  out  to  the  inhabitants  of  what  are 
called  occupied  districts.  But  I  feel  bound  to  add  that 
the  setback  to  progress  thus  indicated  does  not  spring 
entirely  from  the  demoralisation  of  Germany.  It  is 
partly  due  to  the  use  without  stint  or  limit  of  all  the 
highly  developed  power  of  the  modern  state  for  mili- 
tary purposes.  Before  19 14  the  organisation  of  whole 
nations  for  war  had  made  great  strides.  Compulsory 
military  service  had  taken  within  its  net  large,  and  ever 
larger,  portions  of  the  manhood  of  the  leading  states 
of  the  world.  A  regular  cult  of  the  sword  as  the  great 
teacher  of  duty  and  discipline  had  sprung  up.    Germany 

1  See  Articles  4,  23,  44-52. 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     123 

led  the  way  in  both  the  theory  and  the  practice  of  this 
new  religion.  Other  countries  followed,  till  at  last 
over  nearly  all  Europe,  and  wide  tracts  beyond  its 
borders,  practically  the  whole  male  population  was 
trained  for  service  in  the  field.  But  during  the  present 
war  matters  have  been  carried  much  further.  The 
womanhood  of  the  belligerent  nations  has  followed  in 
the  footsteps  of  their  manhood,  and  even  the  children 
are  entering  on  the  same  path.  We  are  constantly  told 
that  those  who  make  munitions  of  war  at  home  are 
doing  as  valuable  service  as  those  who  fire  them  out  of 
guns  and  rifles  at  the  front.  Undoubtedly  this  is  true; 
and  the  same  principle  applies  to  many  others  besides 
munition  workers.  A  very  large  proportion  of  these 
patriotic  toilers  are  women.  And  further,  a  consider- 
able amount  of  war-service  is  done  by  children,  as  for 
instance  in  gathering  crops,  collecting  materials,  and 
distributing  literature.  How  is  it  possible  in  the  face 
of  such  facts  to  maintain  the  distinction  between  com- 
batants and  non-combatants?  But  what  is  to  take  its 
place?  Is  the  clock  of  progress  to  go  back  three  hun- 
dred years,  and  the  track  of  invading  armies  to  be 
again  marked  by  promiscuous  destruction?  Are 
women  to  be  made  into  prisoners  of  war  at  the  best, 
and  at  the  worst  violated  and  slaughtered?  Shall  chil- 
dren be  gathered  wholesale  into  internment  camps,  and 
distributed  thence  into  industrial  and  domestic  slavery? 
The  problem  is  terribly  real.  It  arises  from  the  very 
nature  of  the  case.  The  boasted  modern  organisation 
of  whole  nations,  and  not  merely  their  armed  forces, 


i24  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

for  war,  has  provided  the  world  with  as  fruitful  a  hot- 
bed of  moral  and  jural  difficulties  as  ever  confronted 
men  of  thought  in  their  studies  or  men  of  action  in  the 
field.  Frankly,  I  see  no  way  to  deal  with  it,  and  at  the 
same  time  preserve  the  old  humanities  and  chivalries 
of  war.  The  only  real  remedy  is  to  remove  the  soil 
from  which  the  evils  spring.  No  half-measures  can  be 
effective;  and  it  is  impossible  to  go  back  to  the  condi- 
tions of  fifty  years  ago.  But  we  may  go  forward.  The 
world  can  and  must  be  organised  for  peace,  and  not 
for  war. 

We  must  now  consider  the  second  of  those  great 
and  recent  changes  that  cry  aloud  to  civilised  humanity, 
and  lay  on  it  the  task  of  saving  the  world  from  ruin. 
It  is  concerned  with  the  sea  and  its  use.  By  the  adop- 
tion of  their  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare  the  Germans 
practically  made  war  on  all  the  commercial  shipping 
of  the  world,  in  order  to  strike  what  they  fondly  be- 
lieved would  be  a  mortal  blow  at  England.  They 
sought,  but  in  vain,  to  prevent  the  coming  of  food  and 
raw  material  to  her  ports,  and  the  transport  of  men 
and  munitions  from  them  to  the  various  fronts.  This 
war  of  theirs  on  shipping  meant  a  war  on  shipmen 
also.  They  cannot,  as  we  have  seen,1  capture  the  ves- 
sels in  the  only  lawful  way,  which  is  scrupulously  tender 
of  human  life.  But  they  can  sink  them,  and  in  so  doing 
they  often  sink  those  who  man  them  as  well.  It  is 
calculated  that  since  the  war  began  over  12,000  neutral 
mariners  have  been  sent  to  their  doom  in  this  way.  The 

1  See  pp.  107-109. 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     125 

wounded  tiger  in  the  jungle  reserves  its  spring  for  the 
hunters  and  beaters.  The  German  tiger  of  the  seas 
turns  in  its  blood-guilty  rage  on  unarmed  men,  and 
defenceless  women  and  their  babes. 

This  gross  and  wicked  illegality  is  accomplished  by 
another  just  as  illegal,  and  more  likely,  because  it  is 
not  at  first  sight  so  inhuman,  to  be  allowed  to  pass 
without  general  reprobation.  I  allude  to  the  attempt 
to  deprive  neutrals  of  their  ancient  and  undoubted  right 
to  traverse  freely  the  open  seas  of  the  world,  as  long 
as  they  observe  the  rules  set  up  between  states  for 
the  regulation  of  oceanic  commerce  in  time  of  war, 
such  for  instance  as  that  which  prohibits  on  pain  of 
capture  the  sea-carriage  of  contraband  to  a  belligerent. 
In  remote  antiquity  those  who  thought  about  the  sea 
at  all  seem  to  have  regarded  it  as  being  like  the  air  a 
gift  of  nature  to  all  mankind.  When  the  Roman  law- 
yers attempted  to  give  legal  form  to  current  theories, 
they  declared  that  it  was  one  of  the  res  communes,  the 
things  common  to  all  which  anyone  could  use  but  no 
one  acquire  as  property.1  But  if  we  follow  the  scanty 
guidance  contained  in  the  earliest  records  we  possess 
we  find  that  the  sea,  as  Sir  Henry  Maine  has  said, 
11  was  common  only  in  the  sense  of  being  universally 
open  to  depredation."  2  When  the  power  of  Rome 
was  at  its  height  vigorous  measures  were  taken  against 
the  pirate  fleets,  and  the  Mediterranean  was  in  reality 
free  to  peaceful  merchantmen.     But  with  the  break-up 

1  Justinian,  Institutes,  Bk.  II,  Tit.  I,  §  I. 
1  International  Law,  p.  76. 


126  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

of  the  Empire  the  old  conditions  returned.  The  sight 
of  a  sail  at  sea  caused  terror  to  the  inhabitants  of 
coastal  districts.  Bitter  experience  taught  them  to  re- 
gard it  as  the  bearer  of  lawless  and  cruel  men,  who 
would  plunder  and  destroy  their  homes,  slaughter  all 
who  resisted,  and  carry  off  the  survivors  into  slavery. 
The  barbarous  custom  of  wrecking  arose  quite  as  much 
from  the  promptings  of  self-defence  as  from  cupidity. 
Great  secular  rulers  and  good  Popes  alike  made  war 
upon  it,  but  it  did  not  even  begin  to  die  out  till  the 
mediaeval  order  developed  from  the  chaos  of  the  dark 
ages,  and  the  seas  became  again  to  some  extent  high- 
ways of  commerce.  With  the  revival  of  maritime  traffic 
there  set  in  a  great  movement  towards  the  assertion  of 
proprietary  rights  in  the  seas  and  territorial  juris- 
diction over  them.  The  Baltic  was  claimed  by  Denmark 
and  Sweden  jointly;  the  Northern  Seas  from  Stadland 
in  Norway  to  Cape  Finisterre  in  Spain  by  England;  the 
Adriatic  by  Venice;  and  the  Gulf  of  Genoa  by  Genoa. 
These  are  but  examples,  not  an  inclusive  list.  Such 
claims  were  often  challenged  by  other  powers  who 
disputed  their  validity  and  desired  to  exercise  authority 
themselves.  But  few,  if  any,  in  mediaeval  times  ob- 
jected on  principle  to  sovereignty  over  the  open  ocean. 
The  Prince  who  possessed  a  sea  had  to  "  keep  "  that 
sea,  that  is  to  say  he  was  held  bound  to  protect  those 
who  sailed  over  it  from  unlawful  depredations.  As 
long  as  he  did  this  with  any  kind  of  efficiency  he  was 
regarded  more  as  a  benefactor  than  a  usurper.  His 
dominion  was  not  held  to  justify  the  exclusion  of  ves- 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     127 

sels  of  other  nations,  though  sometimes  tolls  were 
levied  on  them,  and  licences  to  fish  sold  to  them.  The 
movement  of  thought  in  the  middle  ages  seems  to  have 
run  strongly  in  the  direction  of  what  is  called  mare 
clausum;  and  apparently  no  sense  of  grievance  arose 
to  counteract  it  till  after  the  discovery  of  America,  and 
the  opening  out  of  the  sea-route  to  India  from  Western 
Europe  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Then  Portu- 
gal claimed  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  Spain  the  Pacific, 
and  each  endeavoured  to  keep  the  vessels  of  other 
powers  out  of  its  sea  domain.  Naturally  the  rising 
maritime  states  resisted.  Their  strong  desire  to  share 
in  the  wealth  of  the  Orient  and  the  New  World 
prompted  them  to  challenge  the  claim  to  exclude  them 
from  the  waters  which  led  to  what  were  deemed  the 
golden  lands  beyond.  They  cast  about  for  a  legal 
theory  to  justify  their  position,  and  found  it  in  the 
old  doctrine  of  the  Roman  Jurists  that  the  sea  was 
incapable  of  permanent  appropriation,  while  its  use 
was  common  to  all.  Hence  arose  towards  the  end  of 
the  sixteenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
century  the  great  Mare  Clausum  and  Mare  A  per  turn 
controversy,  with  Grotius  as  the  most  prominent  repre- 
sentative of  the  new  notions.  When  once  it  was  recog- 
nised that  maritime  states  must  have  rights  of  owner- 
ship and  control  over  the  waters  that  wash  their  shores 
and  the  gulfs  and  bays  that  penetrate  into  their  land 
territory,  the  victory  of  the  advocates  of  Mare  Aper- 
tum  was  rapid  and  complete.  The  theory  that  the  open 
sea  was  the  common  highway  of  all  mankind,  and  there- 


128  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

fore  free  to  all  for  passage  and  commerce,  was  so 
obviously  fitted  for  the  new  era  of  trans-oceanic  trade, 
and  so  clearly  beneficial  to  the  human  race,  that  it  met 
with  general  acceptance  when  modified  so  as  to  provide 
for  the  exigencies  of  national  defence.  Hence  it  came 
to  pass  that  in  the  early  days  of  modern  International 
Law  a  jurisprudence  of  the  ocean  was  rapidly  devel- 
oped. Its  foundation  principle  was  that  the  open  seas 
of  the  world  were  absolutely  free  from  the  dominion 
and  control  of  any  state  or  group  of  states,  but  could 
be  used  by  each  and  all  for  their  lawful  occasions, 
without  any  further  let  or  hindrance  than  that  which 
arose  from  the  obligation  to  respect  the  corresponding 
rights  of  others.  Pirates,  as  enemies  of  the  human  race, 
could  be  captured  and  punished  by  any  who  were  strong 
enough  to  seize  them.  The  operations  of  war  were 
reckoned  among  the  lawful  occasions  for  which  the 
open  sea  might  be  used,  but  no  belligerent  could  per- 
manently occupy  its  waters  for  his  warlike  purposes, 
just  as  no  trading  state  could  fence  off  a  portion  of  the 
ocean  for  its  traffic  alone.  The  right  of  blockade  may 
possibly  be  regarded  as  an  exception  to  the  rule  against 
permanent  and  exclusive  use  of  an  element  common  to 
all.  But,  if  so,  it  is  the  only  one ;  and  the  right  to  warn 
off  vessels  from  the  neighbourhood  of  the  blockaded 
ports  ceases  the  moment  the  blockade  ceases.  The 
doctrine  that  the  high  seas  of  the  globe  are  open  to  all 
in  war  as  well  as  in  peace  has  stood  firm  for  centuries  on 
the  rock  of  universal  consent. 

But  it  is  in  jeopardy  now.    New  modes  of  warfare 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     129 

have  arisen,  and  new  means  of  transmitting  informa- 
tion. The  result  has  been  a  tendency  on  the  part  of 
belligerents  to  encroach  on  neutral  rights  in  order  to 
utilise  these  things  in  their  own  interests  and  turn  them 
against  their  adversaries.  We  have  before  us  a  small 
extension  of  belligerent  authority  as  against  neutrals 
in  1904,  and  an  enormous  inroad  on  neutral  rights 
about  ten  years  afterwards.  The  second  followed  the 
first  largely  because  what  was  done  on  the  former  occa- 
sion received  no  international  regulation  and  limitation. 
The  chain  of  events  began  when  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  a  vessel  which  was  undoubtedly  neutral  was 
equipped  for  wireless  telegraphy,  and  used  by  a  cor- 
respondent of  the  Times  for  the  transmission  to  his 
paper  of  intelligence  concerning  the  doings  of  the  fight- 
ing fleets.  Here  was  a  new  case,  and  one  which  obvi- 
ously required  some  development  of  belligerent  control; 
for  it  is  clear  that  the  smallest  lack  of  discretion  or 
good  faith  might  have  resulted  in  the  gift  of  valuable 
information  to  one  side  or  the  other  in  the  war.1  Each 
belligerent  dealt  with  the  matter  in  its  own  way.  The 
Russian  Admiral  threatened  to  treat  as  a  spy  the  cor- 
respondent who  initiated  the  plan;  and  the  Japanese 
authorities  warned  him  off  a  certain  portion  of  the 
high  seas.  Clearly  he  was  no  spy;  for  he  acted  openly, 
and  the  essence  of  espionage  is  secrecy.  But  the  possible 
dangers  to  belligerents  that  lurked  in  such  proceedings 
as  his  were  sufficient  to  justify  some  restriction  of  his 

1  Higgins,  War  and  the  Private  Citizen,  pp.  89-112;  Lawrence,  War 
and  Neutrality  in  the  Far  East,  Chap.  V. 


130  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

common  law  right  of  free  navigation.  In  the  Proceed- 
ings of  the  United  States  Naval  War  College  for  1904 
will  be  found  a  carefully  reasoned  statement  as  to  what 
the  restrictions  should  be.1  Unfortunately  no  conven- 
tion embodying  them  has  been  negotiated  between 
states.  Belligerents  were  left  free  to  be  mild  or  severe, 
reasonable  or  unreasonable,  as  seemed  good  to  them 
when  the  emergency  arose,  with  the  result  that  in  19 15 
a  particularly  arrogant  and  unscrupulous  belligerent  ig- 
nored neutral  rights  entirely.  Very  early  in  the  world- 
war  Germany  laid  mines  in  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Atlantic  highway  round  the  North  of  Ireland.  Some 
of  them  were  unanchored  and  certainly  did  not  fulfil 
the  requirement  of  being  "  so  constructed  as  to  become 
harmless  an  hour  at  most  after  those  who  laid  them  lost 
control  over  them."  2  Great  Britain  was  unwilling  to 
resort  to  mines  at  all,  and  refrained  from  making  use 
of  them  till  several  merchant  vessels,  neutral  as  well 
as  British,  had  been  destroyed,  and  no  less  than  sixty 
persons  of  neutral  nationality  drowned.  When  at  last 
we  retaliated  in  the  Autumn  of  19 14  we  refrained  en- 
tirely from  the  use  of  unanchored  mines,  and  warned 
mariners  of  the  position  of  our  fields  of  anchored 
mines,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  Hague  Conven- 
tion that  deals  with  the  subject.3  It  has  been  suggested 
that  Germany  was  free  to  disregard  this  Convention 
because  Montenegro,  one  of  the  belligerents,  had  not 

1  See  pp.  112-116. 

2  Hague  Convention  of  1907  on  Automatic  Submarine  Contact  Mines, 
Art.  1.  3  See  Article  3. 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     131 

signed  it,  and  its  seventh  article  laid  down  that  its  pro- 
visions were  applicable  "  only  if  all  the  belligerents  " 
were  parties  to  it.  This  excuse,  if  it  is  seriously  put 
forward,  sets  up  a  most  minute  technical  point  against 
a  plain  precept  of  humanity.  Whether  or  not  it  is  good 
in  the  forum  of  law,  the  fact  that  it  is  relied  on  is 
enough  to  ensure  condemnation  in  the  forum  of  con- 
science. In  that  exalted  court  the  plea  that  the  Con- 
vention need  not  be  observed  because  a  mere  atom  of  a 
state  which  does  not  possess  a  single  sea-going  ship 
neglected  to  sign  it  would  meet  with  nothing  but  con- 
tempt and  indignation. 

We  have  just  seen  that  during  the  last  few  years 
there  has  been  a  general  neglect  on  the  part  of  the 
whole  body  of  civilised  states  to  define  clearly  the  ex- 
ceptional circumstances  under  which  belligerents  might 
limit  the  free  navigation  of  the  seas  in  time  of  war, 
and  prescribe  the  exact  nature  of  the  limitations  which 
could  be  permitted.  It  stands  to  reason  that  such 
neglect  would  be  exploited  to  the  full  by  a  power  which 
in  order  to  gain  an  advantage  in  war  violated  a  Con- 
vention regarded  even  by  its  authors  as  pitiably  weak 
in  the  restraints  it  put  on  the  employment  of  submarine 
mines.  Accordingly  we  find  that  Germany,  in  retalia- 
tion for  our  attempt  to  prevent  goods  from  abroad 
from  reaching  her  across  the  ocean,  carried  still  fur- 
ther the  lawless  attacks  on  human  life  she  had  initiated 
by  her  promiscuous  use  of  mines.  In  February,  191 5, 
she  declared  the  sea  for  some  distance  round  the  British 
Isles  to  be  what  she  called  indifferently  a  Naval  War 


132  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

Zone  or  a  Barred  Zone,  and  we  will  call  a  War  Zone. 
By  this  she  meant  that  British  and  Allied  vessels  tra- 
versing the  area  in  question  would  be  liable  to  destruc- 
tion at  any  time  by  her  submarines,  and  in  addition  that 
neutral  merchantmen  would  be  exposed  to  similar 
danger.  At  the  end  of  January,  19 17,  she  multiplied 
her  War  Zones,  extending  them  to  the  Atlantic  and 
the  Mediterranean,  and  at  the  same  time  withdrew  the 
concession  she  had  made  to  the  United  States  in  the 
previous  May  to  the  effect  that  American  vessels  should 
not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  without  opportunity 
of  escape  being  given  to  those  on  board  them.  For  the 
future  there  was  to  be  no  faltering.  From  February 
1,  19 17,  she  intended  to  prevent  by  force  navigation 
to  and  from  the  coasts  of  her  enemies.  To  quote  her 
own  words,  "  all  ships  met  within  the  Zone  will  be 
sunk."  x 

This  is  what  is  meant  by  unrestricted  U-boat  war- 
fare. As  we  all  know  it  brought  the  United  States  into 
the  fight  early  in  the  following  April;  and  neither 
America  nor  the  powers  associated  with  her  in  the 
struggle  are  likely  to  end  it  without  obtaining  the  full- 
est security  against  the  repetition  in  future  of  such 
murderous  attacks.  We  have  previously  discussed  them 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a  proper  regard  for  human 
life.  Now  I  want  to  point  out  that  legally  they  are 
fatal  to  what  has  been  regarded  for  about  three  cen- 
turies as  one  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  civilised 
mankind.     What  becomes  of  the  time-honoured  doc- 

1  German  Memorandum  of  January  31,  1917. 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     133 

trine  that  the  open  seas  of  the  world  are  free  for  all 
to  traverse  on  their  lawful  occasions,  if  any  belligerent 
who  can  make  a  vast  area  of  them  dangerous  is  allowed 
to  reserve  it  as  a  sort  of  sea-province  of  his  own,  and 
warn  neutrals  off  on  pain  of  death?  A  more  manifest 
usurpation  it  is  impossible  to  conceive.  And  where  is 
it  to  end?  If  neutrals  submit  to  it,  they  must  be  content 
in  future  to  navigate  the  ocean  by  the  gracious  per- 
mission of  warring  states.  Their  old  right  becomes  a 
privilege,  granted  or  withheld  at  the  will  of  others. 
War  is  installed  as  Lord  Paramount  of  the  world; 
and  Peace  stands  humbly  in  the  background  ready  to 
pick  up  with  effusive  gratitude  such  morsels  as  the  real 
master  of  God's  earth  may  throw  to  her.  Not  the  least 
of  the  services  which  the  United  States  have  done  to 
mankind  during  their  national  existence  was  rendered 
when  they  threw  down  the  gage  of  battle  to  a  power 
whose  monstrous  War  Zones  robbed  civilisation  of  one 
of  its  most  essential  means  of  existence.  Let  us  hope 
that  when  success  has  crowned  their  efforts,  they  and 
we,  and  the  nations  allied  with  us,  will  see  to  it  that 
the  revised  International  Code  which  will  assuredly 
come  into  being  not  only  re-enacts  the  old  right  in  the 
plainest  terms,  but  also  provides  means  for  enforcing 
it  promptly  against  all  gainsayers. 

The  third  of  the  great  changes  which  have  become 
apparent  to  all  the  world  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war  is  concerned  with  the  air.  Its  conquest 
was  a  triumph  of  scientific  knowledge  and  mechanical 
skill.     But  instead  of  being  used  for  the  welfare  of 


i34  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

humanity  it  was  at  once  pressed  into  the  service  of 
destruction.  Germany,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  fourth 
Lecture,  led  the  way  in  its  perversion.  The  other 
belligerents  have  followed,  till  now  there  seems  a 
prospect  that  new  and  more  terrible  miseries  will  be 
added  to  the  already  superabundant  horrors  of  war. 
Few  of  us,  I  think,  yet  realise  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  destruction  that  may  be  wrought  on  the  earth 
from  the  air  in  the  next  great  war.  What  belligerent 
countries  now  suffer  is  a  mere  trifle  in  comparison  with 
it.  States  will  guard  their  air-frontiers  with  organised 
air-forces,  as  they  now  guard  their  land-frontiers  with 
armies.  Great  battles  will  take  place  in  the  space  above 
the  borders,  and  the  vanquished  will  have  to  suffer  the 
horrors  of  air-invasion.  What  these  will  be  no  tongue 
or  pen  can  describe.  For  one  air-raid  to-day  there  will 
be  scores  in  a  few  years'  time;  for  one  aeroplane, 
hundreds;  for  one  airman,  thousands.  Squadron  after 
squadron  will  come  over  in  wave  after  wave,  and  each 
will  cut  a  broad  swath  of  destruction  across  the  in- 
vaded land.  Town  after  town  will  be  subjected  to 
continuous  bombardment  on  one  excuse  or  another,  till 
nothing  will  be  left  but  masses  of  smoking  ruins.  The 
capital  and  the  more  important  military  or  manufactur- 
ing centres  will  probably  be  protected  by  gigantic  bomb- 
proof structures;  but  the  whole  country  cannot  be  thus 
roofed  with  steel.  It  will  be  turned  into  one  vast 
Gehenna,  loathsome  with  the  shattered  corpses  of  un- 
armed civilians,  and  smoking  with  the  lurid  mirk  of  a 
thousand  incendiary  fires.  To  this  we  shall  come  within 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     135 

a  few  more  years,  if  mankind  is  so  callous  or  so  hope- 
less as  to  take  no  precautions  against  it.  Writing  in 
1908,  I  made  a  vain  attempt  to  awaken  rulers  and 
shipping  interests  to  the  dangers  threatening  life  and 
property  in  any  maritime  war  of  the  immediate  future, 
in  spite  of  the  humanitarian  aspirations  so  freely  set 
forth  and  so  feebly  translated  into  rules  at  the  Hague 
Conference  of  the  previous  year.  After  reviewing 
various  questions  in  some  detail,  I  summed  up  in  the 
words,  "  There  is  no  escape  from  the  conclusion  that 
in  any  war  which  covered  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
world's  seas,  and  was  fought  out  to  a  finish  by  power- 
ful navies,  there  would  be  wholesale  slaughter  of  non- 
combatants,  the  majority  of  whom  would  probably  be 
neutral.  As  for  property,  it  would  be  destroyed  right 
and  left,  in  spite  of  all  the  immunities  which  have  been 
secured  for  neutral  trade  within  the  last  century."  x 
No  one  took  the  slightest  notice  of  what  I  said.  Cham- 
bers of  Commerce  were  too  much  occupied  with 
championing  all  the  old  severities  of  naval  warfare  to 
make  any  attempt  to  realise  the  new  dangers  that 
threatened  international  trade.  Politicians  were  so  full 
of  zeal  for  the  discomfiture  of  their  political  foes 
that  they  had  no  energy  to  spare  for  safeguarding 
humanity  from  freshly  devised  horrors.  I  was  a  voice 
crying  in  the  wilderness,  a  mere  writer  on  International 
Law  and  therefore,  of  course,  a  feckless  hair-splitter  or 
a  dreamy  cosmopolitan.    I  should  not  expect  any  better 

1  Lawrence,    International   Problems   and   Hague   Conferences,    pp. 
175-176- 


i36  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

fate  to-day  but  for  the  fact  that  the  imagination  of  the 
public  has  been  excited  by  all  that  appertains  to  the 
new  art  of  flying.  What  the  student  of  international 
affairs  cannot  hope  to  do  by  himself  may  be  accom- 
plished with  the  potent  aid  of  the  engineer  and  the 
novelist.  And  when  once  people  are  thoroughly  awake 
to  the  immense  possibilities  for  evil  as  well  as  for 
good  contained  in  aircraft,  they  may  be  induced  to 
combat  the  former  as  well  as  develop  the  latter. 

To  assist  the  awakening  process  let  us  try  to  bring 
into  one  focus  our  recent  conclusions.  We  have  seen 
that  in  modern  warfare  nations  are  organised  for 
mutual  destruction  far  more  completely  than  they  have 
ever  been  before,  vast  stretches  of  open  ocean  are 
withdrawn  from  peaceful  uses  and  reserved  for  bellig- 
erent operations,  and  from  the  air  we  breathe  the 
weapons  of  death  are  showered  down  upon  us  in  ever- 
increasing  abundance.  It  follows  from  the  first  of 
these  developments  that  the  comparatively  merciful 
treatment  granted  for  centuries  to  non-combatants  will 
rapidly  vanish,  from  the  second  that  the  seas  will  no 
longer  be  free  in  the  sense  that  all  may  traverse  them 
on  their  legitimate  business,  and  from  the  third  that 
destruction  of  life  and  the  means  of  living  will  be 
more  indiscriminate,  more  complete,  and  more  wide- 
spread than  it  has  ever  been  before,  even  in  the  darkest 
of  the  dark  ages.  All  this,  it  seems  to  me,  is  bound  to 
take  place  quite  apart  from  any  special  lawlessness  or 
cruelty  in  one  or  more  of  the  belligerents.  It  is  inherent 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     137 

in  the  nature  of  the  case.  War  has  made  a  conscription 
of  all  the  arts  and  sciences,  and  pressed  them  without 
stint  into  its  service.  To  do  so  it  had  to  break  through 
many  wholesome  restraints,  and  violate  many  time- 
honoured  sanctities.  But  this  having  been  accomplished 
the  consequences  I  have  sketched  will  inevitably  follow, 
unless  mankind  at  large  makes  a  general  effort  in  the 
opposite  direction.  To  Germany  belongs  by  far  the 
greater  portion  of  the  discredit.  She  has  not  only 
developed  a  reasoned  theory  of  the  State  and  of  War, 
under  which  all  these  things  were  certain  to  take  place; 
but  she  has  led  the  way  in  their  inauguration  knowingly, 
thoroughly,  gleefully.  Her  guilt  will  be  shared  by 
the  other  nations,  if  they  make  no  attempt  to  stem  the 
tide  of  horror  and  ruin.  History  shews  that  when  once 
new  means  of  destruction  gain  a  foothold  in  warfare 
they  come  to  stay  until  they  are  superseded  by  other 
and  more  effective  weapons.  Moral  considerations 
may  for  a  long  time  prevent  their  adoption;  but  I  doubt 
whether  any  of  them,  when  received  into  general  use, 
have  ever  been  abandoned  owing  to  conscientious 
scruples.  We  must  make  up  our  minds  to  the  employ- 
ment in  the  warfare  of  the  future  of  high  explosives, 
flame-jets,  poisonous  gases,  submarines,  bombing 
aeroplanes,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  devilish  enginery 
with  which  we  are  now  familiar.  Moreover  the  potency 
of  science  in  destruction  will  increase  with  the  progress 
of  invention,  and  this  we  cannot  stop,  even  if  we  fool- 
ishly wished  to  do  so.  What  we  can  do  is  to  diminish 
and  finally  destroy  the  medium  in  which  science  works 


138  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

for  the  torture  and  ruin  of  mankind.  There  is  no  rea- 
son in  the  nature  of  things  why  states  should  settle  their 
differences  by  a  resort  to  force.  Once  it  was  the  proud 
boast  of  every  freeman  that  he  redressed  his  griev- 
ances by  the  might  of  his  own  strong  arm.  But  in  the 
end  the  method  of  judicial  trial  proved  far  more  satis- 
factory, and  secured  universal  adoption  among  civilised 
communities,  faulty  though  it  often  was  in  its  early 
days,  and  far  from  perfect  as  its  results  sometimes  are 
even  now.  Why  should  not  national  quarrels  be  decided 
in  the  same  way?  No  doubt  there  are  difficulties,  and 
some  of  them  are  very  great.  But  they  can  be  over- 
come if  mankind  is  in  earnest,  though  nothing  less 
than  a  strong,  general  and  persistent  determination  to 
achieve  the  end  in  view  will  suffice.  When  every  man 
was  his  own  guardian  and  his  own  avenger,  it  was 
difficult  to  get  him  to  give  up  his  barbaric  freedom, 
and  become  an  unit  in  a  society  where  law  took  the 
place  of  naked  force,  and  reason  superseded  passion. 
The  process  took  ages,  but  it  was  completed  at  last; 
and  now  in  every  civilised  state  it  is  an  offence  visited 
with  severe  punishment  to  do  what  was  done  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course  in  the  old  days  and,  in  graphic  popular 
phrase,  take  the  law  into  one's  own  hands.  Already 
states  have  constituted  a  society,  as  I  shewed  in  the 
second  Lecture.  If  they  willed,  they  could  become  a 
society  organised  for  the  purpose  of  administering 
justice  between  its  members.  At  the  close  of  the  pres- 
ent war  civilised  humanity  must  decide  whether  to  take 
a  big  step  forwards  towards  international  peace  and 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     139 

brotherhood  or  stagger  back  to  barbarism  amid  ever- 
increasing  horrors.  The  most  fateful  moment  in  the 
world's  history  since  the  birth  of  the  babe  of  Bethlehem 
will  have  arrived.  The  great  choice  of  which  Lowell 
sings  will  be  put  to  mankind: — 

Once  to  every  man  and  nation  comes  the  moment  to 

decide 
In  the  strife  of  Truth  with  Falsehood  for  the  good  or 

evil  side ! 
Some  great  cause,  God's  new  Messiah,  offering  each 

the  bloom  or  blight, 
Parts  the  goats  upon  the  left  hand,  and  the   sheep 

upon  the  right, 
And  the  choice  goes  by  for  ever  'twixt  that  darkness 

and  that  light. 

But  on  this  occasion  no  individual,  no  national,  deter- 
mination will  be  sufficient.  The  matter  is  one  for  the 
human  race  as  a  whole.  It  need  not  be  unanimous,  but 
it  must  come  to  a  definite  conclusion.  Hesitation  and 
delay  will  amount  to  the  same  thing  as  a  deliberate 
choice  of  evil;  for  the  old  bad  system  of  constant 
distrust  and  incessant  preparation  for  mutual  destruc- 
tion will  still  remain,  and  grow  worse  and  worse  as  the 
years  roll  by.  But  if  the  alternative  of  light  and  good 
is  taken,  then  there  must  be  a  united  effort  to  realise  all 
that  such  a  splendid  decision  implies.  The  opportunity 
will  be  before  us  soon,  and  there  must  be  no  paltering 
with  it. 

The  very  magnitude  of  the  present  evil  will  secure 
to  us  such  possibilities  of  reformation  as  have  never 


i4o  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

before  presented  themselves.  Hitherto  the  nations 
have  moved  in  a  vicious  circle.  No  single  one  among 
them  has  dared  to  disarm  and  trust  to  neighbourliness 
and  just  dealing  for  peace  and  security,  because  by  so 
doing  it  would  render  itself  helpless  against  the  others 
and  invite  attack  by  its  defenceless  condition.  The  most 
unscrupulous  and  ambitious  powers  would  have  the  rest 
at  their  mercy,  and  the  arrogant,  not  the  meek,  would 
inherit  the  earth.  But  the  measures  resorted  to  for  pro- 
tection were  made  the  excuse  for  further  armaments 
on  the  part  of  those  who  desired  to  fish  in  troubled 
waters.  Thus  the  evil  grew  not  only  through  the  action 
of  those  states  who  saw  their  advantage  in  it,  but  also 
through  the  precautions  taken  in  order  to  foil  their 
designs.  Nothing  can  prove  efficacious  against  it  but  a 
general  agreement  to  organise  the  Society  of  Nations 
for  peace  instead  of  war;  and  this  was  impossible  in 
the  state  of  mind  prevailing  till  lately  among  many 
peoples.  But  the  experience  of  the  last  few  years  has 
been  so  awful  that,  for  the  time  being  at  any  rate,  the 
most  militant  have  been  sobered  by  it.  Moreover  the 
war  is  a  world-war,  which  means,  among  other  things, 
that  the  majority  of  civilised  states  are  parties  to  it,  and 
must  therefore  come  together  by  their  plenipotentiaries 
to  negotiate  the  terms  of  peace.  Not  only  will  the  as- 
sembly be  representative  of  all  the  belligerent  nations, 
but  it  is  quite  possible  that  important  neutrals  will  in 
some  capacity,  though  not  as  principals,  be  admitted 
to  it.  In  any  case  it  will  be  a  Congress  unlike  any  other 
that  has  ever  assembled  to  end  a  war.   It  will  be  unique 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     141 

in  the  number  of  states  represented  at  it,  and  unique 
in  the  chastened  mood  of  all  the  parties  to  it,  not  ex- 
cepting the  bleeding  and  exhausted  victors.  Its  spirit 
will  be  the  spirit  of  the  civilised  world  and  its  decisions 
will  be  the  decisions  of  mankind.  In  it  and  by  means  of 
it,  the  vicious  circle  may  be  broken,  and  the  peoples  of 
the  earth  set  free  from  its  accursed  domination.  Never 
before  has  a  similar  opportunity  arisen,  and  if  it  is 
allowed  to  slip  mankind  may  never  have  another.  To 
let  it  pass  would  be  one  of  the  most  grievous  sins 
against  light  the  world  has  ever  witnessed.  Unless  the 
human  race  has  lost  all  vision  of  justice  and  brother- 
hood, all  care  for  peace  and  security,  and  all  love  for 
what  is  beautiful  and  holy,  it  will  strive  as  it  has  never 
striven  before  so  to  organise  the  Society  of  Nations 
that  for  the  future  war  will  be  difficult,  if  not  impossi- 
ble. Given  a  few  more  years  of  such  waste,  destruction 
and  cruelty  as  we  have  recently  endured,  and  civilisa- 
tion will  be  at  its  last  gasp.  The  world  cannot  afford  to 
wait  for  the  slow  evolution  of  a  remedy,  especially  as 
it  seems  probable  that  warfare,  if  left  to  the  gradual 
development  of  customary  observances,  will  grow  in 
severity  rather  than  in  mercy.  Spontaneous  submission 
to  German  domination  is  unthinkable;  and  surrender, 
if  brought  about  by  force,  would  inaugurate  universal 
slavery,  not  the  willing  obedience  of  free  peoples  to 
laws  of  their  own  imposing.  It  follows,  therefore,  that 
the  general  and  express  consent  of  states  is  the  only 
possible  agent  of  immediate  reform  By  this  means 
mankind  must  establish  a  new  and  better  international 


142  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

order.  There  is  no  other  way.  It  has  been  trodden 
already,  as  we  saw  in  the  third  Lecture,  at  the  Hague 
Conferences  of  1899  and  1907.  It  can  be  used  again 
without  any  break  in  the  continuity  of  international 
development,  and  we  can  learn  by  the  experience  al- 
ready gained  to  make  it  a  much  more  efficient  instru- 
ment of  progress  than  it  was  before. 

As  a  first  step  in  the  organisation  of  the  world  for 
peace  rather  than  for  war  the  duty  of  helping  to  enforce 
International  Law  must  be  laid  on  all  states.  If  they 
are  not  willing  to  shoulder  the  burden,  it  is  useless  to  go 
further.  The  world  must  be  left  to  rush  headlong  to 
perdition  in  its  blindness,  and  lack  of  devotion  to  the 
common  welfare.  The  plans  for  a  fresh  struggle  will 
be  laid  on  the  day  when  the  present  conflict  ends.  All 
the  wealth  and  all  the  mental  equipment  which  should 
have  gone  into  the  work  of  social  and  international  re- 
construction will  go  instead  into  preparations  for 
mutual  slaughter.  The  air  will  be  alive  with  fleets  of 
war-planes,  and  the  sea  above  and  beneath  the  surface 
will  be  filled  with  new  and  more  terrible  instruments  of 
destruction.  On  land  fresh  weapons,  more  powerful 
explosives,  more  diabolical  methods  of  maiming  and 
torture,  will  constantly  come  into  being.  From  such 
a  prospect  even  Germany  might  shrink.  But  the  will- 
ing assumption  by  all  nations  of  the  obligation  to  re- 
strain and  punish  peace-breakers  is  the  price  to  be  paid 
for  deliverance.  Nor  is  it  burdensome  when  compared 
with  the  benefits  it  will  purchase.  In  fact  it  would  in- 
volve far  smaller  sacrifices  than  the  condition  of  armed 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     143 

peace  varied  occasionally  by  devasting  wars  which  is 
the  only  practical  alternative.  The  conviction  that  in 
states  a  similar  obligation,  resting  on  individual  citi- 
zens, is  the  only  real  security  for  justice  between  man 
and  man  and  the  safety  of  life  and  limb,  has  been 
growing  steadily  from  age  to  age.  To-day  the  strong- 
est individualist  would  not  dream  of  going  back  to 
primitive  conditions  of  chaotic  disorder  and  almost  un- 
bridled anarchy.  The  self-restraint  and  corporate 
action  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  a  better  order 
have  become  a  second  nature  to  most  of  us,  and  made 
the  task  of  maintaining  and  improving  it  so  easy  that 
all  we  have  to  do  is  to  pay  our  police-rates  cheerfully, 
and  support  the  authorities  in  bringing  the  whole 
weight  of  the  public  forces  to  bear  on  those  who  defy 
the  law.  There  is  nothing  to  shew  that  this  state  of 
affairs  could  not  be  reproduced  in  the  Society  of 
Nations,  if  civilised  mankind  willed  it.  As  a  recent 
writer  has  well  said,  "  Personal  safety  and  social  justice 
depend  upon  the  practice  of  mutual  protection,  and  it 
may  be  confidently  asserted  that  national  safety  and 
international  peace  must  be  based  upon  that  same 
principle."  * 

Undoubtedly  the  peaceful  life  and  general  content 
with  the  law  and  its  administration  that  are  such 
marked  features  in  all  well-governed  national  com- 
munities would  not  be  attained  at  one  bound  in  the 
community  of  states  under  a  reorganised  international 
order.  Neither,  on  the  other  hand,  would  the  transition 

1  A.  J.  Jacobs,  Neutrality  versus  Justice,  p.  13. 


144  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

from  the  rule  of  force  to  the  rule  of  right  be  so  long  or 
so  difficult  a  process  in  the  Society  of  Nations  as  it  is 
proved  to  be  in  the  Society  of  Individuals.  The  disci- 
pline mankind  has  gone  through  in  the  latter  will  fit  it 
for  the  quicker  and  better  performance  of  its  work  in 
the  reform  of  the  former.  The  statesmen  of  to-day, 
even  though  they  may  display  all  the  shortcomings  it  is 
the  fashion  to  impute  to  most  of  them,  are  at  any  rate 
much  more  restrained  and  cultured  beings  than  were 
Frankish  chiefs  or  Saxon  thanes,  and  the  peoples  for 
whom  they  speak  have  learnt  in  the  course  of  centuries 
to  appreciate  the  benefits  of  peace  and  stability.  For 
some  time  past  we  have  lived  under  an  international 
order  corresponding  roughly  to  the  internal  order 
which  subsisted  for  centuries  within  the  older  State- 
communities.  Courts  were  gradually  established  to  try 
disputes  between  individuals  and  inflict  punishment  for 
crime,  while  the  old  right  of  private  vengeance  was  not 
at  first  absolutely  abolished,  but  allowed  only  under 
strict  regulations.  Similarly  nations  have  had  their 
Arbitral  Tribunals,  and  have  resorted  to  them  with 
increasing  frequency;  but  they  have  not  yet  given  up 
the  right  of  making  war  at  their  own  will  and  pleasure, 
though  in  waging  it  they  have  accepted  more  or  less 
completely  certain  restraints  which  are  embodied  in 
what  we  call  the  laws  of  war.  The  Society  of  Nations 
is  now  in  the  same  condition  as  the  Society  of  Indi- 
viduals was  in  England  in  the  time  of  Alfred  the  Great, 
who  provided  in  his  Dooms  that  the  kindred  of  a  mur- 
dered man  should  wait  for  seven  days  before   they 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     145 

attempted  to  slay  the  murderer,  and  if  he  consented 
within  that  time  to  make  the  money  compensation 
which  was  the  legal  satisfaction  for  his  crime,  he  was 
not  to  be  attacked  at  all.  In  other  words  it  is  just 
beginning  to  emerge  from  barbarism.  But  as  indi- 
viduals were  in  time  completely  converted  to  orderly 
ways,  and  consented  to  laws  which  made  penal  that 
resort  to  the  blood  feud  which  was  once  the  proud 
privilege  of  every  freeman,  so  it  may  come  to  pass 
that  states  shall  soon  agree  to  put  under  a  ban  as 
enemies  of  the  common  weal  those  of  their  number 
who  resort  to  war  instead  of  to  International  Courts 
of  Arbitration  or  Committees  of  Conciliation.  There 
is  nothing  Utopian  in  the  suggestion.  If  acted  on,  it 
would  but  carry  one  step  further  a  process  of  evolution 
which  has  been  worked  out  already  in  its  earlier  stages 
in  close  resemblance  to  the  historical  development  of 
civilised  society  within  progressive  states.  There  is 
one  great  lesson  which  surely  must  have  been  burnt 
into  the  mind  and  conscience  of  humanity  by  the  terri- 
ble experience  of  the  last  few  years.  It  is  that  each 
nation  must  not  only  obey  the  rules  of  International 
Law  itself,  but  help  to  enforce  them  on  others.  When 
once  this  lesson  has  been  learnt,  it  ought  not  to  pass 
the  wit  of  man  to  devise  ways  and  means  for  carrying 
it  into  practice.  We  will  venture  to  make  a  few  sug- 
gestions as  to  the  methods  that  might  be  followed, 
bearing  in  mind  that  those  are  most  likely  to  meet 
with    acceptance   that    grow    naturally    out    of    insti- 


146  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

tutions  and  arrangements  already  in  use  among  the 
powers  in  their  mutual  intercourse. 

We  may  take  for  granted  that  after  the  war  a  great 
assemblage  of  plenipotentiaries  will  come  together  to 
settle  the  final  conditions  on  which  the  struggle  will  be 
ended.  This  will  involve  much  discussion  and  will  take 
a  long  time.  Now  a  peace  by  negotiation  is  sometimes 
denounced  as  an  unpatriotic  surrender  of  high  purposes 
and  noble  aims,  and  sometimes  exalted  as  a  triumph  of 
reason  and  morality  over  passion  and  injustice.  Both 
attitudes  are  mistaken;  for  in  truth  the  phrase  describes 
the  means  used,  not  the  result  attained.  A  peace  dic- 
tated by  a  conqueror  to  a  thoroughly  beaten  foe  might 
conceivably  be  just  and  even  generous.  A  peace  reached 
by  diplomatic  bargaining  might  be  unjust  and  sordid  to 
the  last  degree.  The  antithesis  frequently  proclaimed 
between  peace  by  negotiation  and  peace  by  constraint  is 
false.  Its  constant  repet'tion  by  great  masses  of  man- 
kind serves  only  to  shew  that  most  of  us  are  slaves  of 
formulae.  Negotiation  there  must  be  when  a  score  or 
more  of  states,  including  all  the  Great  Powers  of  the 
World,  have  been  at  war  for  years.  In  such  circumstances 
it  is  an  impossibility  that  any  one  of  them,  however 
strong  and  victorious,  can  dictate  its  will  in  every  par- 
ticular; and  even  if  it  could,  negotiations  would  still  be 
necessary  in  order  to  correlate  its  objects  with  those  of 
its  allies,  and  put  them  all  into  proper  diplomatic  phrase- 
ology. For  reasons  that  will  be  given  immediately  I 
find  myself  in  complete  agreement  with  those  who  urge 
that  no  formal  Peace  Congress  should  be  summoned 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     147 

till  the  enemy  is  ready  to  accept  our  primary  demands 
of  restitution  and  reparation,  respect  for  international 
right  and  security  for  future  good  behaviour.  But  how 
is  this  to  be  known  without  some  interchange  of  views, 
however  informal,  beforehand;  and  when  it  is  known, 
how  are  the  details  of  the  settlement  to  be  worked  out 
without  much  discussion  and  a  good  deal  of  give  and 
take?  And  what  is  this  but  negotiation?  The  idea  of  a 
peace  without  it  is  about  as  sensible  as  that  of  a  loaf 
without  flour  or  a  debate  without  speech.  But  just  as 
the  mere  presence  of  flour  does  not  secure  that  a  loaf 
is  good,  and  the  mere  use  of  speech  does  not  of  necessity 
make  a  debate  eloquent  and  ennobling,  so  the  mere 
fact  that  negotiation  has  taken  place  will  not  guarantee 
that  the  terms  of  peace  are  just  and  righteous.  Neither 
on  the  other  hand  will  it  imply  that  they  must  be  un- 
satisfactory. It  simply  means  that  a  necessary  instru- 
ment has  been  used.  The  goodness  or  badness  of  the 
result  depends  on  the  spirit  in  which  the  use  is  made. 

But  while  whatever  peace  is  reached  must  be  a  peace 
of  negotiation,  there  is  all  the  difference  in  the  world 
between  a  peace  reached  by  a  process  of  bargaining  and 
a  peace  enshrining  the  views  and  ideals  of  one  side  or 
the  other  in  the  struggle.  The  former  suits  what  may 
be  called  business  disputes,  as  when  states  have  gone 
to  war  for  territory  or  economic  advantages.  The  lat- 
ter is  the  only  tolerable  solution  when  the  war  is  a  war 
of  principles  involving  the  deepest  convictions,  the  most 
cherished  ideals,  the  most  passionate  emotions  of  the 
combatants.     This  is  the  case  in  the  present  world- 


148  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

conflict.  I  do  not  often  feel  moved  to  express  approval 
of  any  of  the  Kaiser's  utterances.  But  he  seems  to  me 
to  have  spoken  with  true  insight  when  on  June  15, 
19 1 8,  on  the  thirtieth  anniversary  of  his  accession,  he 
declared  that  the  war  he  is  now  waging  was  "  a  strug- 
gle of  two  world-views  which  were  wrestling  with  one 
another,"  and  added  that  either  "  the  German  views 
.  .  .  must  be  upheld,  or  the  Anglo-Saxon  principles  .  .  . 
must  be  victorious."  Though  when  he  went  on  to 
describe  the  German  principles  as  "  right,  freedom, 
honour  and  morality,"  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  principles 
as  "  the  idolatry  of  Mammon,"  one  can  only  regard  his 
words  as  a  glaring  instance  of  that  colossal  self-decep- 
tion and  arrogant  presumption  which  looks  upon  every- 
thing German  as  necessarily  good,  and  everything  op- 
posed to  Germany's  acts  and  designs  as  in  consequence 
utterly  evil.  The  world  outside  the  Kaiser's  realm  has 
formed  a  very  different  judgment.  It  holds,  as  he  does, 
that  two  incompatible  ideals  are  striving  for  the  mas- 
tery. But  it  believes  that  in  this  great  battle  of  the  na- 
tions the  Allies  are  the  champions  of  political  freedom 
and  international  righteousness,  even  though  each  one 
of  them  may  have  some  spots  on  its  record  in  these 
respects.  A  German  triumph  would  assuredly  result 
in  the  enthronement  of  autocracy  in  the  sphere  of  in- 
ternal affairs,  and  the  exaltation  of  brute  force  as  the 
determining  factor  in  all  transactions  between  states. 
"  There  is  no  International  Law,"  said  William  II  to 
Mr.  Gerard,  the  American  Ambassador,  and  his 
Chancellor  endorsed  the  anarchical  sentiment.    "  There 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     149 

is  no  need  of  any,"  say  thousands  of  his  subjects,  seeing 
that  victorious  Germany  will  settle  all  external  ques- 
tions according  to  her  views  of  her  own  interests,  which 
other  nations  will  in  time  come  to  see  must  be  theirs 
also. 

When  we  consider  not  only  German  aims,  but  also 
the  brutal  and  crooked  means  used  to  attain  them,  we 
shall  see  that  the  real  struggle  is  between  progress  and 
reaction,  right  and  wrong,  the  realisation  of  the 
brotherhood  of  nations  or  the  consummation  of  their 
slavery  to  one  great  super-state  and  its  satellites.  For 
nothing  less  is  the  field  set:  for  no  smaller  issue  is  the 
battle  joined.  One  result  only  will  save  civilisation,  and 
that  is  the  defeat  and  overthrow  of  the  German  military 
system.  This,  therefore,  we  must  strain  every  nerve  to 
accomplish,  failing  repentance,  of  which  there  are  no 
signs  in  the  utterances  of  German  rulers  or  the  temper 
of  the  German  people.  High-sounding  talk  there  is  in 
abundamce,  and  constant  professions  of  willingness  to 
negotiate,  but  no  frank  acceptance  of  the  sole  condi- 
tions of  a  righteous  and  abiding  peace.  Instead  we  have 
vague  formula:  accepted  "  in  principle,"  only  to  be 
circumvented  and  discarded  in  practice  whenever  Ger- 
many is  able  to  force  a  treaty  on  a  beaten  and  humili- 
ated foe.  The  German  spirit  remains  the  same 
throughout;  and  till  it  has  been  purged  by  the  stern 
discipline  of  military  overthrow  there  is  no  prospect  of 
change.  For  this  cause  we  of  the  Allied  nations  must 
steel  ourselves  to  agonise  and  persevere.  To  patch  up 
a  settlement  at  once  would  be  false  to  the  high  aims 


ISO         THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

with  which  we  entered  the  war,  and  treason  to  those 
who  have  given  their  lives  to  safeguard  liberty  and 
enthrone  justice.  Moreover  it  would  be  fatal  to  the 
cause  of  peace,  which  can  prevail  only  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  citadel  of  force  and  unright.  No  people 
would  benefit  thereby  more  than  the  Germans  them- 
selves. They  can  be  brought  to  a  better  mind  and 
made  to  respect  the  claims  of  human  brotherhood  by 
the  discovery  that  war  is  not  a  profitable  national  in- 
dustry, and  apparently  in  no  other  way.  America  is 
thoroughly  awake  to  this  great  truth.  And  now  that 
she  has  joined  us  with  all  her  vast  resources  we  should 
indeed  be  traitors  to  the  cause  of  righteousness  if  we 
slackened  our  efforts,  and  gave  new  life  to  the  deceit, 
the  cruelty,  the  limitless  ambition  of  the  enemy.  If  we 
give  way  now,  in  what  respect  are  we  better  than  the 
ancient  Hebrew  faint-hearts  of  whom  the  terrible  words 
were  written,  "  Curse  ye  Meroz,  saith  the  angel  of  the 
Lord;  curse  ye  bitterly  the  inhabitants  thereof;  because 
they  came  not  to  the  help  of  the  Lord,  to  the  help  of 
the  Lord  against  the  mighty  "  ? 

But  there  is  little  fear  of  such  a  pitiful  surrender. 
Our  hearts  are  high  and  our  resolution  unbroken.  We 
are  beginning  to  find  out  that  Germany  is  not  invincible. 
The  crowning  victory  for  which  she  flouted  public  law 
and  outraged  the  dictates  of  humanity  still  eludes  her 
grasp.  She  sold  her  soul  for  a  price  which,  thank  God, 
remains  unpaid.  And  now,  deprived  of  the  speedy  tri- 
umph on  which  she  counted,  she  is  struggling  on  with 
alternations  of  success  and  defeat.    But  both  alike  are 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     151 

slowly  sapping  her  strength,  till  at  length,  if  only  the 
Allies  maintain  their  dauntless  courage  and  steadfast 
brotherhood,  she  must  stagger  in  ever-increasing  weak- 
ness to  the  inevitable  doom.    All  the  atrocities  of  mili- 
tary "  frightfulness,"  all  the  resources  of  bad  faith,  all 
the  shifts  and  subterfuges  of  insincere  diplomacy  will 
have  been  tried  in  vain.   The  wages  of  sin  will  be  paid 
in  the  death  of  the  abominable  system  that  has  deluded 
a  great  nation,  and  striven  through  its  ruthless  war- 
craft  to  fix  a  yoke  of  infamy  on  the  whole  world.   Then 
will  be  the  time  to  offer  forgiveness  if  the  fruits  of 
repentance  are  brought  forth,  and  such  amends  as  are 
possible  duly  made.     For  a  chastened  and  humbled, 
though  not  for  a  sullen  and  malicious  Germany,  there 
will  be  a  place  in  a  real  brotherhood  of  the  nations. 
She   may   sit  with   other   states   at  the   international 
council-board,   and  use   for  the   common   benefit   her 
great  gifts  of  deep  thought,  patient  industry  and  skil- 
ful organisation.  The  world  has  need  of  her  as  long  as 
she  is  content  to  be  a  member  of  a  Family  of  Nations. 
She    will    discover    that    the    Allies    have    no    inten- 
tion of  depriving  her  of  a  rood  of  land  that  is  really 
German,  or  crippling  her  by  penalties  more  severe  than 
what  is  needful  for  reparation  and  security.     She  will 
then  perhaps  begin  to  realise   the   greatness   of   the 
deception  practised  by  her  rulers  when  they  assured 
her  she  was  fighting  for  her  own  safety  and  freedom. 
While  her  future  attitude  remains  doubtful  she  cannot 
expect  much  influence  in  shaping  that  organisation  of 
the  Society  of  Nations  for  peace  which  must  be  started 


152  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

as  soon  as  the  war  is  over;  but  if  she  frankly  accepts 
the  new  order  she  may  come  in  time  to  have  a  full 
share  in  the  task  of  moulding  and  developing  it. 

Meanwhile  the  need  of  a  new  departure  is  pressing 
and  the  world  cannot  begin  too  soon  to  make  prepara- 
tions for  it.  The  preliminary  work  of  discussion  is 
going  on  now  in  every  civilised  country,  and  the  Con- 
ference which  meets  to  make  peace  should  derive  great 
assistance  from  it.  It  will  be,  as  we  have  seen,  a  Con- 
ference so  big  as  to  be  fairly  representative  of  civilised 
humanity,  especially  if  the  few  powers  of  importance 
which  remain  neutral  are  given  a  consultative  voice. 
If  in  addition  the  states  which  compose  it  resolve  to 
shoulder  the  responsibility  of  enforcing  International 
Law,  we  may  look  for  some  long  steps  forward  in  the 
direction  of  the  organisation  of  the  Society  of  Nations 
for  peace,  and  against  war.  But  the  task  of  thinking 
out  a  practical  form  of  such  organisation  is  far  too 
great  and  complicated  to  be  performed  by  the  body 
whose  primary  work  it  is  to  settle  the  conditions  of 
peace.  Still  the  initiative  must  come  from  the  great 
representative  Conference;  for  nothing  short  of  the 
decision  of  the  leading  powers  of  the  world  will  suffice 
to  put  so  vast  an  enterprise  in  hand  with  any  chance  of 
success.  The  best  solution  of  the  difficulty  appears 
to  be  that  the  Conference  should  lay  down  a  few 
fundamental  principles  and  ideas,  and  then  appoint  an 
International  Committee  to  work  out  the  details,  and 
embody  its  proposals  in  a  great  Law-making  Treaty 
which  every  power  in  the  civilised  world  should  be 


CONDITIONS  OF  RECONSTRUCTION     153 

invited  to  sign.  Another  International  Committee 
should  be  appointed  to  revise  the  Law  of  Nations  in 
the  light  of  the  experience  gained  by  the  war,  and  pro- 
duce an  International  Code.  When  the  drafts  are 
ready  they  should  be  submitted  first  to  the  government 
of  each  separate  state,  and  finally  to  a  great  Interna- 
tional Congress  composed  of  representatives  from  all 
civilised  states. 

All  this  will  take  years  to  accomplish;  but  it  is  of 
the  utmost  importance  that  it  should  be  begun  at  once, 
before  the  memory  of  the  horrors  of  the  World-War 
has  grown  dull,  and  while  mankind  are  still  suffering 
from  the  evils  that  arise  from  the  neglect  of  the  divine 
precepts  of  justice,  mercy  and  brotherhood.  It  is  not 
necessary,  or  even  desirable,  that  the  Committees  we 
have  suggested  should  be  composed  entirely  of  mem- 
bers of  the  Peace  Conference.  Many  of  them  will 
possess  no  special  qualifications  for  such  service,  and 
most  will  be  too  busy  with  their  primary  work  of  nego- 
tiating the  conditions  of  settlement.  The  framing  of  a 
new  world-order  will  tax  the  utmost  energies  of  the 
best  intellects  and  highest  characters  to  be  found 
among  men.  These  should  be  selected  for  the  purpose 
whether  they  are  plenipotentiaries  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence or  not.  They  should  be  told  the  objects  they  are 
to  aim  at,  and  must  then  be  left  free  to  work  out  the 
best  plans  for  attaining  them  in  the  existing  condition 
of  the  world.  On  no  account  must  they  waste  their  time 
in  constructing  Utopias,  and  devising  what  seem  to 
them  flawless  projects  suited  only  for  ideal  conditions 


154  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

of  human  life.  It  should  be  understood  that  they  will 
issue  a  series  of  Reports,  each  dealing  with  a  differ- 
ent department  of  their  subject,  and  a  period  of  many 
months  should  be  assigned  to  them  for  the  purpose. 
One  thing,  however,  must  be  done  quickly,  if  it  is  to  be 
done  at  all.  Mankind  cannot  wait  long  for  some  means, 
however  rudimentary,  for  settling  international  dis- 
putes without  war.  If  they  are  delayed,  fresh  quarrels 
will  soon  break  out;  and  the  awful  round  of  misery, 
bloodshed,  torture  and  ruin  will  begin  again,  to  the 
destruction  of  civilisation  itself,  which  cannot  endure  a 
quick  repetition  of  the  horrors  of  the  last  few  years. 
Either  the  Peace  Conference  must  place  foremost 
among  the  conditions  of  the  great  settlement  a  general 
obligation  to  submit  disputes  that  cannot  be  settled  by 
diplomatic  means  to  some  international  authority  or 
authorities,  created  by  itself,  or  it  must  instruct  the 
Committee  it  puts  in  charge  of  such  matters  to  report 
on  this  question  within  three  months  at  most,  and  must 
itself  take  immediate  action  on  the  recommendations 
it  receives. 


LECTURE  VI. 

THE  REBUILDING  OF  INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY. 

In  the  third  and  fourth  of  these  Lectures  we  de- 
scribed the  worst  and  most  obtrusive  of  the  evils  exist- 
ing in  the  Society  of  Nations.  In  the  fifth  we  endeav- 
oured to  set  forth  the  conditions  precedent  to  the  ap- 
plication of  remedies  with  any  prospect  of  success.  We 
saw  that  civilised  states  must  not  be  content  with  obey- 
ing International  Law;  but  must  in  addition  accept  the 
duty  of  enforcing  it  on  wrongdoers  among  their  num- 
ber, just  as  individuals  in  a  state  bring  their  combined 
force  to  bear  on  unworthy  members  of  the  community 
who  break  and  defy  its  laws.  This  change  from  a  pas- 
sive to  an  active  obedience  must  itself  be  effected  by  the 
common  consent  of  civilised  mankind,  embodied  in 
a  great  law-making  international  document,  which 
must  be  signed  and  ratified  in  the  most  formal  manner 
by  those  in  each  state  who  have  authority  to  pledge 
its  faith  before  the  world. 

It  is  clear  that  such  an  epoch-making  act  cannot  be 
brought  about  without  a  great  change  of  heart  among 
the  peoples.  They  must  realise  the  brotherhood  of 
nations  in  a  way  they  have  never  done  before.  They 
must  part  for  ever  with  the  doctrine  that  right  and 

155 


156  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

justice,  benevolence  and  good-will,  have  no  place  in  the 
intercourse  of  states  though  they  are  essential  to  the 
well-being  of  the  Society  of  Individuals.  In  short  they 
must  resolve  to  apply  the  principles  of  Christianity  to 
their  transactions  with  one  another.  The  will  to  power 
must  go  and  the  will  to  serve  must  take  its  place.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  war  has  brought  about  a  great 
spiritual  awakening  in  many  circles;  and  even  when  no 
effects  of  this  kind  are  perceptible  mere  prudence  may 
do  what  the  vision  of  a  regenerated  world  has  failed  to 
accomplish.  For  the  bitter  experience  of  the  last  few 
years  must  surely  have  convinced  the  most  sceptical 
that  a  continuance  of  present  conditions  will  in  no  long 
time  destroy  civilisation  itself.  And  the  resulting  bar- 
barism will  be  much  worse  than  that  from  which  the 
race  has  slowly  emerged,  because  it  will  have  all  the 
resources  of  science  at  the  disposal  of  its  spirit  of 
violence  and  destruction.  With  this  as  the  only  alterna- 
tive, men  devoid  of  moral  enthusiasm  or  spiritual 
vision  may  well  resolve  to  give  the  precepts  of  Christ 
a  trial  in  international  affairs,  simply  on  the  ground 
that  they  may  make  things  better,  and  cannot  possibly 
make  them  worse.  And  though  such  people  are  useless 
as  pioneers,  as  a  wing  of  a  great  army  slowly  forcing 
its  way  onward  against  strong  resistance  they  have  a 
valuable  function  to  perform.  They  prevent  the  rest 
from  expecting  the  impossible.  Enthusiasts  for  right- 
eousness are  the  very  salt  of  the  earth,  which  would  be 
rotten  indeed  if  it  were  not  for  their  health-giving 
activity.    But  they  are  apt  to  underrate  difficulties,  and 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  157 

ignore  the  fact  that  their  own  ardent  nature  is  not 
widely  diffused  among  men.  It  is  well  therefore  to  be 
sometimes  reminded  that  we  are  not  out  in  this  present 
crusade  to  establish  the  Millennium  by  one  great  in- 
ternational treaty.  No  one  who  is  of  any  serious  ac- 
count in  the  world  of  thought  or  action  imagines  that 
the  coming  Peace  Conference  can  set  up  on  earth  the 
New  Jerusalem, 

State  serving  State  in  joyful  amity, 
Safe  in  the  reign  of  Universal  Law. 

This  is  the  ideal  to  keep  before  our  eyes;  but  we  know 
full  well  that  the  victories  of  justice  and  brotherhood 
are  not  secured  in  one  supreme  moment  by  one  magnifi- 
cent rush.  Like  victories  in  the  field  under  the  condi- 
tions of  modern  warfare,  they  must  be  fought  for  step 
by  step.  Sustained  effort,  long  continued  watchfulness, 
careful  thought,  and  self-sacrificing  endurance  are 
necessary  to  win  the  gains  within  reach,  much  more 
therefore  to  hold  and  improve  them,  and  prepare  the 
final  triumph. 

And  even  when  a  new  and  better  order  has  taken 
the  place  of  the  present  defective  organisation  of  inter- 
national society,  we  must  always  remember  that  it  will 
be  but  a  piece  of  human  machinery,  and  therefore  by 
no  means  flawless.  The  law  of  even  the  most  pro- 
gressive states  has  its  defects.  Nevertheless  life  and 
property  are  far  more  secure,  and  justice  is  far  better 
done  between  man  and  man,  than  was  the  case  in  the 
old  days  when  each  was  his  own  avenger  and  righted  his 


158  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

wrongs  by  the  might  of  his  own  hands.  No  one  now 
wants  to  go  back  to  them.  Whatever  of  evil  may  lurk 
in  the  law  of  the  land  and  its  administration,  it  is  far 
more  endurable  than 

the  good  old  rule, 
....  the  simple  plan, 
That  they  should  take  who  have  the  power, 
And  they  should  keep  who  can.1 

So  will  it  be  with  the  Society  of  Nations.  Its  law  will 
need  alterations  and  additions  from  time  to  time,  and 
precautions  must  be  taken  against  bias  and  corruption 
among  those  who  are  charged  with  the  task  of  inter- 
preting and  enforcing  it.  But  the  change  from  an  inter- 
national order  based  on  the  last  resort  on  war,  and  at 
all  times  engrossed  in  costly  preparations  for  war,  to 
an  international  order  based  on  justice  and  provided 
as  a  matter  of  course  with  Courts  to  administer 
it,  will  afford  to  rulers  and  peoples  such  a  blessed 
relief  from  ruinous  expense  and  constant  anxiety  that 
no  self-governing  state,  even  when  smarting  under  the 
decision  of  a  tribunal  against  it,  will  attempt  to  revive 
the  discredited  chaos  of  former  days.  Very  possibly, 
nay,  almost  certainly,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  establish 
all  at  once  such  a  complete  system  as  we  should  wish. 
But  if  only  we  can  make  a  good  beginning  now,  succeed- 
ing generations  will  take  up  the  work  in  their  turn,  and 
develop  further  the  beneficent  institutions  they  will 
have  inherited  from  us. 

1  Wordsworth,  Rob  Roy's  Grave. 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  159 

The  means  devised  for  securing  the  noble  aims  I 
have  set  before  you  is  the  foundation  of  a  League  of 
Nations  in  which  all  civilised  states,  or  at  least  the 
greater  number  of  them,  shall  be  banded  together  for 
the  purpose  of  settling  international  disputes  without 
war.  There  is  nothing  new  in  a  League.  History  posi- 
tively bristles  with  examples.  Again  and  again  in  all 
ages  groups  of  states  have  entered  into  alliances,  gen- 
erally for  some  temporary  purpose,  such  as  the  defeat 
of  another  state  or  states  in  war.  We  need  go  no 
further  for  a  case  in  point  than  the  present  alliance 
against  Germany  and  the  Central  Powers.  Sometimes 
a  more  permanent  object  was  contemplated,  as  when  by 
the  Achasan  League  in  ancient  Greece  several  city- 
states  were  banded  together  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
permanent  peace  among  themselves,  and  common  de- 
fence against  external  attack.  Occasionally,  though  very 
seldom,  the  production  of  a  new  state  from  more  or 
less  independent  elements  has  been  aimed  at.  The  most 
conspicuous  instance  is  the  creation  of  the  United 
States  of  America  out  of  the  thirteen  colonies  who  cut 
themselves  adrift  from  Great  Britain  in  1776  and 
forced    her    to    acknowledge    their    independence    in 

1783. 

But  the  yet  unformed  League  we  have  in  mind  to-day 
differs  from  all  the  formed  and  historical  Leagues 
which  have  preceded  it.  They  were  partial.  It  is 
general  in  idea  and  we  hope  will  be  general  in  reality. 
It  aims  at  nothing  less  than  binding  all  the  civilised 
states  of  the  world  together,  and  that  permanently  and 


160  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

not  for  a  time  only.  But  it  does  not  seek  to  make  of 
them  one  great  world-state.  Its  promoters  are  not 
wasting  strength  and  energy  on  the  task  of  super- 
Empire  building.  They  regard  it  as  at  once  chimerical 
and  reactionary;  and  undoubtedly  they  are  right. 
Whatever  a  few  enthusiasts  may  say,  the  idea  of  form- 
ing all  peoples  who  have  passed  out  of  the  stage  of 
barbarism  into  one  huge  Confederation  under  one 
supreme  government,  with  scores  or  even  hundreds  of 
subordinate  authorities  under  it,  is  fantastic  to  the  last 
degree.  No  attempt  to  realise  it  is  likely  to  advance 
further  than  the  paper  on  which  the  project  is  written. 
The  ennobling  passion  of  patriotism,  which  has  been 
enormously  strengthened  by  the  events  of  the  present 
war,  would  rise  in  revolt  against  it.  Imagine,  for 
instance,  the  feelings  of  the  average  Frenchman  when 
told  that  La  Patrie,  for  which  he  has  suffered  and 
bled,  and  for  the  freedom  of  whose  sacred  soil  his 
nearest  and  dearest  have  gladly  died,  is  to  be  reduced  to 
the  rank  of  a  department  in  a  new  political  entity, 
called,  let  us  say,  the  United  States  of  the  World.  The 
thing  is  impossible,  as  impossible  as  turning  all  Mon- 
archies into  Republics  on  the  one  hand,  or  on  the  other 
establishing  an  Universal  Empire  with  William  II  of 
Prussia  as  its  Emperor. 

Moreover  the  notion  is  as  reactionary  as  it  is  fanciful. 
Alexander  may  have  dreamed  of  a  world-state,  and 
Napoleon  of  a  great  European  Empire  with  Egypt  and 
India  and  a  large  part  of  the  East  thrown  in.  But 
neither  of  these  brilliant  conquerors  has  been  regarded 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  161 

as  one  of  the  heaven-sent  leaders  who  have  guided  the 
bleeding  footsteps  of  mankind  along  the  stony  way 
that  leads  to  the  promised  land.  Whatever  may  be  the 
case  centuries  hence,  neither  to-day  nor  for  long  ages  to 
come  will  the  nations  of  the  earth  approximate  to  one 
another  so  closely  in  ideas  and  civilisation  as  to  make 
possible  one  supreme  authority  over  them  all,  even 
though  it  be  limited  in  scope  to  a  few  functions.  Any 
attempt  to  set  up  such  an  authority  could  proceed  by 
force  only,  and  would  therefore  intensify  the  evils  it 
was  meant  to  cure. 

But  while  we  cannot  revive  projects  of  world-wide 
sovereignty,  and  ought  not  if  we  could,  the  notion  of 
duty  to  humanity  at  large  needs  to  be  strenuously 
insisted  on.  It  ought  to  be  developed  side  by  side  with 
the  patriotic  emotions.  There  is  no  real  opposition 
between  the  two;  but  on  the  contrary  those  who  are 
most  devoted  to  their  own  land  will  generally  be  found 
more  responsive  than  others  to  the  claims  of  the  race, 
just  as  within  the  state  the  best  husbands  and  fathers 
are  almost  invariably  the  best  citizens  also.  The  glad 
and  self-sacrificing  performance  of  the  duty  of  limited 
scope  gives  rise  to  joyful  willingness  to  undertake  the 
wider  obligation.  This  point  of  view  has  been  seized 
by  M.  Clemenceau,  the  veteran  Prime  Minister  of 
France,  and  eloquently  set  forth  in  the  noble  words 
with  which  he  greeted  the  victories  of  the  French  armies 
in  the  Summer  of  191 8 :  "  The  supreme  obstacle  to  the 
establishment  of  right  among  mankind  is  about  to  dis- 
appear amid  the  paeans  of  a  victory  which  it  will  be 


1 62  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

our  duty  to  convert  into  a  triumph  for  humanity.  .  .  . 
Our  nation,  which  has  devoted  so  much  of  all  its  ener- 
gies to  all  the  causes  of  humanity,  takes  no  account  of 
its  wounds.  For  long  it  existed  without  hope.  It  has 
earned  its  right  to  the  day,  so  long  awaited,  that  now 
has  dawned,  and  it  asks  for  no  recompense  but  the 
privilege  of  working  in  common  with  all  other  nations 
of  good  conscience  at  the  problems  of  social  equity 
which  will  be  the  abundant  fruit  of  the  most  splendid 
victory  of  all  times."  * 

The  most  pressing  of  the  services  which  the  nations 
owe  to  the  race  at  large  is  the  reorganisation  of  inter- 
national society,  and  the  setting  up  in  it  of  efficient 
machinery  for  the  settlement  of  international  quarrels. 
Unless  we  can  in  the  immediate  future  make  wars  less 
frequent  and  less  terrible  and  in  the  end  abolish  war 
altogether,  all  other  reforms,  all  other  attempts  to 
realise  social  equity,  will  be  useless.  They  will  vanish 
amidst  the  storms  of  a  bloody  catastrophe  in  which 
civilisation  itself  will  be  shattered  to  pieces.  M. 
Clemenceau  has  seen  this;  and  though  till  lately  he  was 
not  regarded  as  a  strong  supporter  of  the  project  of  a 
League  of  Nations,  recently,  when  declaring  in  favour 
of  putting  an  end  to  violence  and  the  introduction  of 
the  regime  of  organised  law,  he  added  the  remark- 
able words,  "  The  regime  of  organised  law  for  the 
world    is    the    League    of    Nations." 2     The    French 

1  Message  to  the  Presidents  of  the  Departmental  Councils-General, 
August  25,  1918. 

3  Account  of  Interview  in  Daily  Chronicle  of  August  27,  1918. 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  163 

Premier,  therefore,  interprets  the  task  he  so  nobly  and 
confidently  accepts  for  his  heroic  people  as  including 
among  the  first  of  its  reforms  the  establishment  of  a 
League  of  Nations.  Nor  does  he  stand  alone.  It  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  the  leading  statesmen 
in  all  the  Allied  governments  share  his  view,  and 
many  of  them  hold  it  even  more  strongly  than  he 
does. 

But  it  may  be  argued  that  such  a  League  would  dero- 
gate from  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  the 
states  which  compose  it.  Undoubtedly  it  would  take 
away  from  each  member  the  right  of  deciding  for  itself 
on  the  spur  of  the  moment  whether  it  should  resort  to 
war  when  a  dispute  in  which  it  was  engaged  failed  to 
yield  to  diplomatic  means  of  settlement.  But  would 
this  limitation  amount  to  a  surrender  of  sovereignty? 
If  so,  then  no  state  in  the  whole  world  is  sovereign  and 
independent;  for  there  is  none  that  has  not  bound  itself 
in  advance  to  take  some  particular  course  in  certain 
circumstances,  and  has  therefore  parted  to  that  extent 
with  its  absolute  freeedom  of  action.  Indeed  we  may 
go  still  further  and  say  that  quite  apart  from  special 
agreement  every  state  finds  its  activities  constantly 
limited  or  stimulated  by  the  mere  fact  of  its  membership 
in  the  Society  of  Nations.  For  states,  and  for  individ- 
uals also,  every  advance  in  civilisation  implies  restraint. 
It  is  the  price  we  pay  for  social  life.  Liberty  in  the 
sense  of  being  free  to  do  just  what  one  pleases,  how  one 
pleases,  and  when  one  pleases,  spells  savagery.  That 
man  is  free  whose  conduct  is  governed  by  rules  which 


1 64  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

his  own  mind  and  conscience  approve,  because  they  are 
based  on  a  due  regard  for  the  welfare  of  others  as  well 
as  his  own.  Similarly  that  state  is  independent  whose 
action  is  conditioned  by  no  restraints  save  those  to 
which  it  has  freely  submitted,  in  order  to  secure  its  own 
and  the  common  good.  Its  sovereignty  consists  in  free- 
dom from  habitual  submission  to  the  dictates  of  any 
external  authority  in  matters  of  national  policy  and 
conduct,  not  in  the  power  of  riding  roughshod  over 
other  states  for  its  own  selfish  purposes.  If  this  be 
correct,  no  state  can  lose  its  independence  by  entering 
a  League,  and  covenanting  with  the  other  members  to 
refer  disputes  between  them  to  the  decision  of  an 
impartial  tribunal  and  to  join  in  enforcing  the  rules  of 
the  League  upon  disobedient  members.  This  is  no  new 
doctrine  invented  for  the  purpose  of  removing  an 
objection  against  the  project  which  is  called  for  con- 
venience' sake  that  of  a  League  of  Nations.  It  exists 
by  implication  in  the  current  practice  of  states.  No 
one  of  any  account  has  ventured  to  impugn  the  full 
sovereignty  and  complete  independence  of  Great  Britain 
or  the  United  States  of  America.  And  yet  by  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  Treaty  of  1850  these  two  powers  bound 
themselves  to  each  other  not  to  make  acquisitions  of 
territory  in  Central  America.  The  Treaty  lasted  till 
1 90 1,  when  under  a  new  and  entirely  altered  set  of 
circumstances  it  was  abrogated,  and  replaced  by  the 
quite  different  provisions  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty.  That  is  to  say,  for  fifty  years  two  of  the 
strongest  and  most  important  states  in  the  world  sub- 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  165 

mitted  to  a  drastic  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  their 
right  under  International  Law  of  adding  to  their  do- 
minions by  conquest,  occupation,  or  cession.  Nor  did 
such  a  transaction  stand  alone.  The  annals  of  diplo- 
macy are  crowded  with  similar  self-denying  ordinances. 
For  instance,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  last  century  the 
chief  colonising  powers  of  Europe  made  many  agree- 
ments for  the  delimitation  of  their  respective  Spheres  of 
Influence  in  the  parts  of  Africa  unoccupied  by  civilised 
peoples.  In  every  case  each  party  bargained  for  the 
reservation  to  itself  of  certain  large  districts,  on  condi- 
tion that  it  did  not  in  the  districts  reserved  for  the  other 
"  make  acquisitions,  conclude  treaties,  accept  sovereign 
rights  or  Protectorates,  or  hinder  the  extension  of  the  in- 
fluence of  the  other."  *  To  purchase  a  free  hand  in  one 
quarter  state  after  state  submitted  to  severe  restraints 
in  another.  And  yet  these  states  were  never  deemed 
to  have  parted  with  their  independence.  Neither  has 
it  been  affected  in  the  judgment  of  the  world's  rulers 
by  adhesion  to  great  international  agreements  whereby 
large  groups  of  states  pledge  themselves  to  take  in 
future  certain  action  which  ordinary  International  Law 
does  not  render  incumbent  upon  them,  or  to  submit  in 
future  to  action  on  the  part  of  others  when  ordinary 
International  Law  lays  them  under  no  obligation  to 
do  so. 

The  Geneva  Conventions  of  1864  and  1906  are 
good  examples  of  the  first  kind,  and  the  second  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  General  Act  of  the  Brussels  Confer- 

1  Anglo-German  Agreement  of  1890,  Art.  VII. 


1 66  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

ence  of  1890.  By  the  former  nearly  all  civilised  powers 
have  bound  themselves  to  care  for  the  sick  and  wounded 
of  the  enemy  as  well  as  their  own,  and  to  respect  and 
protect  all  medical  units  and  establishments  to  which- 
ever side  they  may  belong.  By  the  latter  a  large  num- 
ber of  states  have  agreed  to  the  search,  and  if  neces- 
sary the  capture,  of  their  merchantmen  by  the  warships 
of  the  other  signatory  powers  when  they  are  suspected 
of  being  engaged  in  the  Slave  Trade,  provided  that  the 
visit  and  search  takes  place  in  a  certain  well-defined 
maritime  zone  and  is  applied  only  to  vessels  of  less 
than  500  tons.  This  involves  a  remarkable  surrender; 
for  by  the  Law  of  Nations  every  state  has  exclusive 
jurisdiction  over  its  vessels  on  the  high  seas,  and  the 
right  to  search  other  ships  than  their  own  is  jealously 
denied  to  all  save  belligerents,  except  in  the  case  of 
pirates  who  may  be  visited  and  captured  by  the  com- 
missioned cruisers  of  any  power.  Yet  in  order  to  right 
a  great  wrong  and  rid  mankind  of  a  terrible  scourge 
the  leading  maritime  powers  of  the  world  have  con- 
sented in  this  one  case  to  allow  officers  of  other  nations 
to  perform  acts  of  high  state  authority  under  their 
flags.  Had  this  been  done  as  a  mere  act  of  power,  it 
would  have  amounted  to  a  gross  infringement  of  their 
sovereign  rights;  but  since  they  agreed  to  it  beforehand 
they  are  no  more  deemed  to  have  forfeited  full  in- 
dependence thereby  than  a  man  who  has  applied  for 
and  received  a  post  under  a  business  firm  is  held  to 
have  forfeited  his  personal  liberty  by  being  obliged  to 
keep  office  hours.    And  when  the  agreement  is  entered 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  167 

into  for  the  welfare  of  the  world  the  states  who  are 
parties  to  it,  instead  of  being  degraded  thereby  in  the 
opinion  of  mankind,  receive  the  reward  of  their  self- 
sacrifice  in  fuller  honour  and  a  position  of  greater  in- 
fluence than  before.  The  idea  that  entry  into  the 
contemplated  League  of  Nations  will  derogate  from 
the  full  independence  of  the  powers  who  join  it  is  due 
to  a  compound  of  bad  jurisprudence  and  unhistorical 
history.  In  jurisprudence  a  general  consent  fully  and 
freely  given  beforehand  takes  away  the  element  of 
external  compulsion  and  all  that  it  implies;  and  in 
history  power  after  power  is  recorded  as  having  sub- 
mitted to  great  restraints  on  its  freedom  of  action 
without  being  regarded  as  having  lost  its  position  as  a 
sovereign  state. 

But  for  all  this  we  are  by  no  means  secure  against 
an  attempt  to  frighten  patriotic  citizens  with  the  spectre 
of  universal  dominion.  We  must  remember  that  the 
world  contains  a  vast  number  of  people  who  are  by 
nature  averse  to  change,  and  disposed  to  see  nothing 
but  the  dangerous  side  of  any  projected  improvement. 
If  they  could  have  had  their  way  we  should  still  be 
travelling  by  stage  coach  for  fear  of  railway  accidents, 
and  writing  all  our  business  letters  ourselves  for  fear 
of  a  breach  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  a  shorthand 
typist.  Besides  these  there  are  others  who  feel  in- 
stinctively that  the  new  order  must  interfere  with  some 
pleasant  practice  of  their  own  out  of  which  they  suck 
no  small  advantage,  and  are  therefore  blind  to  its  evil 
effects  on  the  community.    Viscount  Grey  of  Falloden, 


1 68         THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

who  it  will  be  remembered  was  Foreign  Secretary  for 
Great  Britain  when  the  war  broke  out  and  for  some 
time  after,  tells  in  his  valuable  pamphlet  on  our  present 
subject  an  amusing  story  of  an  African  chief  in  a 
territory  under  British  rule.  He  strongly  objected  to 
paying  taxes;  and  when  it  was  pointed  out  to  him  that 
they  were  used  to  support  a  police  force  which  kept 
order  and  prevented  raids,  he  declared  that  he  could 
protect  his  own  tribe  himself,  and  was  able  before  the 
British  came  to  raid  his  neighbours,  and  return  in 
triumph  with  booty  and  captives,  to  the  joy  of  all  his 
people  and  the  special  delight  of  his  womenfolk. 
"  Now,"  said  he,  "  you  come  here  and  tell  me  that  I 
ought  to  like  paying  taxes  to  be  prevented  from  doing 
this,  and  that  makes  me  mad."  x  There  are  a  few  states 
and  many  individuals  who  resemble  this  black  poten- 
tate in  all  things  but  his  frankness.  Prussia,  for  in- 
stance, has  made  of  war  a  profitable  industry,  and 
openly  and  avowedly  regards  it  as  a  political  weapon, 
to  be  resorted  to  whenever  its  use  is  likely  to  be  advan- 
tageous in  that  struggle  with  other  powers  which  she 
regards  as  the  right  and  indispensable  condition  of 
international  society.  As  long  as  she  is  in  this  state  of 
mind,  which  means  in  effect  as  long  as  her  military 
power  remains  unshaken  and  on  the  whole  victorious, 
she  cannot  be  expected  to  welcome  an  attempt  to  estab- 
lish a  social  order  among  the  nations  based  on  peace 
and  good-will  instead  of  conflict,  and  developed  by 
impartial  justice  instead  of  the  clash  of  arms.    And  on 

1  Grey,  The  League  of  Nations,  pp.  IX,  12. 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  169 

her  side  among  individuals  will  be  those  whose  natures 
have  been  thoroughly  Prussianised,  that  is  to  say,  the 
arrogant,  the  masterful,  the  contemners  of  the  Christ- 
like spirit,  and  also  all  those  who  find  in  war  and  prepa- 
rations for  war  the  means  of  gaining  great  positions 
and  large  fortunes,  that  is  to  say  the  army-contractors, 
the  munition-makers,  and  the  hunters  after  military 
glory  for  the  fame  and  honour  it  brings.  All  these  will 
raise  the  cry  of  National  Sovereignty  in  Danger;  and 
some  of  us,  especially  the  timid  folk  who  shrink  consti- 
tutionally from  any  disturbance  of  the  accustomed 
order,  will  really  believe  it.  They  will  be  joined  by  the 
fanatics  of  state  equality,  the  publicists  who  would 
rather  see  right  and  justice  assassinated  in  the  inter- 
national forum  than  secured  by  according  legal  recog- 
nition to  the  differences  in  power  and  influence  which 
exist  among  the  states  of  the  civilised  world.  The 
united  forces  of  these  various  contingents  will  put  up  a 
tremendous  fight.  In  spite  of  such  demonstrations  as 
have  just  been  given  of  the  falsity  of  their  battle-cry, 
they  will  muster  large  hosts  at  the  polling  stations  and 
in  the  National  Assemblies.  Those  of  us  who  stand 
for  national  freedom  and  human  brotherhood  must 
meet  them  with  the  counter-cry  of  Civilisation  in 
Danger.  We  need  not  shrink  from  the  conflict.  It 
will  be  a  holy  privilege  to  take  part  in  it;  and  those 
who  help  to  win  the  spiritual  Armageddon  will  de- 
serve as  well  of  humanity  as  those  who  struck  stout 
blows  in  the  material  Armageddon  which  is  preced- 
ing it. 


170  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

O  that  the  armies  indeed  were  arrayed !    O  joy  of  the 

onset ! 
Sound,  thou  trumpet  of  God !   Come  forth,  great  cause 

to  array  us! 
King  and  leader  appear!    Thy  soldiers  sorrowing  seek 

thee.1 


But  there  need  be  no  sorrowing  in  our  ranks.  Not  only 
do  we  know  under  whose  banner  we  fight:  not  only  are 
we  fully  persuaded  of  the  truth  of  what  we  believe : 
but  we  have  found  a  leader.  He  is  not  an  hereditary 
King,  but  an  elected  President,  Woodrow  Wilson,  the 
chosen  ruler  of  a  hundred  million  American  freemen. 
By  his  robust  belief  in  freedom  and  humanity,  his 
clear-eyed  comprehension  and  eloquent  presentment  of 
the  vital  issues  at  stake,  and  his  stern  determination  to 
use  all  the  resources  of  his  country  for  securing  first 
complete  victory  and  then  righteous  peace,  he  has 
roused  the  enthusiasm  of  the  lovers  of  ordered  liberty 
throughout  the  world;  and  by  his  wisdom,  his  strong 
sense  of  justice,  and  his  unerring  judgment,  he  has  won 
the  foremost  place  in  the  galaxy  of  able  and  devoted 
men  who  are  directing  the  policy  of  the  Allies.  In  his 
own  stirring  words  he  has  convinced  the  champions  of 
liberty  and  justice  in  this,  the  greatest  struggle  of  all 
history,  that  "  They  are  crusaders.  They  are  fighting 
for  no  selfish  advantage  for  their  own  nations.  They 
would  despise  anyone  who  fought  for  the  selfish  advan- 
tage of  any  nation.     They  are  giving  their  lives  that 

'  Arthur  Clough,  Bothie  of  Tober-na-Vuolich. 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  171 

homes  everywhere  may  be  kept  sacred  and  safe,  and 
men  everywhere  be  free."  x 

That  the  man  who  can  write  such  words  as  these 
should  be  acclaimed  as  prophet  and  leader  by  the  fore- 
most democracies  of  the  world  is  a  proof  that  the 
change  of  heart  of  which  we  spoke  at  the  beginning  of 
this  Lecture  has  made  great  progress  among  men.  Con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  they  are  being  taught  by 
suffering,  and  permeated  by  the  spirit  of  Christ.  To 
them  is  granted  a  glimpse  of  the  goal  of  the  world, 
which  is,  as  a  great  divine  has  finely  said,  "  to  be  the 
Kingdom  of  God  established  in  the  liberty  of  His 
children,  through  the  service  and  sacrifice  of  love."  2 
When  once  the  peoples  of  the  earth  have  seen  this  great 
vision  of  happiness  through  mutual  service,  and  peace 
and  security  through  brotherhood  and  justice,  they  will 
brush  aside  all  quibbles  about  state  sovereignty,  and 
demand  that  the  Society  of  Nations  shall  be  so  re- 
organised that  in  future  disputes  between  its  members 
must  be  settled  without  war.  Their  rulers  will  be  told 
to  create  a  League  of  Nations  for  this  purpose,  or  give 
place  to  others  who  are  willing  to  undertake  the  task. 
Then  will  be  the  time  for  the  faint-hearted,  the  scepti- 
cal, and  the  partisans  of  enmity  and  force,  to  maintain 
that,  splendid  as  is  the  idea  of  a  free  and  peaceful 
world,  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  its  realisation  are 
insuperable.  In  what  remains  of  this  Lecture  we  will 
briefly  consider  such  a  plea. 

1  Labour  Day  Message,  September  2,  1918. 

1  J.  W.  Oman  in  Pain  and  Conflict  in  Human  Life,  p.  170. 


172  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

When  proposals  for  reform  have  passed  safely 
through  the  stage  of  being  regarded  as  wicked  or 
ridiculous,  they  are  usually  met  with  the  objection  that 
they  are  impracticable.  But  as  a  rule  this  accusation 
derives  its  power  to  dishearten  and  restrain  from  noth- 
ing more  formidable  than  our  own  timidity.  Readers 
of  Pilgrim's  Progress  will  remember  how  terribly 
Christian  was  frightened  at  first  by  the  lions  on  either 
side  of  the  pathway  to  the  Celestial  City.  Yet  when 
he  plucked  up  heart  of  grace  and  went  bravely  on  be- 
tween them,  "  he  heard  them  roar,  but  they  did  him  no 
harm."  Similarly  when  we  see  lions  standing  on  guard 
along  the  road  which  leads  to  peace  and  freedom  for 
mankind,  the  best  and  simplest  course  is  to  go  straight 
on;  and  we  shall  probably  find  that  the  difficulties  that 
look  so  formidable  can  be  surmounted  by  care  and 
courage,  or  even  in  some  cases  turn  out  to  be  no  diffi- 
culties at  all.  At  the  present  moment  the  lions  are  very 
busy,  and  there  is  much  roaring.  We  are  told  in  de- 
spairing or  threatening  tones  that  absolutely  impartial 
tribunals  cannot  be  found,  that  even  if  they  were  found 
strong  and  ambitious  states  would  never  accept  adverse 
decisions  in  matters  of  great  moment,  and  in  short  that 
sinister  interests  must  in  the  long  run  prevail  against 
any  tendency  on  the  part  of  nations  to  work  together 
for  the  common  good.  In  addition  it  is  asserted  that 
no  effective  means  of  enforcing  the  decrees  of  inter- 
national tribunals  can  be  established  without  general 
disarmament  and  the  creation  of  an  International  Police 
Force  under  the  orders  of  some  central  authority  which 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  173 

does  not  exist  and  could  not  be  called  into  being  without 
first  doing  what  is  admitted  to  be  impracticable  and 
creating  one  great  World-State.  We  shall,  I  think, 
find  on  examination  that  some  of  these  so-called  im- 
possibilities have  been  recently  performed,  and  others 
can  be  attempted  with  every  prospect  of  success  by 
developments  and  combinations  of  institutions  already 
in  existence. 

If  this  be  so,  our  League  of  Nations  will  prove  to  be 
but  a  further  step  in  the  gradual  evolution  of  inter- 
national society.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that 
every  effort  should  be  made  to  give  it  this  character,  not 
only  in  appearance  but  in  reality.  Nothing  could  be 
more  fatal  than  to  represent  it  as  a  wonderful  device 
which  will  cure,  by  brand  new  remedies,  a  large  part  of 
the  evils  which  afflict  humanity,  and  has  been  perfected 
on  the  spur  of  the  moment  in  the  minds  of  modern 
champions  of  democracy  as  far  superior  in  character 
and  ability  to  the  statesmen  of  past  epochs  as  is  the 
plan  itself  to  the  international  chaos  that  preceded  it. 
The  peoples  of  the  world  shrewdly  suspect  that  there  is 
a  great  deal  of  political  quackery  about,  and  have  no 
fancy  for  being  made  into  its  victims.  But  if  they  can 
be  convinced  that  the  step  they  are  asked  to  take  is  a 
long  stride  forwards  on  a  road  which  the  best  states- 
men and  the  most  progressive  nations  have  been  fol- 
lowing for  generations,  they  may  be  induced  to  brace 
their  nerves  and  muscles  for  the  bound.  Nor  will  they 
be  grievously  disappointed  if  it  does  not  land  them  at 
once  at  the   goal  of  their  efforts.    Instead  they  will  re- 


174  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

joice  if  it  brings  them  perceptibly  nearer,  and  in  the 
meantime  greatly  improves  their  condition;  and  will  be 
quite  content  to  leave  to  their  descendants  both  the  toil 
of  further  progress  and  the  happiness  of  a  nearer 
approach  to  perfection.  The  earlier  half  of  these 
Lectures  will  have  been  written  in  vain,  if  my  read- 
ers are  not  convinced  that  a  very  real  improvement 
in  the  international  order  took  place  during  the  last 
three  centuries,  and  continued  till  its  progress  was  sud- 
denly arrested  by  the  outbreak  of  the  World-War  in 
1 9 14.  I  will  try  now,  at  the  end  of  the  latter  half,  to 
shew  how  this  improvement  may  be  continued  at  a 
greatly  accelerated  pace  by  advancing  on  the  old  lines. 
We  need  not  fear  to  innovate;  but  we  must  take 
care  that  the  innovations  are  developments  of  plans 
and  principles  that  have  already  stood  the  test  of 
experience. 

Surely  there  is  nothing  strange  or  revolutionary 
about  a  League.  There  have  been  such  things  since 
the  beginning  of  recorded  history.  Latterly  one  has 
been  growing  up  as  big  as  civilisation  itself;  for  what 
is  the  Society  of  Nations  but  a  League  of  Nations, 
though  it  does  not  go  by  that  name?  We  have  seen 
that  it  has  gradually  become  self-conscious  through  the 
machinery  of  Congresses  and  Conferences  ever  in- 
creasing in  the  numbers  of  the  states  represented  and 
widening  in  the  scope  of  the  business  transacted.  At 
last  in  the  Hague  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907  it 
evolved  an  organ  for  making  something  analogous  to 
laws  for  the  whole  Society.     In  order  to  create  an 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  175 

effective  League  of  Nations  we  must  substitute  for  the 
mere  understanding,  reached  in  1907,  that  Hague  Con- 
ferences should  meet  every  seven  or  eight  years,1  a 
formal  international  agreement,  that  all  civilised  pow- 
ers who  are  willing  to  sign  a  great  World-Treaty  to 
that  effect  shall  organise  themselves  according  to  its 
terms  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  general  peace  on 
a  basis  of  justice  and  mutual  concession.  This  having 
been  done,  the  all-important  question  will  arise  what 
should  be  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  or  in  other  words 
what  shall  be  the  Constitution  of  the  League.  We 
cannot  attempt  here  to  draw  up  a  draft  treaty;  but  the 
chief  points  to  be  dealt  with  in  it  may  be  indicated  and 
briefly  discussed. 

The  first  is  concerned  with  the  machinery  for  set- 
tling disputes  without  war.  Directly  this  is  mentioned 
the  word  Arbitration  seems  at  once  to  suggest  itself, 
which  certainly  would  not  have  happened  a  hundred 
years  ago,  a  fact  which  bears  convincing  witness  to  the 
marvellous  advance  of  pacific  ideas  and  pacific  methods 
within  the  last  century.2  It  is  now,  however,  generally 
admitted  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  international 
disputes,  one  specially  suited  for  submission  to  Arbitral 
Tribunals  and  the  other  requiring  a  different  method. 
These  have  been  distinguished  as  Justiciable  and  non- 
Justiciable  differences.  The  justiciable  cases  are  those 
which  arise  out  of  disputed  interpretations  of  treaties 

1  Final  Act  of  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907,  Vau  4.  See  also 
ante,  pp.  69,  70. 

*  See  Lecture  III,  pp.  72-76. 


176  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

and  commonly  received  rules  of  International  Law,  or 
disagreements  as  to  facts  and  the  legal  consequences  of 
admitted  facts.  The  non-justiciable  cases  are  those 
that  lie  outside  the  scope  of  accepted  legal  rules  or 
solemn  agreements  which  have  to  be  interpreted  on 
legal  principles,  and  are  concerned  with  national  aspira- 
tions, ambitions  and  grievances,  the  clash  of  dynastic 
or  economic  interests,  and  the  claims  of  races  and  na- 
tionalities within  a  state  to  international  recognition  and 
a  statehood  of  their  own.  The  former  appeal  to  a 
known  law  controlling  an  accepted  international  order, 
the  latter  involve  a  conviction  on  one  side,  if  not  on 
both,  that  the  law  is  inadequate  and  the  existing  order 
unsatisfactory.  The  former  turn  upon  the  proper 
application  of  legal  rules  or  the  clearing  up  of  doubts 
as  to  matters  of  fact,  the  latter  upon  the  advisability  of 
changing  the  law  or  modifying  the  existing  order.  The 
former  require  for  their  settlement  deep  knowledge 
of  International  Law  and  sound  judgment  in  its  appli- 
cation, the  latter  skilful  statesmanship,  penetrating  in- 
sight, and  wide  sympathy.  A  reference  to  one  or  two 
historical  instances  will  make  this  distinction  clear.  The 
long  controversy  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  over  the  Newfoundland  Fisheries  was  justiciable 
because  it  turned  on  the  true  meaning  of  Article  I  of 
the  Treaty  of  1 8 1 8  between  the  two  countries,  and  the 
rules  of  International  Law  applicable  to  the  circum- 
stances that  had  arisen  in  the  fishing  area.  On  the  other 
hand  the  dispute  of  191 1  between  Italy  and  Turkey 
over  Tripoli  was  non-justiciable  because  it  arose  out  of 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  177 

a  demand  on  the  part  of  Italy  that  the  Sultan  should 
cede  to  her  a  portion  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  in- 
volved the  moral  rather  than  legal  question  whether 
chronic  and  hopeless  misgovernment  on  the  part  of 
one  power  can  justify  another  in  setting  aside  a  legal 
title. 

It  follows  from  what  has  just  been  stated  that  for 
the  settlement  of  justiciable  disputes  we  require  as  near 
an  approach  to  a  Law  Court  as  can  be  obtained  in  the 
present  state  of  international  relations;  while  for  non- 
justiciable cases  a  small  Committee  composed  of  men 
of  tried  statesmanship,  penetrating  insight  and  wide 
sympathy,  would  give  the  best  chance  of  satisfactory 
solutions.  The  contemplated  League  of  Nations 
should  therefore  provide  both.  The  performance  of 
the  first  half  of  the  task,  which  is  concerned  with  the 
provision  of  Arbitral  Tribunals,  need  not  be  very 
difficult.  We  have  but  to  start  where  the  Hague  Con- 
ference of  1907  left  off,1  and  complete  the  organisation 
of  the  Judicial  Arbitration  Court,  which  was  abandoned 
unfinished  then  because  of  the  impossibility  of  inducing 
some  of  the  smaller  states  to  accept  anything  less  than 
absolute  equality  with  the  greatest  in  the  composition 
of  the  Court.  Various  ingenious  ways  of  overcoming 
this  difficulty  have  been  proposed  since,  among  the 
most  hopeful  being  the  election  of  the  judges  by  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  powers  who  become  members  of 
the  League.  Given  the  good-will  which  is  a  condition 
precedent  of  any  advance,  it  ought  not  to  be  very  diffi- 

1  See  ante,  pp.  75,  76. 


178  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

cult  to  create  the  permanent  High  Court  of  Arbitral 
Justice  which  is  wanted.  But  the  use  of  it  should  not 
be  made  obligatory  at  first.  What  must  be  insisted  on 
is  that  all  the  members  of  the  League  shall  refer  all 
the  justiciable  disputes  they  cannot  settle  between  them- 
selves to  an  Arbitral  Court  of  some  kind  and  abide  by 
its  decision.  This  is  essential.  Without  it  we  shall  not 
have  made  any  real  advance.  But  whether  the  tribunal 
be  the  so-called  Permanent  Arbitral  Court  established 
at  the  Hague  Conference  of  1899,  or  the  new  and 
really  permanent  Court  that  has  yet  to  be  created,  or  a 
Court  established  for  the  occasion  by  special  agreement 
between  the  parties  concerned,  is  a  matter  of  compara- 
tive indifference.  At  first  submission  to  judicial  pro- 
cess may  be  rendered  easier  by  the  knowledge  that  the 
disputants  have  a  choice  of  tribunals,  and  can  even 
make  their  own.  But  doubtless  after  a  time  the  powers 
will  be  convinced  of  the  superior  advantages  of  a  Court 
"  freely  and  easily  accessible,  composed  of  judges  repre- 
senting the  various  judicial  systems  of  the  world,  and 
capable  of  insuring  continuity  in  arbitral  jurisprudence.1 
When  this  occurs  all  cases  will  naturally  find  their  way 
to  the  tribunal  best  qualified  to  deal  with  them;  and  it 
will  stand  alone  as  the  judicial  organ  of  international 
society,  or  possibly  it  may  become  a  great  Arbitral 
Appeal  Court,  fully  occupied  with  hearing  important 
issues  brought  up  to  it  from  inferior  tribunals,  which 
will  have  been  created  to  act  as  Courts  of  First  Instance 

1  Draft  Hague   Convention  of   1907  Relative  to  the   Creation   of   a 
Judicial  Arbitration  Court,  Art.  1. 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  179 

and  to  settle  smaller  matters.  We  may  be  quite  sure 
that  if  once  a  system  of  International  Courts  is  made 
to  work  successfully  it  will  develop  rapidly. 

We  have  now  to  consider  how  the  non-justiciable 
cases  can  be  met.  They  would  prove  in  practice  more 
difficult  than  the  others  because  as  a  rule  they  stir  the 
passions  of  nations  far  more  deeply.  But  even  with 
regard  to  them  we  need  not  despair  of  creating  means 
of  peaceful  settlement  on  the  lines  of  the  development 
of  existing  institutions.  They,  or  rather  some  of  them, 
have  been  dealt  with  in  recent  years,  though  the  pro- 
cedure has  not  been  so  definite  or  the  method  so  simple 
as  in  justiciable  disputes.  For  a  century  or  so  there 
has  existed  a  somewhat  nebulous  body,  called  the  Con- 
cert of  Europe,  whose  growth  and  functions  were 
briefly  described  in  the  second  Lecture.1  We  saw  there 
that  the  Six  Great  Powers  of  Europe  exercised  for  a 
long  time  a  somewhat  vague  and  ill-defined  supervision 
over  changes  in  the  international  order  of  Europe,  espe- 
cially though  not  exclusively  in  matters  connected  with 
the  slow  dissolution  of  the  Turkish  Empire.  We  saw 
further  that  during  the  last  generation  the  group  of 
Great  Powers  has  been  enlarged  by  the  addition  of  two 
Non-European  States — America  and  Japan.  Thus  the 
Concert  of  Europe  grew  into  a  World-Concert,  but 
only  for  some  purposes  which  may  be  roughly  described 
as  world-purposes.  International  difficulties  which 
were  purely  European  in  character  were  dealt  with  as 
before.     For  instance,  in  19 12  the  European  Concert 

1  See  ante,  pp.  39-42. 


i8o  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

took  in  hand  the  questions  connected  with  the  first 
Balkan  War,  and  endeavoured  to  settle  them  in  such  a 
way  as  to  avoid  a  general  struggle.  In  this  it  succeeded, 
but  only  for  a  short  time.  A  second  Balkan  War  broke 
out  in  19 13,  largely  because  Austria  backed  by  Germany 
instigated  Bulgaria  to  quarrel  with  its  allies,  and  thus 
brought  about  the  act  of  bad  faith  which  inaugurated 
the  fratricidal  conflict.  After  a  short  and  merciless 
struggle  it  resulted  in  the  utter  defeat  of  Bulgaria, 
and  was  ended  quickly  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest, 
which  was  practically  dictated  by  the  Central  Powers 
in  flagrant  defiance  of  the  principle  of  Nationality. 
Then  violence  and  intrigue  took  the  place  of  honest 
diplomacy.  Events  rushed  on  with  terrific  impact  to  a 
fearful  catastrophe.  All  attempts  on  the  part  of  Vis- 
count Grey  of  Falloden  to  revive  the  Concert  of 
Europe  and  use  it  as  peace-maker  were  foiled  by  the 
deliberate  purpose  of  Germany.  The  lesser  Concert 
perished  in  the  turmoil  of  a  world-wide  conflict  in 
which  its  leading  members  took  opposite  sides;  and 
with  it  fell  the  World-Concert  also. 

Undoubtedly  this  brief  recital  does  not  encourage 
us  to  think  that  we  can  find  ready  made  to  our  hands 
in  the  Concert  of  Europe  or  in  the  World-Concert  a 
satisfactory  means  of  settling  those  deep-seated  inter- 
national quarrels  which  are  not  susceptible  of  judicial 
treatment.  But  it  does  show  that  in  the  course  of  ages 
the  Society  of  Nations  has  thrown  up  an  organ,  how- 
ever rudimentary  in  structure  and  imperfect  in  action, 
for  dealing  with  such  cases.    Moreover  this  organ  did 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  181 

sometimes  give  results  which,  if  not  ideally  perfect,  at 
least  prevented  terrible  wars  and  modified  existing 
arrangements  in  the  direction  of  righteousness.  This 
was  the  case  when  in  1867  Luxemburg  was  neutralised 
and  Italy  raised  to  the  rank  of  a  Great  Power,  and 
when  in  1882  the  pressure  of  the  Powers  induced 
Turkey  to  cede  Thessalian  territory  to  Greece.  And  in 
our  own  time  we  have  seen  the  outbreak  of  war  over 
the  Morocco  Question  prevented  in  1900  by  the  Alge- 
ciras  Conference,  which  was  the  work  of  the  Great 
Powers,  and  the  first  Balkan  War  brought  to  an  end 
in  1913  by  the  Concert  of  Europe.  These  are  no 
mean  achievements,  though  they  might  have  been 
greatly  improved  upon.  Putting  matters  as  low  as 
possible  they  shew  that  a  Committee  acting  informally 
as  representing  the  whole  body  of  civilised  states  can 
find  tolerable  solutions  of  difficult  international  prob- 
lems, and  that  power  in  the  hands  of  those  who  arrive 
at  the  solution  is  as  essential  to  its  success  as  the  justice 
of  the  solution  itself.  What  the  world  needs  is  a 
reform  of  the  Committee  which  will  make  it  really  and 
formally  representative  of  the  whole  Society  of  Nations, 
while  at  the  same  time  there  shall  stand  behind  it, 
ready  to  be  called  into  action  if  needed,  the  organised 
force  of  the  entire  community.  If  the  states  of  civilised 
humanity  were  bound  together  in  a  great  League  such 
as  we  have  contemplated,  it  should  be  possible  to  secure 
by  election  a  competent  Committee  to  deal  with  all 
cases  that  may  arise,  or  a  series  of  competent  Commit- 
tees each  elected  ad  hoc  for  its  own  particular  case. 


1 82  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

But  it  seems  to  me  that  unless  some  position  of  advan- 
tage on  the  Committee  or  Committees  is  reserved  for 
the  Great  World-Powers,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  pre- 
dominant force  would  always  be  available  to  support, 
if  necessary,  the  decisions  arrived  at.  Yet  unless  this 
union  of  irresistible  force  with  impartial  justice  can  be 
established  and  maintained,  the  new  order  will  break, 
down,  like  the  old,  in  a  welter  of  bloodshed  and  misery. 
It  subsists  more  or  less  completely  in  every  decently 
governed  state  as  far  as  the  relations  of  individuals  are 
concerned.  Why  should  it  be  deemed  impossible  in  the 
relations  of  states?  Given  the  will  to  install  right 
as  the  arbiter  of  international  disputes  the  way  seems 
fairly  obvious. 

But  we  must  remember  that  nothing  can  be  done 
unless  states  shoulder  the  obligation  of  enforcing  Inter- 
national Law.  If  they  are  willing  to  add  this  to  the 
duty  already  incumbent  on  them  of  obeying  its  rules 
themselves,  it  follows  that  our  contemplated  League  of 
Nations  must  contain  provisions  for  coercing  recalci- 
trant rr.embers.  There  are  economic  and  social  means 
of  brnging  pressure  to  bear,  and  we  may  confidently 
hope  that  a  resort  to  armed  force  will  be  rarely,  if 
ever,  required.  But  the  force  must  be  there,  because 
without  it,  and  the  fixed  intention  of  using  it  in  the  last 
resort,  all  other  means  will  be  valueless.  A  powerful 
and  unscrupulous  state  could  compel  their  abandonment 
by  a  vigorous  use  of  its  own  forces.  As  soon  as  this 
was  done  the  whole  machinery  of  the  League  would  be 
thrown  out  of  gear  and  become  useless,  just  as  the 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  183 

social  order  within  a  state  would  collapse  beneath  the 
onslaught  of  armed  brigands  if  the  authorities  had  no 
police  and  no  troops  to  use  against  them.  Whether  the 
force  necessary  to  secure  obedience  to  the  decisions  of 
the  League's  Tribunals  should  be  a  kind  of  sea  and 
land  police  under  the  direct  orders  of  the  chief  tribunal, 
or  whether  it  should  consist  of  contingents  called  up 
from  each  of  the  member  states  according  to  some  plan 
agreed  upon  at  the  beginning,  is  one  of  those  problems 
which  should  be  left  to  the  statesmen  and  jurists  who 
will  have  to  work  out  the  details  of  the  League's  con- 
stitution. Civilised  mankind  will  do  well  to  trust  much 
to  such  experts.  The  problems  to  be  solved  are  far 
too  complicated  for  the  average  citizen  to  deal  with, 
ignorant  as  he  must  necessarily  be  of  historical  and 
technical  details.  He  should  be  content  to  insist  on  a 
few  great  principles,  and  this  he  must  do  with  no 
uncertain  voice.  If  he  shews  that  he  is  in  earnest  and 
will  take  no  denial,  trained  and  experienced  masters  of 
state-craft  and  law-craft  will  do  his  behests  far  better 
than  he  could  do  them  himself.  But  he  must  be  recon- 
ciled to  the  certainty  that  at  first  their  work  will  be 
neither  complete  nor  perfect.  I  trust  they  will  not  at- 
tempt to  provide  beforehand  for  every  contingency  that 
the  mind  of  man  can  conceive.  This  is  not  the  way  the 
great  contributions  to  human  progress  in  the  sphere  of 
government  are  made.  There  would  have  been  no 
British  Parliament  if  Edward  I  and  his  advisers  had 
endeavoured  to  think  out  and  provide  for  all  the  prob- 
lems of  representation  and  control  which  have  since 


1 84  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

arisen.  Even  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has 
received  several  amendments,  and  will  no  doubt  re- 
ceive in  due  time  many  more.  It  has  also  been  modified 
in  several  respects  by  the  almost  imperceptible  growth 
of  political  custom,  as  for  instance  with  regard  to  the 
election  of  the  President.  What  happens  in  the  growth 
of  institutions  is  that  from  time  to  time  a  great  step 
forward  is  made  consciously,  and  sometimes  by  a 
mighty  effort  and  with  much  misgiving.  Generally  the 
impelling  force  has  been  the  wish  to  escape  from  some 
calamity  or  secure  some  ardently  desired  benefit,  often 
both  combined.  Then,  when  that  immediate  end  has 
been  attained  with  more  or  less  completeness,  the  new 
institution  has  been  slowly  improved  and  developed 
by  the  wisdom  of  succeeding  generations  who  have  met 
their  difficulties  with  new  devices  suited  to  the  circum- 
stances of  their  own  times.  So  we  may  hope  it  will  be 
with  the  League  of  Nations.  It  will  be  constituted  to 
deliver  humanity  from  the  scourge  of  war,  or  at  least 
to  diminish  its  frequency  and  its  terrors.  If  it  succeeds 
in  doing  this  to  any  considerable  extent,  it  will  be  so 
precious  to  the  nations  that  they  will  not  permit  it  to 
succumb  to  any  of  the  dangers  that  will  undoubtedly 
beset  its  path.  Instead  they  will  provide  means  of 
providing  against  them  as  they  arise,  and  thus  gradually 
perfect  the  machinery  of  the  League,  sometimes  in  ways 
which  do  not  now  come  within  the  scope  of  our  vision. 
To  gain  the  greatest  results  in  the  long  run  we  must  not 
ask  too  much  at  first.  We  must  be  content  with  deliv- 
erance from  the  evils  that  have  well-nigh  overwhelmed 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  185 

us  in  these  last  terrible  years.  But  we  must  take  care 
that  the  deliverance  is  thorough  as  far  as  it  goes;  and 
this  it  will  not  be  unless  it  provides  for  the  enforcement 
of  the  rules  of  the  League  by  all  the  might  of  its 
members. 

It  is  necessary  also  to  secure  that  any  force  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  the  final  authority  in  the  League 
shall  be  sufficient  for  the  purposes  in  view.  This  means 
in  practice  that  no  member  should  be  permitted  to 
amass  armaments  at  its  own  will  and  pleasure,  and  that 
a  proportional  reduction  of  present  armaments  should 
take  place  as  soon  as  possible.  Entire  disarmament  is 
not  desirable,  even  if  it  were  feasible.  Each  state  will 
require  a  force  to  cope  with  internal  disorders,  and 
those  whose  frontiers  march  with  territory  inhabited 
by  peoples  too  barbarous  to  be  members  of  the  League 
will  need  protection  against  their  inroads.  Similarly  at 
sea  trade  will  ask  for  security,  and  security  cannot  be 
obtained  by  merely  proclaiming  it.  Pirates  and  slave- 
traders  understand  no  argument  but  that  of  force.  How 
to  bring  about  proportional  reduction  of  armaments  is 
probably  the  most  difficult  of  all  the  problems  that 
await  solution  if  the  world  is  to  be  organised  for  peace, 
and  not  for  war.  One  thing,  and  one  thing  only,  seems 
quite  clear  in  connection  with  it,  and  that  is  the  absolute 
necessity  of  prohibiting  all  private  trade  in  the  manu- 
facture and  distribution  of  munitions  of  war.  The 
state  alone  should  be  allowed  to  make  and  hold  the 
means  of  deadly  strife.  Beyond  this  nothing  can  be 
said  with  certitude,  save  that  some  way  must  be  found 


1 86  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

for  "  rationing  "  each  state  as  to  the  nature  and  extent 
of  its  preparations  for  war.  The  discovery  of  the  best 
means  should  be  left  to  experts;  and  it  should  be  recog- 
nised that  their  task  must  take  a  long  time,  and  cannot 
be  performed  to  perfection  at  the  first  attempt.  We 
must  be  content  in  this,  as  in  many  other  departments  of 
life  and  conduct,  with  some  tolerable  approach  to  the 
end  in  view. 

We  have  now  seen  that  there  are  four  needs,  the 
satisfaction  of  which  civilised  mankind  should  insist 
upon  in  any  scheme  for  the  creation  of  a  new  and  better 
international  order  whether  by  means  of  a  League  of 
Nations  or  in  some  other  way.  They  are  first  the 
provision  of  Arbitral  Courts  to  deal  with  cases  suscep- 
tible of  judicial  treatment,  secondly  the  establishment 
of  Conciliation  Committees  for  the  settlement  of  cases 
not  capable  of  legal  adjustment,  thirdly  the  organisa- 
tion of  an  international  force  to  be  used  in  the  last 
resort  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  recalcitrant  states 
to  submit  to  the  decisions  of  these  Tribunals  and  Com- 
mittees, and  fourthly  the  proportional  and  simultaneous 
disarmament  of  all  civilised  powers,  saving  only  the 
forces  necessary  to  safeguard  the  social  fabric.  The 
first  of  these  can  be  satisfied  by  carrying  a  little  further 
the  plans  already  formulated  and  in  part  put  into  work- 
ing order  by  the  Hague  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907. 
The  second  could  be  met  by  the  drastic  reform  and  vig- 
orous development  of  the  system  of  the  Concert  of 
Europe  and  the  World-Concert  which  has  had  a  rudi- 
mentary and  precarious  existence  for  several  genera- 
tions. In  dealing  with  the  third  we  may  obtain  valuable 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  187 

hints  from  the  few  occasions  when  an  international 
force  was  used  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  a  state 
which  defied  the  Concert  of  Europe.  As  to  the  fourth 
there  are  no  precedents;  but  proposals  pointing  to 
partial  disarmament  have  been  made  by  responsible 
rulers  on  several  occasions,  and  as  late  as  1907  the 
Second  Hague  Conference  passed  unanimously  a  reso- 
lution to  the  effect  that  the  serious  examination  by  the 
powers  of  the  question  of  the  restriction  of  military 
charges  was  eminently  desirable.  All  these  are  directly 
concerned  with  the  organisation  and  work  of  the 
League. 

But  in  addition  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  provision 
for  the  revision  of  its  activities  from  time  to  time,  and 
also  for  the  improvement  and  extension  of  the  Inter- 
national Law  under  which  it  must  live  and  which  its 
Courts  will  have  to  administer.  For  this  something  in 
the  nature  of  a  Legislative  Assembly  will  be  required; 
and  the  nations  already  possess  the  germ  of  one  in  the 
Hague  Conference.  Many  reforms  are  needed  both  in 
its  constitution  and  in  its  procedure.  But  it  has  not  to 
be  created.  There  it  stands,  ready  for  adjustment  to 
the  needs  of  the  new  epoch. 

Here  then  we  have  our  answer  to  those  who  parade 
before  us  their  pet  bogie  of  impracticability.  Some  of 
the  things  that  require  to  be  done  have  been  accom- 
plished already.  Others  have  come  near  to  accomplish- 
ment. The  experience  of  the  past  is  full  of  guidance 
for  the  future.  A  little  more  courage,  a  little  more  con- 
fidence in  humankind,  a  little  more  faith  in  God  and 
goodness,    and   the   field   is   won.    The    Faint-hearts 


1 88  THE  SOCIETY  OF  NATIONS 

always  start  some  new  scare  when  the  terror  of  the  first 
is  removed.  They  now  whisper  with  bated  breath, 
"  Look  at  the  Holy  Alliance.  That  was  a  League,  and 
it  became  the  instrument  of  a  gang  of  despots  for  the 
purpose  of  riveting  the  yoke  of  autocracy  on  the 
peoples."  From  this  they  ask  us  to  infer  that  a  League 
of  Nations  must  come  to  a  like  end,  which  is  much  the 
same  as  pointing  to  an  unhappy  marriage,  and  using 
it  as  an  argument  against  the  institution  of  matrimony. 
The  League  of  Nations,  if  established,  will  become 
what  its  members  want  it  to  become.  Its  future  must 
rest  with  them.  Then  we  are  solemnly  warned  of  the 
danger  of  admitting  Germany  into  the  League,  as  if 
her  permanent  exclusion  would  not  stultify  the  whole 
project,  and  give  mankind,  instead  of  one  great  organi- 
sation for  maintaining  peace,  two  hostile  groups  con- 
stantly plotting  against  each  other  and  preparing  for 
the  inevitable  struggle.  It  may  well  be  that  the  condi- 
tions of  admission  for  Germany  should  differ  greatly 
according  to  her  state  of  mind  and  mode  of  govern- 
ment at  the  time;  but  if  she  must  be  forced  at  all  it 
would  be  far  better  to  force  her  in  than  to  bar  her  out. 
A  repentant  and  regenerated  Germany  would  be  a 
valuable  recruit  for  the  brotherhood  of  nations;  and  a 
sullen  and  angry  Germany  would  be  much  more  effi- 
ciently restrained  within  the  League  than  outside. 

We  come  back  at  the  end  to  what  we  have  constantly 
asserted  throughout.  The  problem  before  us  is  at 
bottom  moral  and  spiritual.  There  is  no  real  security 
for  a  better  and  nobler  international  society  save  the 
ennoblement  of  the  thoughts  and  desires  of  men.    The 


REBUILDING  OF  SOCIETY  189 

best  constitutional  machinery  in  the  world  will  not 
produce  good  results  if  the  citizens  who  work  it  are 
base  and  ignorant  nor  will  the  most  ably-devised 
scheme  for  a  League  of  Nations  give  to  tortured 
humanity  the  peace  and  security  it  longs  for  if  the 
nations  themselves  still  cling  to  their  old  jealousies  and 
schemes  for  mutual  disservice.  The  more  democratic 
the  form  of  government  in  the  separate  states,  the  more 
completely  will  the  nature  of  their  international  activi- 
ties depend  on  the  moral  standard  of  their  peoples. 
There  is  need  therefore  as  political  liberty  extends  of 
developing  to  the  full  that  feeling  of  human  brother- 
hood which  is  the  great  antidote  to  the  poison  of 
national  hate.  This  feeling  finds  its  home  chiefly  in  the 
Church  and  in  the  Labour  Movement.  The  union  of 
the  two  in  a  demand  for  a  League  of  Nations  would 
make  it  irresistible,  and  at  the  came  time  purify  it  from 
all  ignoble  elements.  Before  the  dim  inarticulate  peo- 
ples would  arise  a  vision  of  world-righteousness  and 
world-peace.  Then  in  a  flash  they  would  realise  that 
only  the  golden  rule  of  Christ  can  bring  the  golden 
age  of  man.  And  what  they  see  to-day  they  will  ob- 
tain to-morrow;  for 

The  dreams  which  nations  dream  come  true 

And  shape  the  world  anew. 
.......        t.i 

And  down  the  happy  future  runs  a  flood 

Of  prophesying  light; 
It  shews  an  earth  no  longer  stained  with  blood, 
Blossom  and  fruit  where  now  we  see  the  bud 

Of  brotherhood  and  right.1 

1  Lowell. 


INDEX 


Abu-Bekr:  102. 
Adriatic:  126. 
Aerschot:  98. 
Africa:  7,  38,  165. 
Air:  conquest  of,  and  its  perver- 
sion, 133,  134. 
Alexander  the  Great:  160. 
Alfred  the  Great:  144. 
Algeciras  Conference:  181. 
Algeria:  38. 

America:  34-37,  126,  150. 
Arbitral  Tribunals:  175-177,  186. 
Armenia:  19,  103. 
Asiatic  States:  8,  35,  38,  41,  67,  68. 
Atlantic:  130,  132. 
Attila:  102. 
Australia:  7. 
Austria:  28,  39,  41,  90,  180. 


B 


Charlemagne:  12. 

China:  8. 

Christian    Morality:    22,    26,    27, 

188,  189. 
Christian  of  Brunswick:  18. 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty:  164. 
Clemenceau,  M.:  161. 
Combatants  and  Non-combatants: 

the    distinction,    121,     122;     its 

tendency  to  vanish,  122-124. 
Conciliation  Committees:  144,  181, 

182,  186. 
Congresses:     of     Osnaburg     and 

Miinster,  56-58;  of  Vienna,   56, 

60-62;   of  Aix-la-Chapelle,   56; 

of   Paris,    56,    61 ;    of   Ryswick, 

59 ;  of  Utrecht,  59. 
Constantine  the  Great:  12. 
Caesar  Borgia:  95. 
Constantinople:  23. 
Contraband  of  War:  84. 
Crimean  War:  56. 


Balkan  Peninsula:  3. 

Balkan  Wars:  180,  181. 

Baltic:  126. 

Belgium:    German    atrocities    in, 

88,    96-105;    its    neutralisation, 

89-94. 
Below,  Von:  92. 
Bernhardi:  18,  115. 
Bernstorff,  Count  Von:  119. 
Biology:  18. 
Blockade:  84. 
Bologna:  23. 

Brest-Litovsk,  Treaty  of:  103. 
Bristol,  University  of:  1. 
British  Parliament:  183. 
Bruges:  98. 

Brussels:  66,  92,  93,  98. 
Bulgarian  People:  3. 


D 


Declaration:  of  Paris,  56,  61,  62; 
of  St.  Petersburg,  65 ;  of  Lon- 
don, 83,  84. 

Denmark:  126. 

Dinant:  98. 

Diplomatic  Representatives:  rank 
of,  6. 

Dumba,  Dr.:  119. 


Edward  I:  183. 

Egypt:  160. 

Europe:  22,  33,  35-38,  65-67,  68. 


Canning,  George:  36 
Canon  Law:  22-26. 


Family  of  Nations:  6,  33,  39. 
France:  36,  38,  39,  90,  101-103. 
Freiburg:  no. 


191 


192 


INDEX 


Geneva  Arbitration:  72,  73. 

Geneva  Conventions:  64,  108. 

Gentilis,  Albericus:  28,  29. 

Gerard,  Ambassador:  147. 

Germany:  her  bad  faith  in  the 
world-war,  18,  91-94,  nj,  116, 
149;  her  barbarity,  18,  96-115, 
122,  137,  150;  her  enslavement 
of  civilians,  19,  100,  101 ;  her 
cruelty  to  prisoners  of  war,  19, 
no;  her  bombing  of  popula- 
tions and  hospitals,  19,  105, 
108 ;  her  U-boat  warfare,  20, 
106-109,  124,  131-133;  her  at- 
tacks on  neutral  vessels,  20,  21, 
ill,  112,  124;  diminution  of 
number  of  states  in  her,  34; 
a  Great  Power,  41 ;  her  doc- 
drine  of  Kriegsraison,  86,  98; 
her  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality, 91-95;  the  doom  of  her 
militarism,  150,  151;  her  place 
in  a  regenerated  Society  of  Na- 
tions, 151,  188. 

German  War  Book:  104. 

Ghent:  99. 

Great  Britain:  36,  38,  39,  72,  89, 
130,  164,  176,  180. 

Great  Powers:  39-42,  67,  179-182. 

Great  Publicists:  nature  and  lim- 
its of  their  authority,  51-53; 
importance  and  extent  of  their 
work,  52,  53. 

Greece:  10,  13,  17,  181. 

Greek  People:  3,  10. 

Gregory  XIII:  24. 

Grey  of  Falloden,  Viscount:  167, 
168,  180. 

Grotius,  Hugo:  brief  biography 
of,  29-31;  his  theory  of  Nat- 
ural Law,  43;  his  appeal  to  the 
consent  of  nations,  44;  his  re- 
spect for  customary  rules,  42, 
48;  his  championship  of  mare 
apertum,  127. 


H 


Hague  Conferences:  8,  34,  38,  66, 

68,  7',  73-78,  83,  84,  174,  175. 
Hague  Reglemenl ;  99-101,  122. 


Hapsburg,  House  of:  13,  33. 

Hawaii:  38. 

Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty:  164. 

Herod  the  Great:  II. 

Hobbes,  Thomas:  45,  46. 

Holland:  114,  120. 

Holland,  Professor  Sir  T.  E.:  28. 

Holy  Alliance:  36. 

Holy  Roman  Empire:  12,  13. 

Hospital  Ships:  108. 


I 


India:  38,  127,  160. 

Indo-China:  38. 

International  Arbitration:  its  his- 
tory, 72-76;  Courts  of,  144,  145. 

International  Custom:  22,  25,  26. 

International  Law:  requires  a 
plurality  of  States  and  inter- 
course between  them,  6,  7; 
sprang  up  among  Christian 
powers,  8,  12,  13  ;  rudiments  of, 
10;  nature  of,  28;  based  on 
general  consent,  58,  59;  its  par- 
tial overthrow,  87;  its  rules  of 
capture  at  sea,  107;  forbids 
War  Zones,  113,  114;  part  of 
it  still  standing,  87,  118;  its  re- 
construction,   120,    145,    155-158. 

International  Police  Force:  172, 
182,  183. 

International  Prize  Court:  41,  84. 

International  Rivers:  60. 

Italy:  3,  41,  95,  176,  177,  181. 


Japan:  8,  41,  179. 
Jenkins,  Sir  Leoline:  54. 

K 

Kaiser,  The:  103,  116,  147,  148. 
Kriegsraison,  Doctrine  of:  86,  98, 

104,  117. 
Kultur :  102. 


Laws  of  War  at  Sea:  their  recent 
growth,  82,  83 ;  disregard  of 
them  by  Germany,  117. 


INDEX 


193 


Laws  of  War  on  Land:  their 
growth,  79-82 ;  attempts  to 
codify,  by  Dr.  Lieber,  79;  a 
Brussels  Conference,  79;  the 
Institute  of  International  Law, 
80;  the  Hague  Conferences,  80- 
82;  disregard  of  them  by  Ger- 
many, 117. 

League  of  Nations:  description  of, 
159-162;  not  destructive  of 
State  sovereignty,  162-171;  not 
impracticable,  172-187;  must 
enforce  International  Law  and 
the  decisions  of  International 
Tribunals,  182-186;  must  re- 
duce armaments,  185-187;  re- 
quires periodically  a  Legisla- 
tive Assembly,  187;  must  work 
on  accepted  lines,  186;  cannot 
succeed  without  a  living  faith 
in  human  brotherhood,  188,  189. 

Liege:  92. 

Lincoln,  President:  79. 

London:  no. 

Louvain:  98,  100. 

Lueder,  Professor:  104. 

Luxemberg:  181. 

M 

Macaulay:  22. 

Machiavelli:  his  separation  of 
Statecraft  from  morality,  14, 
15;  its  results,  15,  16,  18;  the 
revolt  against  it,  21. 

Mahomet:  102. 

Mahomet  II :  23. 

Mansfeld:  18. 

Maritime  Codes:  54. 

Marshall,  Chief  Justice:  55. 

Milton:  20,  21. 

Monroe  Doctrine:  35,  36. 

Montenegro:  130. 


N 


Napoleon:  160. 

Nations:    how    they    differ    from 

States,  2-5. 
Natural  Law:  29,  49,  50. 
Natural  Reason:  29. 
Naval  Conference  of  London:  83. 
Negotiation,  Peace  by:  146,  147. 


Neutrality,  Law  of:  disregard  of 
it,  118,  125-133. 

Newfoundland  Fisheries:  176. 

New  World:  its  place  in  the  So- 
ciety of  Nations,  34-37. 

Nietzsche:  115. 

Norway:  120,  126. 

O 

Oxford:  23,  28,  82,  83. 


Pan-American  Union:  37. 

Paris:  23,  56. 

Paris,  Treaty  of   (1856)  :  8. 

Peace  Conference:  152-154. 

Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration: 
74- 

Persia:  8. 

Philippine  Islands:  38. 

Poland:  2,  3,  19,  103. 

Pope,  The:  crowns  Charlemagne, 
12;  claims  supremacy  over 
Emperor,  13;  loses  much  of  his 
authority,  13;  his  decrees  help 
to  form  Canon  Law,  24;  at- 
tacks wrecking,  126. 

Porto  Rico:  38. 

Portugal :  127. 

Prize  Courts:  54,  55,  107. 

Prize  Crews:  107. 

Prussia:  39,  90,  168. 

Puffendorf,  Samuel:  short  biog-. 
raphy  of,  44;  differs  from 
Grotius,  44-46;  his  theory  of 
the  personality  of  States,  47. 


Queen  Elizabeth:  28. 


Reformation:  13,  14,  54. 

Renaissance:  14,  54. 

Reprisals:  110-113,  n6,  117. 

Rhineland :  92,  114. 

Roman  Church:  27. 

Roman  Law:  17,  22-24,  125,  127. 

Rome:   dominion   of,    5,    6,    n-13, 

125. 
Russia:  36,  39,  41,  90,  103. 


194 


INDEX 


Scott,  Sir  William  (afterwards 
Lord  Stowell)  :  54-55. 

Serbia:  19,  103,  114. 

Siam:  8. 

Slave  Trade:  61,  166. 

Slavonic  Peoples:  3. 

Society  of  Nations:  its  gradual 
growth,  1 ;  imperfection  of  its 
name,  2,  5;  prerequisites  of  its 
existence,  5-9;  revival  of  it  in 
seventeenth  century,  17,  27;  its 
extent  then,  32;  its  simplifica- 
tion and  amplification  since,  34, 
38;  its  unity,  35,  36,  38;  grades 
in  it,  39-41 ;  Wolff's  theory  of 
it  as  a  civitas  maxima,  48,  49 ; 
its  use  of  express  as  well  as 
tacit  consent,  56,  57,  63,  64;  its 
inclusion  of  civilized  mankind, 
68 ;  its  position,  prospects  and 
defects,  in  1914,  84-86,  143-145; 
its  special  dangers  now,  121- 
141 ;  the  choice  before  it,  147- 
150;  methods  of  regeneration, 
151-154,  182-189. 

Spain:  34,  36,  127. 

States:  how  they  differ  from  Na- 
tions, 2-5;  idea  of  common  su- 
perior destroyed,  14,  17;  the 
modern  State,  17,  21,  85,  88. 

State  of  Nature,  theory  of:  44-47- 

Statute  Book  of  the  Law  of  Na- 
tions: 78. 

Suarez,  Francis:  27,  28. 

Sweden:  126. 

Switzerland:  2. 

Syria:  102. 


Tilly:  18. 

Treitschke:  18,  115. 

Tripoli:  176. 

Turkey:  32,  66,  103,  176,  i8r. 

U 

United  States:  35-37,  41,  73,  88, 
89,  116,  132,  164,  176,  179. 

United  States  Naval  War  Col- 
lege: 129. 

Universal  Sovereignty:  n,  12,  17. 

Unneutral  Service:  84. 


V 


Vattel:  his  appeal  to  custom  and 

experience:  50,  51. 
Venice:  126. 
Virginia:  34. 

W 

Wallenstein:  18. 

Washington:  35,  36. 

War  Zones:  113,  114,  131-133. 

Westlake,  Professor:  27. 

Westphalia,  Peace  of:  31,  33,  42, 

59- 
Wilson,    President:    36,    37,    170, 

171. 
Wolff,    Christian:    his    appeal    to 

customary  rules,  48;  his  theory 

of  a  civitas  maxima,  48,  49. 
World-Powers :  8,  67. 


Ypres:  100. 


Territorial  Sovereignty:  9,  17. 
Thirty  Years'  War:  15,  16,  87. 


Zouch,  Dr.:  54. 


DATE  I 


MflV 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL 


AA    001  149  860 


CAYLORD 


IEOINU    S    A 


